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TREADING  WATER  WHILE  CONGRESS  IGNORES
THE  NATION’S  ENVIRONMENT
Sandra Zellmer*
INTRODUCTION
During the late 1960s, the nation’s attention was riveted on graphic
images of contaminated resources, such as smoldering rivers and oil-soaked
seagulls,1 as well as Rachel Carson’s haunting prose about the “strange
blight”2 of chemical pesticides afflicting land, water, and wildlife.  Policymak-
ers recognized the need for strong legal protections for public health and the
environment, and Congress responded with sweeping legislation governing
the pollution of water, air, and soil, and the demise of threatened and endan-
gered species.3
The Clean Water Act of 1972 (CWA), which regulates discharges of pol-
lutants into waters of the United States, is one of the most significant statutes
among this body of legislation.4  Under the CWA and related federal envi-
ronmental legislation, the nation has made tremendous strides in improving
our water quality along with the waste management practices that affect
 2013 Sandra Zellmer.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Robert B. Daugherty Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law.  I am
grateful to my colleagues Eric Berger, Beth Berkstrand–Reid, Richard Moberly, Anna
Shavers, Christal Sheppard, and Catherine Wilson for their insights on a “half-baked”
presentation of this topic, to the University of Denver law faculty for inviting me to do a
colloquium on gridlock, to Professor Robert Glicksman for sharing his insights on the
Clean Water Act and administrative law, and to Professor John Nagle and the Notre Dame
Law Review editors for hosting the Gridlock symposium.  Samantha Staley also deserves
high praise and thanks for her superlative research.
1 See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 59 (2004) (describing
“visually unsettling events” of the 1960s).
2 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 13 (1962).
3 Sandra Zellmer & Robert Glicksman, Improving Water Quality Antidegradation Policies,
3 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (2013).
4 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
(2006) in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 33 U.S.C.) (originally titled Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act).
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water, air, and soil.5  However, since the basic statutory framework was
adopted in the 1970s, there have been many ecological, technological, social,
and political changes in the United States, but Congress has adopted very few
significant amendments, causing some to question whether federal environ-
mental laws have passed their prime.6
In fact, since 1990, Congress has failed to take any meaningful action to
reform our nation’s pollution control laws.  One might understandably think
that the policymaking vacuum in our legislative branch has rendered our
bedrock environmental provisions far less effective than they could be.  Even
when environmental catastrophes have occurred, such as the 2010 blowout of
BP’s Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, Congress has failed to
respond.  The federal agencies have frequently stepped in to fill the regula-
tory gaps.  In reviewing the agencies’ decisions, the federal courts have issued
a variety of proclamations that shape the statutory playing field, sometimes in
ways that Congress may have never anticipated when it adopted the lofty,
environmentally protective statutory goals.
The CWA, in particular, has been a favorite environmental subject of the
Supreme Court.  Since the CWA’s enactment, the Court has issued thirty-four
CWA decisions, which constitutes thirty-four percent of the one hundred
environmental opinions issued from 1972–2012.7  The Clean Air Act is a dis-
tant second, with only twenty-two opinions issued during the same period.8
The Court has reviewed nearly half of the CWA disputes since 1990, includ-
ing cases challenging the jurisdictional scope of the Act as well as the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) enforcement powers and the division
of authority between the EPA and the Corps of Engineers.9
5 See William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a Success?,
55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 569–73 (describing overwhelming evidence of environmental suc-
cesses achieved since the CWA was enacted).
6 See infra Part III.
7 A Westlaw search in the Supreme Court database on Nov. 1, 2012, yielded a total of
one hundred environmental cases issued between 1972–2012 (thirty-four CWA cases;
twenty-two Clean Air Act cases; nineteen National Environmental Policy Act cases; ten
waste management cases; eight Superfund cases; four pesticide cases; and three mining
reclamation cases).  If natural resource and federal public lands cases are included, the
total rises to 123 cases (ten Mining or Mineral Leasing Act cases; eight Endangered Species
Act cases; three Federal Land Policy and Management Act cases; and two National Forest
Management Act cases).  CWA cases constitute twenty-eight percent of the combined total.
For an assessment of the Court’s treatment of environmental cases through 1999, see Rich-
ard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court,
47 UCLA L. Rev. 703 (2000) (concluding that the Court’s apathy towards environmental
law during its first three decades resulted from its failure to appreciate environmental law
as a distinct area of law).
8 See results of Westlaw search, supra note 7. R
9 See infra Part III.  The D.C. Circuit and other federal courts of appeals have also
issued several blockbuster CWA opinions.  See id.  In 2013, two additional Supreme Court
cases were handed down: L.A. Flood Control Dist. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., No. 11-460,
2012 WL 406006, and Decker v. Northwest Env. Def. Center, No. 11-338, 11-347, 2013 WL
1131708.  They are discussed infra Part II.A; Part III.A.
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Congress has failed to respond in a meaningful way to any of the post-
1990 CWA judicial opinions.  In contrast, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a
syncopated yet rhythmic dance took place between the agencies, the federal
courts, and Congress.  Federal agencies, including EPA, would issue regula-
tions to implement the CWA and other keystone environmental statutes, the
courts would resolve challenges to those regulations, in many cases based on
ambiguous statutory language,10 and Congress would subsequently either val-
idate or repudiate the results.  Examples include point source pollution
exemptions, variances for discharges of toxic pollutants, and discharges from
dredge and fill activities.11
Much has changed since the 1970s, and even since 1990.  The bitterly
partisan nature of environmental issues in Congress today suggests that com-
prehensive, thoughtful reforms tailored to the problems faced by modern
society are unlikely.  It is not clear, however, that congressional reticence or
even gridlock is necessarily a bad thing when it comes to environmental law.
Certainly, the physical environment and the tools available for addressing
environmental problems have changed since most of our key statutes, includ-
ing the CWA, were passed, making some existing provisions seem outdated
and inadequate.12  On the other hand, the objectives of the CWA and other
bedrock environmental laws have not changed; if anything, these goals have
become all the more compelling in the twenty-first century.  As a society, we
still expect clean and reliable water resources—an expectation that cannot
be met unless we attain the CWA’s goals of maintaining and restoring the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waterways.13  Yet if
today’s Congress were to take up the call to reform existing statutes, it may be
more likely to dismantle provisions disliked by powerful, regulated entities
than to pass comprehensive, forward-thinking legislation designed to solve
contemporary environmental problems.14
Perhaps it is not necessary or wise, then, to push for a more responsive
legislature.  While Congress has been neglectful, the federal agencies have
taken up the slack in some instances, crafting more innovative and, in some
cases, more progressive solutions than might be expected in Congress.
10 The standard of review for agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes adminis-
tered by them was articulated in 1984 by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natu-
ral Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
11 See infra Part II.
12 See Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the
New Congress and Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2008) (“[P]olitical polarization
and a lack of leadership have left environmental protection in the United States burdened
with obsolescent statutes and regulatory strategies.”).
13 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) (expressing this interest and codifying the nation’s
interest in improving navigable water ways).
14 See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Endangered Species Act Faces Broad New Challenges, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/26/politics/26spe-
cies.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0 (noting the current “alignment of the planets of people
against the Endangered Species Act in Congress, in the White House and in the agencies”
(quoting Jamie Rappaport Clark)).
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Although it has often taken a citizens’ suit to push the agencies forward, the
agencies have generally been more willing than congressional members to
consider evolving scientific findings and conclusions and to adapt their strat-
egies to the science.
This Article begins in the 1970s, when the nation’s environmental frame-
work was expressed in statutes governing a wide variety of topics, including
water, air, environmental analysis, and endangered species.  Part I explores
the intricate interplay between the agencies charged with implementing
these statutes, the federal courts, and Congress, and demonstrates how Con-
gress routinely amended the statutes as needed to ensure that the agencies
and the courts were staying true to its purposes and implementation
strategies.
Part II moves forward in time and looks at the dramatically different
legislative landscape since 1990.  Very little by way of significant environmen-
tal legislation has been enacted in the past two decades.  This is so despite
the fact that the Supreme Court has reviewed a surprising number of Clean
Water Act cases during this era, including cases challenging the jurisdictional
scope of the Act,15 EPA’s enforcement powers,16 and the division of power
between the EPA and the Corps of Engineers.17  Meanwhile, significant
changes in the physical environment and in our understanding of the envi-
ronment have occurred, without any meaningful response from Congress.
Part III explores a variety of reasons for congressional failures since
1990.  Congress has produced relatively little by way of comprehensive legisla-
tion across the board—not just on environmental issues.  The lack of controls
on campaign financing and the corruptive influence of money from special
interest groups is one reason.  A dramatic increase in the number of filibus-
ters is another.  However, there have been moments of “civic republicanism”
where Congress has managed to pass broad-reaching statutes to address
health care, national security, banking, and several other topics.18  Part III
explains how environmental law is different than other types of legislation,
and why gridlock is so much more palpable in the environmental arena.
Despite high profile catastrophes such as the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout
and the failure of the levee system in New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina, Congress has done virtually nothing on the environmental front.
The chronic problems posed by hyper-partisanship and campaign funding
are present here, too, but there is something more afoot.  Heated rhetoric,
conveyed in inflammatory sound-bites—“job killing” regulatory measures
and private property rights “abuse” among them—is even more evident when
it comes to environmental law than in other areas.  Equally troubling is con-
gressional mistrust—even disdain—for science.
15 See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
16 See, e.g., Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
17 See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009).
18 See Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental
Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1447 (2005).
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Part IV considers the implications of Congress’s failure to act, and
explores the ways in which the federal agencies either have stepped into the
vacuum or could fill the vacuum left by congressional inaction.  It posits that
environmental gridlock may not be such a bad thing after all.  True, from the
standpoint of democratic legitimacy, Congress ought to be doing its job.  But
from the standpoint of environmental protection, perhaps Congress should
leave well enough alone (or at least we will be no worse off if it does remain
silent).  Neither congressional members nor their staffs have sufficient time,
inclination, or expertise to craft adequate responses to modern environmen-
tal problems, many of which are far more complex than the issues faced in
the 1970s.  When it comes to water quality, at least, the low-hanging fruit has
already been picked and the remaining issues, such as nonpoint source pollu-
tion and the protection of isolated wetlands and ephemeral streams, call for
solutions that are both more nuanced and more politically charged than the
basic mandates issued in the 1970s were.  Congress has always been better
able to deal with “macro”-level issues and pose broad-brush policy-oriented
solutions, but complex problems tend to be over-simplified, for example, one
is either “for or against” wetlands protection or “for or against” hamstringing
the economy by regulating industrial discharges.  Moreover, given that the
environmental laws of the 1970s, with their lofty objectives, are the high
water mark, and also that the value of safe, clean water for drinking, fisheries,
and recreation remains intact, it is possible we have nowhere to go but down
if Congress were to start tinkering.
The Article concludes in Part V with an assessment of several “portaging
strategies” that offer an opportunity to work around the congressional logjam
and move the environmental ball forward through non-legislative means.19
Although comprehensive legislative reform may be the “first best” option for
addressing wicked problems like climate change and even nonpoint source
pollution, empowering agencies to engage in more progressive environmen-
tal action presents a viable “second best” alternative.20  This alternative turns
in part on empowering citizens to motivate agency action through petitions
for rulemaking and citizens’ suits, and in part on clearing away impediments
to agency action while minimizing agency capture by anti-regulatory inter-
ests.  A coordinated strategy of regulation, Executive Orders, and enforce-
ment might take us beyond merely “treading water” while Congress ignores
the environment.
19 The phrase “portaging strategies” is adapted from E. Donald Elliott, Portage Strategies
for Adapting Environmental Law and Policy During a Logjam Era, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 24
(2008).
20 See Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Air: Four Propositions About Property Rights and Environ-
mental Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 103, 117 (1999) (observing that we live in a
“second-best world,” with many institutional and technological complexities).
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I. A (MOSTLY) HAPPY TRIO: THE AGENCIES, THE COURTS,
AND CONGRESS FROM 1970 TO 1990
Beginning in 1970, Congress passed an extended family of federal envi-
ronmental statutes, which together became the cornerstone of a new envi-
ronmental era.  The first of these was the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),21 known as the granddaddy of modern environmental law.22  NEPA
was soon followed by the Clean Air Act of 1970,23 which controls air emis-
sions from stationary and mobile sources, the CWA of 1972,24 which regu-
lates water pollutants, and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973,25
which protects endangered species and their habitat.  The year 1970 also
marked the creation of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
implement provisions of the pollution control statutes.26
The Clean Air Act, the CWA, and the ESA add substantive layers to
NEPA’s procedural “look before you leap” mandate.  As Judge Skelly Wright
noted in an early NEPA case, these statutes demonstrate Congress’s commit-
ment “to control . . . the destructive engine of material ‘progress’” by priori-
tizing environmental protection.27
From the advent of the modern environmental era in 1970 through the
1990 CWA and Clean Air Act Amendments,28 Congress was relatively vigilant
about ensuring that its statutes were construed in a fashion that represented
congressional intent.  Major amendments to the CWA were adopted in 1977
and 1987, to the Clean Air Act in 1977 and 1990, and to the ESA in 1978.29
Throughout this period, Congress was responsive to Supreme Court rulings
21 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.
(2006)).  The NEPA was adopted by Congress in late December 1969 and signed into law
on Jan. 1, 1970.
22 See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1111–12 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“NEPA . . . takes the major step of requiring all
federal agencies to consider values of environmental preservation in their spheres of activ-
ity, and it prescribes certain procedural measures to ensure that those values are in fact
fully respected. . .  NEPA . . . makes environmental protection a part of the mandate of
every federal agency and department.”).
23 Pub. L. No 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q
(2006)).  The Clean Air Act was enacted on Dec. 31, 1970.
24 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 65 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
(2006)).
25 Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 and
16 U.S.C.).
26 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at
202 (2006), and in 84 Stat. 2086.
27 Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc., 449 F.2d at 1111 (footnote omitted).
28 Water-related amendments include the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. See infra notes
106–110 and accompanying text.  The 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, Public Law 101-
549, adopted an acid rain (sulfur dioxide) trading program and phased out ozone-deplet-
ing chemicals. See infra notes 115–118 and accompanying text. R
29 See infra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. R
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as well as decisions of the D.C. District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals.30
An examination of the CWA, in particular, provides a good sense of the
dynamics that were in play between Congress, the courts, and the agencies.
The 1972 CWA was preceded by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
of 1948,31 but the 1972 Act bears little resemblance to the 1948 Act.  The
1948 Act placed the federal government in a supporting role in relation to
the states by authorizing federal money for water pollution research, sewage
treatment facilities, and state pollution control programs.32  Although the
1948 Act authorized federal enforcement action, the authorization was
exceedingly narrow and ineffective.  The federal government could file a
public nuisance action for endangerment from interstate pollution but only
with the approval of state officials in the state where the discharge
originated.33  By the mid-twentieth century, rivers were smoldering, water-
fowl were dying, and fisheries were closed due to contamination in many
regions of the country.34  It was clear that the 1948 Act was not working and
that the nation’s water quality problems required more aggressive federal
involvement.35
The CWA of 1972 embraces the simple yet profound goal of eliminating
the discharge of pollutants to ensure the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the nation’s waters.36  To accomplish this goal, § 301 prohibits
the “discharge of any pollutant by any person” unless a National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit or a dredge and fill permit is
obtained.37  This key phrase, “discharge of a pollutant,” is defined, in rele-
vant part, as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source.”38  Navigable waters include surface waters of the United States,
including lakes, rivers, streams, adjacent wetlands, and the territorial seas.39
A “point source” is “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,
30 For the role of courts in prodding remedial action by the legislative and executive
branches, see Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods And Pleas: Limited Government in
an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 410–23 (2011).
31 Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155.  This statute was preceded by the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 401–418 (2000)), which prohibits obstructions to navigation but does not address other
forms of pollution.
32 See N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality Part III:
The Federal Effort, 52 IOWA L. REV. 799, 810 (1967).
33 See Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning From More Than Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal
Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
527, 531 (2005).
34 See Zellmer & Glicksman, supra note 3, at 1. R
35 See William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United
States–State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789–1972: Part I, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 157
(2003).
36 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2006).
37 Id. § 1311(a).
38 Id. § 1362(12).
39 See id. § 1362(7)–(8); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2006) (defining “Waters of the United
States”).
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including but not limited to any pipe . . . from which pollutants are or may be
discharged.”40
One of the first cases to provoke a statutory amendment was Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Callaway,41 which challenged the Corps’s overly
restrictive definition of “navigable waters” as “those waters of the United
States which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently,
or have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for
purposes of interstate or foreign commerce.”42  The court invalidated this
definition and forced the Corps to exercise regulatory responsibility over
dredge and fill activities in non-navigable waterways and adjacent wetlands
under CWA § 404.43  Congress responded to the decision in the 1977 CWA
amendments by exempting fills resulting from normal farming and logging
activities.44  Although it placed parameters on the Corps’s authority by
excluding these activities, it left the basic jurisdictional scope of the CWA
over navigable as well as certain non-navigable waters and wetlands intact.45
Just two years after the Callaway decision, but before the 1977 amend-
ments, environmental groups challenged the EPA’s attempt to exempt agri-
cultural activities from regulation as point sources under the NPDES
program of CWA § 402.  In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle,46 the
court invalidated the EPA’s interpretation, finding that the wording of the
statute was “clear” that the EPA did not have authority to exempt entire cate-
gories of point sources from the § 402 permit requirements.47  However, just
as it had with regard to § 404, Congress was persuaded by EPA’s analysis of
the policy reasons to exempt some agricultural activities from the § 402 pro-
gram, and it responded in the 1977 amendments by exempting irrigation
return flows and agricultural stormwater discharges.48  The provision serves
as a counterpart to the farming exemption of the Corps’s dredge and fill
program.49
Around the same time, the Supreme Court had occasion to address the
enforcement structure of the CWA, and in particular the relationship
between the EPA and state permitting agencies, in EPA v. California. ex rel.
40 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006); see Sandra B. Zellmer, The Virtues of “Command and
Control” Regulation: Barring Exotic Species from Aquatic Ecosystems, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1233,
1235 (2000) (describing “point source” pollution).
41 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
42 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115, 12,119 (Apr. 3, 1974); see 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).
43 Callaway, 392 F. Supp. at 686.
44 See Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 67(a)-(b), 91 Stat. 1600 (1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(f) (2006)).
45 Id.; see Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Bulen, 410 F. Supp. 2d 450 (S.D. W. Va. 2004)
(describing legislative history of section 404’s dredge and fill program).
46 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
47 Id. at 1377 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006)).
48 Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 33(b), 91 Stat. 1577 (1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)
(2006)).
49 See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text (describing passage of 33 U.S.C. R
§ 1344(f) (2006)).
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State Water Resources Control Board.50  There, it held that CWA § 313 required
federal facilities to comply with state requirements respecting the control
and abatement of pollution, but that obtaining a permit from a state with a
federally approved program was not among such requirements.51  In the
1977 amendments, however, Congress overturned the decision and strength-
ened the enforcement capabilities of the states by expanding the CWA’s
waiver of federal sovereign immunity to “administrative authority, and pro-
cess and sanctions,” including state-issued permits.52
In one of its first significant rulings on the jurisdictional scope of the
CWA, the Supreme Court reviewed a citizen suit to compel the EPA to regu-
late discharges of radioactive materials.53  The CWA forbids the discharge of
pollutants absent a permit,54 and defines pollutants to include “radioactive
materials.”55  The lower courts agreed with the petitioners and found that, by
referring to “radioactive materials,” Congress plainly meant to include
“all radioactive materials.”56  The Court reversed in Train v. Colorado Public
Interest Research Group, Inc., holding that the legislative history of the CWA
demonstrated that Congress had not in fact intended to alter the pre-
existing, exclusive control of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) over
nuclear materials.57  According to the Court, even if the text appeared to be
“clear” upon “superficial examination,” the House committee report explic-
itly exempted radioactive materials regulated by the AEC,58 and the debates
on the floors of both chambers clarified that only those radioactive sub-
50 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
51 Id. at 209–12.
52 See Clean Water Act of 1977, §§ 60, 61(a), 313(a)–(b), 91 Stat. 1597 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)–(b) (2006)).  That Act states:
[E]ach officer, agent, or employee thereof in the performance of his official
duties, shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local
requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the
control and abatement of water pollution in the same manner, and to the same
extent as any nongovernmental entity . . . . The preceding sentence shall apply . . .
to any requirement whether substantive or procedural (including any record-
keeping or reporting requirement, any requirement respecting permits and any
other requirement, whatsoever) . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
53 See Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
54 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342 (2006).
55 Id. § 1362(6).
56 Colo. Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc. v. Train, 507 F.2d 743, 747 (10th Cir. 1974).
57 Train, 426 U.S. at 11–12.
58 Id. at 11 (“The term ‘pollutant’ as defined in the bill includes ‘radioactive materi-
als.’ These materials are those not encompassed in the definition of source, byproduct, or special
nuclear materials as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and regulated pursuant
to that Act.” (citing H. R. Rep. No. 92-911, at 131 (1972), reprinted in 1 S. COMM. ON PUB.
WORKS, 93D CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMEND-
MENTS OF 1972 818 (Comm. Print 1973))).
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stances not subject to the AEC’s jurisdiction could be regulated by the EPA.59
The Court observed, “To have included these materials under the [CWA]
would have marked a significant alteration of the pervasive regulatory
scheme embodied in the AEA;” thus, Congress needed to include far more
explicit language in the CWA if it intended to effectuate such a dramatic
change.60  Although Congress revisited the statute and amended it in 1977,
just a year after the Court’s decision, it left the relevant provision alone, indi-
cating tacit approval of the Court’s interpretation.61
A few years later, in 1980, environmental groups challenged the EPA’s
failure to identify and regulate toxic pollutants as required by CWA § 307.62
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, the D.C. Circuit affirmed EPA’s settle-
ment agreement (known as the “Flannery Decree”) with the environmental
groups, which compelled the EPA to list sixty-five toxic chemicals and to
develop strict technology-based effluent limitations for toxic discharges.63
Congress followed up in 1987 by adopting the court’s categorical approach.64
 The significance of the Flannery Decree and Congress’s approval of that
decree cannot be understated.  The structure for implementing require-
59 Id. at 14–16.  In support of its conclusion, the Court also cited 33 U.S.C. § 1311(f)
(1970 ed., Supp. IV), which provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of [the
CWA] it shall be unlawful to discharge any radiological . . . warfare agent or high-level radioac-
tive waste into the navigable waters.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added).  The Court further
explained, “[t]hat Congress has chosen to ban completely the discharge of certain high-
level radioactive material regulated under the AEA does not, by itself, indicate whether
Congress wanted the discharge of other radioactive material regulated under the AEA to
be subject to the FWPCA’s permit program.” Id. at 10–11.
60 Id. at 24.  By the same token, the Court has held that the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission (the successor to the AEC) lacks discretion to authorize discharges of high-level
radioactive waste into navigable waters, given the language of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(f). See
supra note 59; Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d
231 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1980).
61 See Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-Environ-
mentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking is Better Than Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1231, 1277–78 (1996) (“Congress’s decision to give the AEC and its successors
control over these radioactive materials may have been an unsound policy choice. . . ,
the Train Court’s conclusion that the AEC and its successors retained exclusive control
over the discharge of certain radioactive materials was probably the most accurate reading
of Congress’s intent in enacting the Clean Water Act.”).  Mank criticizes the policy under-
pinnings of the result on the grounds that the EPA “is less vulnerable to ‘capture’ or dis-
proportionate influence by industry than the AEC and its successors, whose very
bureaucratic existence depends on the continuing viability of the nuclear power industry.”
Id. at 1278.
62 Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1234 n.6–7 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing
Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Train, Civil Action No. 75-172 (D.D.C. 1976); Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Train, Civil Action No. 2153-73 (D.D.C. 1976)); and 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)).
63 Id. at 1236.
64 Pub. L. No. 100-4, Title III, § 313(d), 101 Stat. 45 (1987).
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ments to control toxic discharges remains in place today, and it has achieved
a great deal of progress in preventing toxic water pollution.65
The Supreme Court issued a landmark CWA opinion in 1980 as well.
EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association66 involved a challenge by representa-
tives of mining and crushed stone industries who claimed that the EPA’s
effluent discharge standards were too stringent.  The CWA requires EPA to
impose increasingly advanced technology-based effluent limitations on dis-
chargers in order to advance the statutory goal of eliminating the discharge
of all pollutants.  Existing dischargers were granted some time to retrofit with
the best technology available for their industry while new dischargers were
required to incorporate the best technology immediately.67  The lowest tier
of technology standards applied to existing plants—facilities for which
retrofitting would be most expensive.  Congress required these plants to
adopt “[e]ffluent limitations . . . which shall require the application of the
best practicable control technology currently available.”68  This standard,
known as the “best practicable” or “BPT” standard, was intended to facilitate
industry’s transition to the new technology-based regime.  In setting BPT
requirements, EPA was directed to consider “the total cost of application of
technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be
achieved . . . .”69  BPT was a temporary measure, remaining in effect only
until July 1, 1983, when it was to be replaced by the next tier of technology-
based standards, which required existing dischargers to adopt the “best avail-
able technology economically achievable” (BAT).70  In setting the BAT stan-
dard, EPA was directed to consider “the cost of achieving such effluent
reduction,” but not to balance costs with the environmental benefits of more
stringent regulations.71
The challenge in Crushed Stone related to the BPT standard.  The indus-
tries argued that EPA must consider granting variances to the BPT standard
based on the capability of an individual discharger to afford the costs of
BPT.72  The Court rejected their argument, reasoning that, while economic
capability is listed as an explicit statutory ground for a variance from the BAT
65 Jeffrey M. Gaba, Informal Rulemaking By Settlement Agreement, 73 Geo. L.J. 1241, 1245
(1985).
66 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
67 For a detailed description of the phased-in effluent standards, see James R. May,
Brief of Environmental Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009) (No. 07-588, 07-589 & 07-597),
SP041 ALI-ABA 263.
68 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
69 Id. § 1314(b)(1)(B).
70 Id. § 1311(b)(2)(A).
71 Id. § 1314(b)(2)(B).
72 EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 72 (1980).  The Court had previ-
ously held that, with respect to the EPA’s practice of categorically setting BPT limits, some
allowance is necessary for variation in individual plants.  E. I. du Pont de Nemours Co. v.
Train, 430 U.S. 112, 128 (1977).  In Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,
510 n.30 (1981), the Court clarified that, in contrast to the BPT determination, in making
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standard,73 economic capability is not listed as grounds for a variance from
the BPT standard.  Moreover, the Court found that the statutory language
failed to support the industries’ position that affordability must be consid-
ered in BPT variance decisions.  It explained:
[T]he Administrator is directed to consider the benefits of effluent reduc-
tions as compared to the costs of pollution control in determining BPT limi-
tations.  Thus, every BPT limitation represents a conclusion by the
Administrator that the costs imposed on the industry are worth the benefits
in pollution reduction that will be gained by meeting those limits.  To grant
a variance because a particular owner or operator cannot meet the normal
costs of the technological requirements imposed on him, and not because
there has been a recalculation of the benefits compared to the costs, would
be inconsistent with this legislative scheme and would allow a level of pollu-
tion inconsistent with the judgment of the Administrator.74
The Court reasoned that Congress must have realized that the BPT limi-
tations would cause economic hardship, including closing of some plants,75
and although Congress took certain steps to alleviate such hardships, those
steps did not include allowing a BPT variance based on economic capabil-
ity.76  In the end, the Court upheld EPA’s interpretation of the CWA as
allowing economic capability variances from the BAT standard but not the
BPT standard.77
Congress apparently agreed with Crushed Stone, or at least chose to leave
the ruling intact in its 1987 amendments.  However, it amended the statute
in 1987 to limit the application of the BAT standard to toxic and nonconven-
tional pollutants, and established a more lenient requirement of “best con-
ventional pollutant control technology” (BCT) for other types of
pollutants.78  With Crushed Stone, the industry’s hopes of making individual-
ized variances widely available were dashed, but Congress did ease up on the
statutory demands for ever more stringent technology controls over time.79
a BAT determination “the Administrator is directed to consider total cost, but not in com-
parison with effluent reduction benefits.”
73 See Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 71–72 (“A [BAT] variance under § 301(c) may be
obtained upon a showing ‘that such modified requirements (1) will represent the maxi-
mum use of technology within the economic capability of the owner or operator; and (2)
will result in reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the discharge of pollu-
tants.’” (quoting CWA § 301(c))).
74 Id. at 76–77.  For a more recent case holding that the EPA could rely on cost-benefit
analysis in promulgating BAT regulations for cooling-water intake structures at existing
power plants under 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b), see Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208
(2009), described infra note 164.
75 Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 79.
76 C. Peter Goplerud III, Water Pollution Law: Milestones From the Past and Anticipation of
the Future, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 7, 10 (1995).
77 Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 79.
78 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E) (2006).  For detailed history, see Oliver A. Houck, The
Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 528 (1991).
79 See William Funk, The Exception that Approves the Rule: FDF Variances Under the Clean
Water Act, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 58 (1985) (“[B]efore Crushed Stone,] industry had
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The 1987 amendments also responded to the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.80
There, the Court upheld EPA’s regulatory variances for “fundamentally dif-
ferent” industrial discharges of toxic pollutants.  The Court reasoned that a
CWA provision prohibiting the EPA from modifying effluent limitations for
toxics did not foreclose the use of fundamentally different factor (FDF) vari-
ances with respect to dischargers for which the discharge categories had not
been accurately drawn in the first place because information was either not
available at the time or was not considered by the EPA.81  Congress subse-
quently agreed and authorized FDF variances in its 1987 amendments.82
The 1987 amendments were also notable for what they did not do.  In a
blockbuster opinion issued in 1985, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,83
the Supreme Court upheld an expansive agency interpretation of the term
“navigable waters,” which, in turn, gave an expansive reach to the jurisdic-
tional scope of the CWA.84  The agency’s regulation covered wetlands adja-
cent to navigable waters.85  The Court unanimously held that the word
“navigable” in the CWA was of “limited import,” and went on to conclude
that the statute extended to non-navigable wetlands adjacent to Lake St.
Clair.86  It deferred to the agency’s regulation, finding it “reasonable, in light
of the language, policies, and legislative history of the Act . . . .”87
Although Congress revisited the statute just two years after the Riverside
Bayview Homes opinion, it was content to let the ruling stand.88  Perhaps this
was in part because the Court had been careful to load its opinion with refer-
ences to the legislative purposes and history of the statute, making it some-
what difficult for Congress to retreat from its earlier expression of intent to
reach far and wide in protecting the nation’s waters. According to the Court:
The [CWA of 1972] . . . constituted a comprehensive legislative attempt “to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
hopes that the variance would be available in more circumstances than only when funda-
mentally different factors were present.  If it had been, then industry’s goal of individual-
ized effluent limitations might have been realized.”).
80 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
81 Id. at 130 (citing 40 CFR § 403.13(b) (1984)).  The Court explained: “the FDF vari-
ance is a laudable corrective mechanism, ‘an acknowledgement that the uniform . . . limita-
tion was set without reference to the full range of current practices, to which the
Administrator was to refer.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at
77–78).
82 Pub. L. No. 100-4, Title III, § 306, 101 Stat. 45, (1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(n) (2006)).  The current FDF variance of 301(n) mirrors the variance developed by
EPA for BPT.
83 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
84 Id. at 131.
85  33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2) (1985).
86 Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133.
87 Id. at 131 (citing Chem. Mfr. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116, 125
(1985); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984)).
88 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (describing the 1987 amendments).
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Nation’s waters.”  This objective incorporated a broad, systemic view of the
goal of maintaining and improving water quality: as the House Report on
the legislation put it, “the word ‘integrity’ . . . refers to a condition in which
the natural structure and function of ecosystems [are] maintained.”  Protec-
tion of aquatic ecosystems, Congress recognized, demanded broad federal
authority to control pollution, for “[water] moves in hydrologic cycles and it
is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source.”89
The most well known example of a swift congressional response to a
Supreme Court ruling was not a CWA case but rather an Endangered Species
Act (ESA) case involving a water development project known as the Tellico
Dam.  In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,90 (TVA) the Court held that ESA
§ 7 requires courts to enjoin federal actions (including permits, licenses,
funding, and federally executed actions) that would jeopardize the existence
of a listed species,91 even if the multi-million dollar project in question had
been authorized prior to enactment and was nearly completed.  According to
the Court, the statute was intended “to halt and reverse the trend toward
species extinction, whatever the cost.”92  Accordingly, the Court concluded
that the ESA gives “endangered species priority over the primary missions of
Federal agencies.”93
Proposed bills to amend the ESA followed close on the heels of the TVA
opinion.  Some would have repealed § 7 altogether.94  Others attempted to
resurrect the “practicability” limitation to § 7 that had been proposed previ-
ously but deliberately omitted from the ESA as passed in 1973.95  Others
were narrower, and would have simply exempted Tellico Dam from the
ESA.96
The amendments adopted in 1978—the same year as the Court’s opin-
ion was handed down—did none of the above.  First and foremost, Congress
89 474 U.S. at 131–32 (alterations in original) (citing H. R. Rep. No. 92–911 (1972)
and S. Rep. No. 92–414 (1972)).  For another important holding that Congress did not
disturb, see Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 66-67 & n.6 (1987) (holding
that CWA §505, which allows citizens’ suits to be filed against persons “alleged to be in
violation,” allows plaintiffs to bring citizens’ suits for “good-faith allegations” of ongoing
violations, and that a plaintiff may be able to recover litigation costs against a “suddenly
repentant defendant,” that is, a defendant who ceased violations upon the filing of a citi-
zens’ suit).
90 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
91 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2006).
92 Hill, 437 U.S. at 184.
93 Id. at 185 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
94 Jason C. Wells, National Security and the Endangered Species Act: A Fresh Look at the
Exemption Process and the Evolution of Army Environmental Policy, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 255, 261 (2006).
95 Id. Earlier statutes had conditioned the obligation to avoid adverse impacts on
endangered species on consideration of what was “practicable” and “consistent with the
primary purpose” of the agencies. See Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531–1543; Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135,
83 Stat. 275.
96 Wells, supra note 94, at 257-60.
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did not repudiate the TVA opinion, and it left § 7 largely intact.  However, it
did adopt the so-called “God Squad” exemption, which allows projects to go
forward despite a jeopardy determination if a “super committee” of officials
votes in favor of the project.97  Subsequently, when the newly formed God
Squad refused to grant an exemption for the Tellico Dam, dam proponents
pushed through an appropriations rider that expressly authorized comple-
tion of the dam notwithstanding the ESA.98  But the objectives and overarch-
ing framework of the statute itself stood firm.  In fact, Congress reaffirmed its
stance on the conservation-oriented mission of the statute in the subsequent
1982 amendments to the ESA by removing economic impacts as a potential
factor for consideration when listing a species as endangered or threatened,
thereby strengthening the emphasis on science, not economics.99
Congress passed its last significant pieces of federal environmental legis-
lation in 1990.100  As described below, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was
adopted in response to a maritime disaster,101 while the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 were passed in the face of international consensus on
the devastating effects of acid rain and ozone-depleting substances.102
97 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)–(h) (2006).
98 125 CONG. REC. H1503 (daily ed. June 18, 1979); see Energy and Water Develop-
ment Appropriation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437, 449–50.  The God Squad
characterized the dam as an “uneconomic boondoggle.”  George Cameron Coggins & Rob-
ert L. Glicksman, Power, Procedure, and Policy in Public Lands and Resources Law, 10 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 3, 81 (1995).  Subsequently, Senators Robert Dole (R-Kan.), Howard
Baker (R-Tenn.), and other “pork-barrel proponents” snuck a rider into an appropriations
bill exempting the dam from the ESA. Id. “Because no one even read the rider on the
floor, only a few legislators knew what had happened.” Id. For details, see Zygmunt J. B.
Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805, 813–14 (1986); Sinden, supra note 18, 1404. R
99 See Amy Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less is More in the Economic
Analysis of Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 150–51 (2004)
(describing how Congress chose to limit the role of economics in the listing process; “when
in the early years of the Reagan administration FWS implemented a practice of applying
cost-benefit analysis to listing decisions pursuant to Executive Order 12,291, Congress
wasted no time in correcting the agency’s overreaching . . . add[ing] the word ‘solely’ to
the clause directing the Secretary to base listing determinations ‘on the basis of the best
scientific and commercial data available’ in order to make clear that the listing standard
remained absolute and that ‘economic considerations have no relevance to [listing] deter-
minations.’” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
100 There is one notable exception of significant reform legislation in the 1990s in the
public lands context: The National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat. 1252 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006)). See
 Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarks of Modern Organic
Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457, 514 (2002) (describing the Act as “a manifestation of the
unusual circumstances and compromises that can result in passage of a sweeping new pub-
lic land law in an era of divided government”).
101 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–61 (2006).
102 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o, 7671–71q (2006).  Another notable water-related provi-
sion passed in 1990 was the Coastal Zone Reauthorization Amendments of 1990 (CZARA),
which amended the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA).  16 U.S.C. § 6217
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On March 24, 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez hit a reef and ran
aground in Prince William Sound, Alaska.103  Eleven million gallons of crude
poured out of the punctured hull, causing one of the largest and most dam-
aging tanker spills in history.104  The accident killed more birds and marine
mammals than any previous U.S. oil spill.  The ensuing investigation revealed
that the captain of the ship was a relapsed alcoholic.  Although Exxon knew
about his drinking, it left him in command, letting him pilot its massive
tanker and its dangerous cargo through the sensitive waters of the Sound.105
The wreck and the resulting public outcry prompted Congress to pass
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA),106 which integrated and amended a
me´lange of existing provisions governing tanker vessels and spills, including
the CWA.107  The OPA requires large tanker ships plying U.S. waters to have
double-hulls.  Although several bills related to oil spills had been considered
prior to passage of the OPA, preemption of state law had been a major stick-
ing point.108  In the end, Congress preserved the states’ ability to respond to
oil spills through two savings clauses, one of which concerned state cleanup
authorities109 while the other preserved state law liabilities and penalties.110
As for Exxon, a jury awarded billions of dollars in compensatory and
punitive damages under Alaska law to fishermen and landowners injured by
(2006).  CZARA aimed to “strengthen the links between Federal and State coastal zone
management and water quality programs and to enhance State and local efforts to manage
land use activities which degrade coastal waters and coastal habitats.”  136 CONG. REC.
37,191 (1990).  Accordingly, each state with a coastal program was to develop a plan for
coastal nonpoint source pollution control measures.  States that failed to do so would lose
a portion of their federal coastal management funds under the CZMA and their nonpoint
source pollution control assistance funds under section 319 of the CWA.  “Despite high
expectations for the program, implementation of section 6217 has been very slow.”
Andrew Solomon, Note, Section 6217 of the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of
1990: Is There Any Point?, 31 ENVTL. L. 151, 153 (2001).
103 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 471 (2008).
104 As immense as this spill was, the blowout of the Deepwater Horizon-Macondo well
in 2010 was sixteen times larger. U.S. COAST GUARD NAT’L INCIDENT COMMAND, NATIONAL
INCIDENT COMMANDER’S REPORT: MC252 DEEPWATER HORIZON (2010).
105 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 471.
106 33 U.S.C. 2701–2761 (2006).  For a detailed history of the OPA, see Craig H. Allen,
Federalism in the Era of International Standards: Federal and State Government Regulation of
Merchant Vessels in the United States (Part II), 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 565, 607–08 (1998); Benja-
min H. Grumbles & Joan M. Manley, The Oil Pollution Act Of 1990: Legislation In The Wake of
a Crisis, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 35 (1995); Russell V. Randle, The Oil Pollution Act of
1990: Its Provisions, Intent, and Effects, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,119, 10,133 (1991).
107 The 1990 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-596 and Pub. L. No. 101-380 (codified at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1268, 1312, 2701–2761 (2006)).  In particular, the OPA amended the Com-
prehensive Emergency Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607 (2006), and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006).
108 Randle, supra note 106, at 10,133; see also Walter B. Jones, Oil Spill Compensation and
Liability Legislation: When Good Things Don’t Happen to Good Bills, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,333
(1989) (noting that various House versions would have preempted state law entirely).
109 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (2006).
110 Id. § 2718(c).
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the oil spill.111  Because the OPA does not apply retroactively to pre-1990
spills, Exxon invoked the CWA and general admiralty law in an attempt to
preempt common law damages awards.112  In rejecting these contentions,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals gave weight to the CWA’s savings clause
and reasoned that the absence of a federal private right of action could more
reasonably be construed as leaving private tort claims intact than as implicitly
destroying them.113  After two decades of litigation, the Supreme Court
affirmed the award, but reduced the amount of punitive damages.114
The second important piece of environmental legislation in 1990
amended the Clean Air Act.  Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
(CAAA) established the first large-scale program to employ tradable permits
to control pollution.115  The 1990 CAAA targeted power plants’ emissions of
sulfur dioxide (SO2), the precursor of acid rain.116  Over the years, this pro-
gram has dramatically reduced SO2 emissions.117
The 1990 CAA Amendments also required the phase-out of ozone-
depleting substances like freon and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).118  These
amendments were motivated by the discovery of the ozone hole in 1985 and
the negotiation of the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer.119  The implementation of the Protocol by the United
States and 190 other countries is “perhaps the single most successful interna-
tional environmental agreement to date,” according to former U.N. Secretary
Kofi Anan.120
111 In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).  For arguments that the large amount of punitive dam-
ages awarded against Exxon and upheld by the circuit court but reduced by the Supreme
Court was appropriate and necessary, see Alexandra Klass & Sandra Zellmer, Exxon Should
Just Pay Its Penance, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.startribune.com/templates/
Print_This_Story?sid=16131362; Alexandra Klass & Sandra Zellmer, Fishermen are Entitled to
Punitive Damages from Exxon, AM. CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (Feb. 27, 2008), http://www.acslaw.
org/acsblog/node/12177.
112 In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1226, 1228.
113 Id. at 1231.
114 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 512–16.
115 Pub. L. No. 101-549 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o (2006)).
116 Joseph Goffman, Title IV of the Clean Air Act: Lessons For Success Of The Acid Rain
Emissions Trading Program, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 177 (2006).
117 Id. at 178; see CHOOSING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Winston Harrington et al. eds.,
2004) (describing the successful “cap and trade” program as a “living legend”).  Yet there is
still work to be done.  “Despite the evident emissions reduction success of the 1990 SO2
program, acid rain continues to plague sensitive ecosystems from the Rockies to the East,
and visibility-marring haze blights our national parks and monuments.  Tens of millions of
Americans breathe air made unhealthful by ozone smog and particulate matter . . . .”
Goffman, supra note 116, at 177–78.
118 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671–7671q (2006).
119 Agreed to on 16 September 1987 and entered into force on 1 January 1989, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 100-10 (1987).
120 U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, A SUCCESS IN THE MAKING: THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON
SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER 11 (2008), available at http://ozone.unep.
org/Publications/MP_A_Success_in_the_making-E.pdf.  “[D]eveloped countries have
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As progressive as the laws produced between 1970 and 1990 were, they
have not been immune to criticism.  For one thing, the CWA “set wildly
unrealistic goals for overcoming industrial pollution.”121  Setting unattaina-
ble standards may have given rise to an impression of triviality, and such stan-
dards may not have been particularly helpful in sorting out the complexities
of implementation.122  But Jedediah Purdy explains that this was not necessa-
rily an unintended consequence:
The regulatory devices of the antipollution statutes were rigid: deadlines,
emission limits, uniform permits.  The drafters and sponsors of the statutes,
however, seem to have imagined this rigidity as a way of pressing forward a
fluid process: the country’s adoption, definition, and pursuit of new commit-
ments. . . . Legislators rejected more flexible instruments because they
understood those as tending, ironically, to fix values that were in flux and as
neglecting the novelty and importance of the commitments the country was
undertaking.123
The legislative drafters of the CWA, the CAA, and other deadline-driven,
technology-based statutes probably saw their approach as “uniquely consis-
tent with, even required by, the task of adopting environmental protection as
a defining national purpose.”124  In doing so, they were simply invoking the
overarching environmental concerns of the era: “ecological consciousness as
a key to understanding and solving complex problems; public-health crises
and apocalyptic danger; and a need for a change in national values.”125  This
type of bold, aspirational legislative action has not been seen since.
II. A BROKEN MINUET: THE AGENCIES, THE COURTS,
AND CONGRESS SINCE 1990
Since 1990, the federal agencies and the Supreme Court have eclipsed
Congress in terms of environmental policy-making.  When it comes to water
quality, Congress has had multiple opportunities to resolve fundamental
issues regarding the jurisdictional scope of the CWA, the EPA’s basic enforce-
ment powers, and the division of labor between the EPA and the Corps of
Engineers, but has produced no significant legislation on any of these fronts.
Meanwhile, our understanding of the physical environment has grown, and
several cataclysmic events affecting the environment have occurred.  But the
agencies and the Court have been left to muddle through, while pressure
mounts from both the regulated community and the environmental interest
groups.
phased out the production and consumption of over 99 per cent of all the chemicals con-
trolled by the Montreal Protocol.” Id.
121 Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and Democ-
racy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1181 (2010).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1189.
124 Id. at 1182.
125 Id.
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A. Agencies and the Court Assume the Dominant Role
in Environmental Lawmaking
The Supreme Court has issued broad-sweeping rulings in a surprising
number of CWA cases since 1990, including cases challenging the jurisdic-
tional scope of the Act (Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (SWANCC)126 and Rapanos v. United States127) as well as fun-
damental enforcement powers (Sackett v. EPA128 and Coeur Alaska, Inc. v.
Southeast Alaska Conservation Council).129  Each of these decisions were
brought before the Court in the form of challenges to agency action under
the Administrative Procedure Act130 and CWA provisions authorizing citi-
zens’ suits and judicial review.131
One of the most significant issues addressed by the Court during this era
involves the jurisdictional scope of the CWA over wetlands and modest or
seasonal streams.  The first of two landmark opinions on this issue came
down in 2001.  In SWANCC, developers challenged the Corps’s “Migratory
Bird Rule” as a basis for asserting statutory jurisdiction over isolated wetlands
with no discernible connection to navigable waterways.132  The Court set
aside the rule, and refused to broaden its earlier decision in Riverside Bayview
Homes133 regarding the CWA’s coverage of wetlands:
We . . . decline . . . to take . . . the next ineluctable step after Riverside Bayview
Homes: holding that isolated ponds, some only seasonal, wholly located
within two Illinois counties, fall under § 404(a)’s definition of “navigable
waters” because they serve as habitat for migratory birds. . . . We said in
Riverside Bayview Homes that the word “navigable” in the statute was of “lim-
ited import” and went on to hold that § 404(a) extended to nonnavigable
wetlands adjacent to open waters.  But it is one thing to give a word limited
effect and quite another to give it no effect whatever.134
The Court refused to give deference to the Corps’s interpretation of the
CWA’s phrase “waters of the United States,” expressing its concern over “sig-
nificant constitutional questions” raised by the interpretation.135  It observed
that there was “nothing approaching a clear statement from Congress”
regarding regulation of isolated ponds and mudflats used by migratory birds,
126 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
127 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
128 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012); see Richard Stoll, EPA Suffers Two Big Court Losses in Three
Days: Congress Gets Part of the Blame, BNA DAILY ENV’T REP. 1, 1 (Mar. 30, 2012) (“The Court
strongly indicated its displeasure . . . over the fact that the entire dispute could have been
avoided if Congress had provided more clarity” regarding the CWA’s jurisdictional scope
over waters that aren’t necessarily navigable.).
129 557 U.S. 261 (2009).
130 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
131 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365, 1369 (2006).
132 531 U.S. 159, 159 (2001).
133 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985); see also
supra notes 83-89. R
134 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171–72 (citations omitted).
135 Id. at 173.
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and that allowing the Corps to claim jurisdiction over such areas “would
result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary
power over land and water use.”136  The Court refused to take on the role of
“readjust[ing] the federal-state balance in this manner . . . .”137
The Corps’s Migratory Bird Rule was included in a preamble to a federal
register notice,138 but it was not expressed in the final, codified regulation
itself.139  In the aftermath of the SWANCC decision, the Corps and the EPA
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to address the jurisdictional reach of
the CWA with respect to isolated wetlands, but the agencies ultimately failed
to amend the regulations.140  Instead, it notified its field officers that they
“should continue to assert jurisdiction over traditional navigable waters . . .
and, generally speaking, their tributary systems (and adjacent wetlands).”141
Five years later, in another challenge brought by developers, the Court
had occasion to consider whether the CWA reached modest tributaries and
wetlands in Rapanos v. United States.142 In a plurality opinion that did little to
resolve the issue, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, stood
with the developers, concluding that the definitional term “waters of the
United States” refers only to “relatively permanent, standing or flowing bod-
ies of water,” not “occasional[ ],” “intermittent[ ],” or “ephemeral” flows.143
As for wetlands, the plurality would have limited the statutory reach to only
those wetlands with a “continuous surface connection” to a traditional (navi-
gable) “water[ ] of the United States.”144
A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy in Rapanos advocated a case-
by-case approach that would allow regulation of wetlands and tributaries with
a “significant nexus” to navigable waters.145  In the years following Rapanos,
136 Id. at 174.
137 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) as an indication that Congress chose to “recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States . . . to plan the devel-
opment and use . . . of land and water resources”).
138 Id. at 184 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The “Migratory Bird Rule” first appeared in
the preamble to a 1986 version of the Corps’ definition of “navigable waters.”  51 Fed. Reg.
41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).  The preamble stated that the 1986 version was not intended to
alter the Corps’ jurisdiction, but was simply to “clarif[y]” the scope of existing regulations.
Id.
139 Definition of Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1998).
140 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15, 2003).
141 Id. at 1998.
142 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
143 Id. at 732–33.
144 Id. at 742.
145 Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The “significant nexus” test was foreshadowed
in SWANCC and in Riverside Bayview Homes:
It was the significant nexus between the wetlands and “navigable waters” that
informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes. . . . [W]e did not
“express any opinion” on the “question of the authority of the Corps to regulate
. . . wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of open water . . . .”
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Justice Kennedy’s test has become the rule implemented by the lower courts
as well as the EPA and the Corps.146
Chief Justice Roberts, in his concurrence, lamented the agencies’ failure
to resolve the issue through notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Agencies . . . are afforded generous leeway by the courts in interpreting the
statute they are entrusted to administer.  Given the broad, somewhat ambig-
uous, but nonetheless clearly limiting terms Congress employed in the Clean
Water Act, the Corps and the EPA would have enjoyed plenty of room to
operate in developing some notion of an outer bound to the reach of their
authority.
. . . Rather than refining its view of its authority in light of our decision
in SWANCC, and providing guidance meriting deference under our gener-
ous standards, the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially boundless view of
the scope of its power.  The upshot today is another defeat for the
agency. . . . [This] situation could have been [readily] avoided.147
Despite Justice Roberts’s admonishment, the agencies have yet to issue a
rule on the jurisdictional scope of the CWA.  In 2011, they released “draft
guidance” on identifying waters and wetlands protected under the CWA, and
then in 2012, they submitted their final guidance to the White House Office
of Management and Budget for review.148  But “guidance” does not carry the
same weight as a regulation issued through notice-and-comment rulemaking
processes.149
Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001) (alterations in
original) (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 n.8
(1985)).
146 See United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007); No. Cal. River Watch v.
City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gerke Excavating,
Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006).  At least one court would uphold CWA jurisdiction if
either the Scalia or Kennedy tests were met.  United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir.
2006).  Meanwhile, the agencies have issued Draft Guidance on Identifying Waters Pro-
tected by the Clean Water Act, which includes all waters with a “significant nexus” as
“described by Justice Kennedy.” EPA & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DRAFT GUIDANCE ON
IDENTIFYING WATERS PROTECTED BY THE CLEAN WATER ACT 4, 7–10 (2011), http://
water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/wous_guidance_4-2011.pdf; see infra
notes 502-06 and accompanying text (describing enforcement implications of Rapanos).
147 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 757–58 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted).  Chief
Justice Roberts added: “The agencies can decide for themselves whether . . . it was wise for
them to take no action in response to SWANCC.” Id. at 758–59 n.*.
148 See DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 146; EPA, CLEAN WATER ACT DEFINITION OF WATERS
OF THE UNITED STATES, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/CWA-
waters.cfm (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
149 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001) (observing that Chev-
ron deference does not apply to agency pronouncements that do not carry the force of law,
such as guidance documents); Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from
Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 772–73 (2007) (observing a trend away from
granting Chevron deference to anything other than regulations issued through notice-and-
comment rulemaking and formal adjudications); Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Discarded
Deference: Judicial Independence in Informal Agency Guidance, 74 TENN. L. REV. 1, 33 (2006)
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Likewise, Congress has failed to resolve the jurisdictional issues posed by
the ambiguous language of the CWA and the agency’s construction of that
language.  As Don Elliott, former General Counsel of the EPA under Presi-
dent George H. W. Bush, observed, “In an earlier era, without a logjam, one
might have anticipated that an issue of this nature could have been the sub-
ject of a compromise statutory solution somewhere along the way, balancing
the interests of developers and environmentalists in some sort of accommo-
dation.”150  But such is not the case.
In 2011, after the agencies issued their Draft Guidance on Identifying
Waters Protected by the Clean Water Act, the Senate took up a proposal “to
permanently block efforts to make sure that the most fragile waters are pro-
tected by the Clean Water Act.”151  Senators John Barrasso and Dean Heller
proposed a rider to the Energy and Water Appropriations bill “to prevent the
Corps from clarifying the extent to which wetlands and intermittent streams
are protected under the Clean Water Act.”152  If the bill’s authors had suc-
ceeded, it would have excluded around twenty percent of the wetlands in the
contiguous United States from protection.153  It did not, however, attain
passage.
The division of power between the Corps and the EPA came before the
Court in 2009 in Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council.154
The Court issued a proclamation that effectively rewrites the definitions of
“pollutant” and “fill,” further narrowing the scope of EPA’s power.  The
Coeur Alaska decision allowed a mine to turn a lake into a waste tailings pond
by calling its waste “fill” rather than a pollutant.  However, the statutory defi-
nition of “pollutant” includes the term “solid waste” and other terms that
would cover most types of mine tailings, including rock, sand, and industrial
(arguing that informal guidance gets more deference than the agency’s post-hoc litigation
position but less than formal rules).
150 Elliott, supra note 19, at 42.  Elliott notes that there have been several failed
attempts to reach a compromise, “including sending the issue to the National Academy of
Sciences, and drafting legislative language, which President Clinton threatened to veto.”
Id.
151 Steve Fleischli, Clean Water Under Attack—Again, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Nov. 11,
2011, 4:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-fleischli/clean-water-under-attack-
_b_1086775.html (citing H.R. Res. 2354, 112th Cong. (2011)).
152 Id. (citing H. R. 2354).
153 Id.  There have been other recent efforts in Congress to dismantle the CWA’s pro-
tection for wetlands.  These included a House Transportation Committee bill, H.R. 4965,
112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012), barring the Corps and EPA from issuing guidance or revising
their regulations based on such guidance regarding coverage of wetlands.  Also, Senator
Rand Paul’s Defense of Environment and Property Act of 2012, S. 2122, 112th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2012), would have limited the CWA only to waters that are navigable by boat or that
are permanent, continuously flowing, and connected to navigable waters.  Both the Senate
bill and its companion in the House, H.R. 4304, died in committee. See GOVTRACK, S. 2122
(112th): Defense of Environment and Property Act of 2012, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/112/s2122 (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
154 557 U.S. 261 (2009).
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waste.155  The issue was whether the mining company needed a dredge and
fill permit from the Corps, which would be relatively lenient, or a strict, tech-
nology-based § 402 pollutant discharge permit from the EPA.  The citizens’
suit argued that an EPA permit was required, but the agencies disagreed and
filed a brief in support of the mining company.156
According to the Court, because § 402 allows the EPA to issue permits
“[e]xcept as provided in . . . [§ 404],”157 if the mining company were eligible
for a 404 permit it would not need a 402 permit.  Eligibility for a 404 permit
depended on whether the tailings could come within the definition of “fill
materials” under § 404.  The agencies’ regulation defined “fill material” as
any “‘material [that] has the effect of . . . [c]hanging the bottom elevation’ of
water.”158  The mining company’s slurry met the regulatory definition of
“fill” because it would have the effect of raising the lake’s bottom
elevation.159
The plaintiffs raised two significant points based on the plain language
and the statutory objectives of the CWA.  First, the plaintiffs argued that
using a lake to dispose of mine tailings was the same as using the lake for
“solid waste” disposal.  Solid waste is listed in the statute as a pollutant,160
and, in turn, the agencies’ regulation treated “trash or garbage” as pollutants
rather than “fill.”161  In addition, CWA § 306(e) specifies “it shall be unlawful
for any owner or operator of any new source to operate such a source in any
standard of performance applicable to such source.”162  The EPA had
adopted new source performance standards for the particular mining process
proposed by Coeur Alaska, so the EPA’s new source standard should apply to
the mine.  The majority opinion gave these arguments short shrift.  In doing
so, it reached a result utterly at odds with the statutory purposes of restoring
and maintaining “the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters.”163  But Congress has remained silent.164
155 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2006).
156 Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 264.
157 Id. at 266 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)) (emphasis omitted).
158 Id. at 268 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2011)).  For regulatory history, see notes 283-
85 infra.
159 Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 289.
160 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2006).
161 Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at 275 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2011)).
162 33 U.S.C. § 1316(e) (emphasis added) (quoted in part in Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at
299 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
163 See Mark Squillace, The Judicial Assault on the Clean Water Act, 59 FED. LAW. 33, 33-34
(2012) (“These judicial efforts to scale back regulations pertaining to water pollution are
utterly at odds with Congress’ plain intent when it adopted the basic scheme of the CWA in
1972.”); notes 288-92, infra (describing application of the same provision, § 232.2, to coal
mining).
164 The Supreme Court issued another significant, but somewhat less controversial,
decision in 2009 in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009).  The issue involved
the appropriate standard for thermal discharges from power plants.  CWA section 316(b)
requires point source standards for cooling intakes to reflect the “best technology available
[BTA] for minimizing adverse environmental impact.” 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006).  In
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Some members of Congress have attempted to correct the Coeur Alaska
opinion, but to no avail.  In 2009, the Clean Water Protection Act was intro-
duced in the 111th Congress by Representatives Frank Pallone and Dave
Reichert.165  This Act would have changed the definition of “fill material” to
exclude mine waste and any other pollutant discharged into water primarily
to dispose of waste.166  The bill had 172 cosponsors, but died in committee.
It was re-introduced with 131 cosponsors in the 112th Congress, but it was
not passed.167  As of this writing, the bill has not been revived.168
In its 2012 opinion in Sackett v. EPA, the Court considered whether the
EPA’s issuance of an administrative compliance order to developers who had
not obtained a CWA § 404 permit was judicially reviewable.169  In unani-
mously rejecting the EPA’s position that it was not, the Court noted that an
administrative order was a “final agency action” that was therefore subject to
review under an APA provision authorizing review of “final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court . . . .”170  The decision
“overruled two decades worth of unanimous precedent from the federal
courts of appeals . . . .”171  Since the Sackett opinion was issued, there has
been a reduction in administrative compliance orders by twenty-six per-
cent.172  Although the long-term effects of Sackett have yet to be fully real-
ized, some scholars believe that the EPA could easily fix the problem
identified by the Court if it were to add modest procedural steps to its
enforcement processes.173  The broader significance of Sackett turns on
establishing the BTA standards, the EPA used a cost-benefit analysis, which opponents
argued was impermissible under the statute and the Court’s holding in EPA v. Nat’l Crushed
Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980). See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009)
(No. 07-588, 07-589 & 07-597), SP041 ALI-ABA 263; May, supra note 67, at 4.  The Court R
affirmed the EPA’s decision to allow existing power plants to avoid using a closed-cycle
system due to the high costs of such systems relative to the water quality benefits, and
rejected arguments based on the legislative history, which suggested that, although EPA
could consider costs in choosing “available” technologies for purposes of the BTA stan-
dard, it should not engage in a balancing of those costs relative to the benefits achieved.
Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. at 241–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165 H.R. 1310, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
166 See Jennifer Koons, Supreme Court Backs Army Corps, Mining Company in Alaska Water
Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/06/22/
22greenwire-supreme-court-backs-army-corps-mining-company-62747.html.
167 GOVTRACK, H.R. 1375 (112th): Clean Water Protection Act, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/112/hr1375#overview (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
168 Id.
169 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1369 (2012) (citing CWA §§ 309(a)(1), 404).
170 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
171 Craig N. Johnston, Sackett: The Road Forward, 42 ENVTL. L. 993, 993 (2012).
172 See Amena H. Saiyid & Jessica Coomes, EPA Issues Fewer Compliance Orders for CWA
Violations in FY 2012, 43 ENV’T REP. 3277, 3277 (2012) (reporting that the EPA issued 355
CWA compliance orders in FY 2012, compared to 479 in FY 2011, and that only 46 of those
orders in 2012 were for § 404 violations, down from 97 such orders in 2011).
173 See Albert Ferlo & Tom Lindley, Practical Impacts of the Sackett Decision, 42 ENVTL. L.
1009, 1020 (2012) (noting that the “extra” fieldwork and factual basis compelled by Sackett
will make enforcement “a slower and more arduous process for EPA,” but “if EPA does take
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whether its holding will be applied outside of the § 404 context.174  As the
Congressional Research Service reported to Congress: “[T]he legacy of Sack-
ett will be greater if the decision is viewed by lower courts as applying else-
where in the CWA outside § 404, and outside the CWA entirely.  No glib
prediction can be made as to this extra-section-404 application, since every
statute varies.”175
The Supreme Court took up two more potentially significant CWA cases
in its 2012–2013 term.  The first of them, however, turned out to be rather
unremarkable.  In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. County of Los Ange-
les, the Ninth Circuit held that a county flood control district must comply
with NPDES permits for urban runoff that collects in channelized systems
(known as municipal separate storm sewer systems or MS4s) that it had main-
tained and “improved” with concrete.176  The MS4 was a man-made construc-
tion through which water continues flowing to the unlined (naturally
occurring) portions of the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers.177  When the
offending pollutants were detected, they had not yet been discharged from
the point source—the MS4.178  The flood control district argued that, absent
an “intervening use or event,” the movement of stormwater from one chan-
nelized portion of a river to a lower portion of the same river does not consti-
tute a “discharge of any pollutant.”179
that time and make that investment, then an order’s recipient is less likely to challenge
that order, and even less likely to do so successfully”); Johnston, supra note 171, at 993. R
174 There is at least some evidence that the EPA is experiencing an across-the-board
chilling effect from Sackett, in that it issued 1088 total administrative compliance orders in
FY 2012, compared to 1324 in FY 2011.  Then again, FY 2012 saw a downward trend in civil
enforcement actions as well. See Jessica Coomes, EPA Intitiating Fewer Civil Enforcement
Cases, Prioritizing Larger, More Complex Cases, 43 ENV’T REP. 3285, 3285 (2012) (EPA initiated
3,027 cases in 2012, compared to 3,283 in 2011 and 3,436 in 2010); notes 507–10, infra
(describing implications of Sackett).
175 ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42450, THE SUPREME COURT ALLOWS PRE-
ENFORCEMENT REVIEW OF CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 404 COMPLIANCE ORDERS: Sackett v.
EPA 6 (2012), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/R42450.pdf.
The report noted that the “number of Section 404 [compliance orders] issued by EPA
during any given year is but a small fraction of the total number issued by the agency (in
FY2011, they constituted 97 out of 1,324 [total environmental compliance orders]).” Id.
176 673 F.3d 880, 900–01 (9th Cir. 2011).
177 Id. at 900.  As the Ninth Circuit noted, “[t]his issue does not usually arise in Clean
Water Act litigation because it is generally assumed that ms4s ‘discharge’ stormwater.” Id.
at 900 n.9.
178 Id. at 899.
179 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 20, L.A.
Flood Control Dist. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., No. 11-460, 2012 WL 4060063.  “[A]n
‘addition’ of pollutants does not occur when water is pumped between ‘two hydrologically
indistinguishable parts of a single water body.’” Id. (citing S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 109 (2004)).  “[T]he mere movement of pol-
luted water within a single water body does not constitute a pollutant ‘discharge’ even
when the movement results from human intervention [such as a pump].” Id.
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The Supreme Court held that the MS4 had made no “addition” of a
pollutant to navigable waters within the meaning of the CWA.180  The Court
concluded that it was bound by its previous decision in South Florida Water
Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,181 which held that the trans-
fer of water within a single body of water did not constitute an addition
within the meaning of the CWA.182  Indeed, in the wake of Miccosukee, it is
hard to argue that a discharge occurs when water—even polluted water—
“simply flows down a single river.”183  The United States pointed out the
absence of any evidence in the record to suggest that there were two separate
bodies of water.184  According to the United States, “No party has contended
that the river segments where the monitoring stations are located are ‘mean-
ingfully distinct’ from downstream portions of the rivers.”185  Even NRDC—
the citizen group plaintiff—agreed that there would be no liability for move-
ments of pollutants within the same waterbody under Miccosukee.186  At the
end of the day, Los Angeles County Flood Control had little effect on the CWA’s
overarching objectives and enforcement provisions.187
Stormwater runoff was also at issue in the second CWA case accepted in
the 2012–2013 term.  In Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, the
180 L.A. Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, No. 11–460, 2013 WL
68691, *713 (Jan. 8, 2013) (requiring permits for any “discharge of a pollutant,” defined as
“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source” (citing 33 U.S.C.
1311(a), 1362(12))).  Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion, with seven other Justices joining
it.  Justice Alito did not join it, but concurred in the judgment. Id.
181 Id. (citing S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95
(2004)).
182 Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. at 102, 105, 109–110.
183 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note
179, at 20. R
184 Id.
185 Id. at 21.  The U.S. opposed any holding that would craft “a per se rule that lining a
pre-existing river segment with concrete inherently transforms a single water body into
two.”  It explained: “To be sure, pollutant discharges did occur when stormwater flowed
into the two rivers from outfalls operated by petitioner and others that are located above
the monitoring stations. The subsequent flow of the rivers past the monitoring stations, however,
did not constitute a ‘discharge of any pollutant.” Id. (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court
agreed. L.A. Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 2013 WL 68691, *713.
186 William Buzbee, How the Los Angeles County Flood Control District MS4 Case Supreme
Court Loss is a Win for the Clean Water Act, CPR BLOG, Jan. 8, 2013, http://www.progressiver-
eform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=1BF6B21F-B185-5DE8-468CA81DF2806262.  Professor
Buzbee played an advisory role for the NRDC in the case. Id.
187 Id. As Buzbee explains, the outcome of the case could have been far worse from an
enforcement standpoint if the Court had reached the permitting issue rather than the
jurisdictional issue.  “[I]f the Los Angeles County District’s MS4 permit required particular
types of pollution control, water quality, and monitoring, and its monitoring revealed viola-
tions, then under decades of decisions, the District would be liable.  To hold otherwise
would undercut the centrally important federalism-linked strict liability, self-reporting per-
mit violation provisions of the CWA.” Id.; see 2013 WL 68692, *714 (stating that the permit
argument “is not embraced within, or even touched by, the narrow question on which we
granted certiorari”).
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Ninth Circuit held that runoff from logging roads is a point source discharge
when it is channeled through “discernible, confined and discrete convey-
ances” in a system of ditches, culverts, and channels, thereby subjecting the
runoff to NPDES permitting requirements.188  The Supreme Court
reversed,189 citing both the statutory definition of the term “point source”
and the 1987 CWA stormwater amendment.190  The latter provision brings
certain stormwater discharges, including those “associated with industrial
activity,” within the scope of the NPDES program but leaves other types of
stormwater to EPA’s discretion.  Despite the fact that logging roads contrib-
ute “up to 90 percent of the total sediment from forestry operations,”191 the
Supreme Court deferred to the EPA’s decision to exempt stormwater from
roads as non-industrial.192
The Ninth Circuit decision in Decker was far more consistent with the
CWA’s objective of restoring and maintaining the integrity of the nation’s
waterways.193  It would have brought the logging industry, like other catego-
ries of point sources, within the NPDES program, which has been “very effec-
tive at controlling . . . stormwater pollution.”194  To minimize the regulatory
burden, the EPA and authorized state agencies could have designed general
permits specifically for logging.195  Meanwhile, Congress has had over a dec-
ade to tighten its stormwater provisions or otherwise address discharges from
logging as well as the myriad types of nonpoint source pollution, but it has
failed to address these fundamental issues.
188 640 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 WL 2368685.  This was not the
Ninth Circuit’s first encounter with logging roads. See, e.g., Env’t Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 344 F.3d
832, 862–63 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting EPA’s position that its Silvicultural Rule prevented it
from regulating forest roads).
189 Decker v. Northwest Env. Def. Center, Nos. 11-338, 11-347, 2013 WL 1131708.
Recall that the EPA had previously sought to exclude all discharges “from agricultural and
silvicultural activities” from the NPDES program, but this argument was flatly rejected in
NRDC v. Costle because the EPA lacks authority to exempt entire categories of point
sources.  568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
However, Costle did not attempt to define the line between point and nonpoint sources.
190 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2006).
191 U.S. EPA, Managing Nonpoint Source Pollution from Forestry, http://water.epa.gov/
polwaste/nps/outreach/point8.cfm (last updated Aug. 22, 2012).
192 Decker, 2013 WL 1131708 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1) (1976)).  The EPA revised
its rule just a few days before oral arguments to “clarify” that discharges from logging roads
are exempt from NPDES requirements.  77 Fed. Reg. 72970 (Dec. 7, 2012). The new rule
states that silvicultural discharges may be evaluated under CWA § 402(p)(6), a provision
that allows “flexible approaches . . . to address the complexity of forest road ownership,
management, and use.”  Id. at 72,972.
193 Decker, 640 F.3d at 1079–80.
194 Paul Kampmeier, Are Clean Water Act Permits Required for Stormwater Pollution From
Industrial Logging Roads?, 43 ABA TRENDS 6, 7 (2012).
195 Id.
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B. Environmental Change and National Disasters
Warranting Congressional Attention
In addition to the spate of judicial activity since 1990, there have been at
least four significant changes and events deserving—but not receiving—con-
gressional attention.  All four relate to the nation’s insatiable demand for
fossil fuels.  First, climate change caused by greenhouse gas emissions, mostly
from power production, has given rise to two of the most catastrophic storms
the nation has ever seen—Hurricanes Sandy and Katrina.  Next, deepwater
oil exploration and development has led to the worst oil spill in our history—
BP’s Deepwater Horizon.  Third, increasing demand for fuel has stimulated a
dramatic increase in the use of a dangerous technique known as hydraulic
fracturing, or fracking, which has caused extensive environmental harm and
has severely depressed property values.  Finally, the production of coal and
the disposal of coal ash have contaminated or even smothered some of the
nation’s waterways and have destroyed many homes.  Congress has
responded with mere baby steps, at best dancing around the margins of these
issues and at worst obstructing regulatory efforts by the EPA.
1. Climate Change and Super Storms
For some if not most areas of the world, a dramatically warming climate
is creating a “no analog” future,196 with unprecedented variability in ecologi-
cal properties and processes.197  Over the coming decades, cli-
mate change will disrupt the human and natural environments even more,
“leading to social and environmental changes of a character and magnitude
not experienced in modern history.”198  Biologists have already begun to
observe significant shifts in the historic ranges of plant and animal spe-
196 Sandra Zellmer, Wilderness, Water, and Climate Change, 42 ENVTL. L. 313, 325-26
(2012) (examining the effects of climate change on wilderness areas, and noting that
“[s]torms, floods, drought, disease, insect infestation, fire, and species invasions are likely
to become more severe and widespread”).
197 J.B. Ruhl, The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, 97 MINN. L. REV. 206, 268
n.191 (2012) (describing “nonlinear feedback and feed-forward loops, previously unknown
emergent properties, and new thresholds of irreversible change”); see Matthew C. Fitzpat-
rick & William W. Hargrove, The Projection of Species Distribution Models and the Problem of Non-
Analog Climate, 18 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION 2255, 2255 (2009) (“By 2100, a quarter or
more of the Earth’s land surface may experience climatic conditions that have no modern
analog . . . .”).
198 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic Base-
lines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 9 (2011).
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cies.199  Dramatic changes in the physical environment are also being seen,
especially in coastal areas experiencing rising sea levels.200
A warming climate brings disastrous “super storms.”201  Scientists at the
National Center for Atmospheric Research have observed ocean tempera-
tures along the Atlantic coast at 3 degrees Celsius above normal (about 37
degrees Fahrenheit).202  Warmer water adds moisture to the atmosphere,
which in turn provides fuel for more intense storms.203
In October 2012, Hurricane Sandy worked its way up the Atlantic coast.
Hurricane force winds extended up to 175 miles from the eye of the storm
and cut a path as much as 820 miles wide.204  Sandy’s “destruction potential”
reached a 5.8 on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s 0
to 6 scale.205  When it hit the northeast, the storm pushed water levels up
10.5 feet in Asbury Park, New Jersey, 13 feet at Staten Island, New York, and,
at its highest, 19 feet in Long Branch, New Jersey.206
199 See Zellmer, supra note 196, at 331 (noting that studies of over 1700 species revealed R
“highly significant, nonrandom patterns of change in accord with observed climate warm-
ing in the twentieth century, indicating a very high confidence (>95%) in a global climate
change fingerprint”) (quoting Camille Parmesan & Gary Yohe, A Globally Coherent Finger-
print of Climate Change Impacts Across Natural Systems, 421 NATURE 37, 41 (2003)).
200 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521–22 (2007) (recognizing that climate-
induced sea-level rise has already begun to engulf coastal areas in the United States).
201 See Kathleen Hart, Markey, Waxman Release Climate Report, Urge Congress to Act on CO2
Emissions, SNL POWER DAILY, Sept. 26, 2012 ( “[T]he U.S. experienced near ‘apocalyptic’
weather this summer . . . .”); WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS REPORT (8th ed.
2013), available at http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-risks-2013-eighth-edition (“Fol-
lowing a year scarred by extreme weather, from Hurricane Sandy to flooding in China,
respondents rated rising greenhouse gas emissions as the third most likely global risk
overall.”).
202 Kevin Trenberth, Hurricane Sandy Mixes Super-Storm Conditions with Climate Change,
THINK PROGRESS, Oct. 29, 2012, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/10/29/1103711/
trenberth-hurricane-sandy-mixes-super-storm-conditions-with-climate-change/?mobile=nc.
Global warming contributes about twenty percent of the increased water temperature. Id.
The Atlantic coast is a “hot spot for climate-change induced sea level increases . . . with the
seas around New York now 2 inches higher than in 1990.”  Margaret Newkirk, Sandy’s Power
Dwarfed by Katrina’s Gutting of the Gulf, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 5, 2012, available at http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-05/sandy-s-power-dwarfed-by-katrina-s-gutting-of-the-
gulf.html.
203 See Trenberth, supra note 202 (“With every degree C, the water holding of the R
atmosphere goes up 7%, and the moisture . . . magnifies the rainfall by double that
amount compared with normal conditions.”).
204 See Trenberth, supra note 202; Jamila Trindle et al., Sandy Hits Coast, Floods New R
York, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2012, at A1.
205 Associated Press, Superstorm Sandy Deaths, Damage And Magnitude: What We Know One
Month Later, HUFF. POST, Nov. 29, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
11/29/superstorm-hurricane-sandy-deaths-2012_n_2209217.html [hereinafter Superstorm
Sandy Deaths] (citing National Hurricane Center data).
206 Newkirk, supra note 202. R
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Sandy killed over 100 people in the United States and 71 people in the
Caribbean.207  The elderly were especially hard hit; nearly half of the people
who died were 65 or older.208  Over five million people in the northeast were
left without electricity for days or even weeks.209  Several months after the
storm, some 3500 families in New York and New Jersey were still displaced,
living week-to-week in motels funded in part by the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency.210  Early estimates of the economic impacts of Hurricane
Sandy ranged up to $50 billion.211  Thousands of businesses were shuttered,
and New York State lost over 29,000 private jobs.212
As devastating as Sandy has been, in comparison, Hurricane Katrina,
which hit the Gulf Coast in 2005, was by far the costliest U.S. storm on
record.213  Katrina caused over $100 billion in economic losses (around $128
billion in current dollars).214  As for humanitarian costs, “Katrina was an
order of magnitude greater, in terms of loss of life [1,833 deaths], suffering
and the destruction of basic public infrastructure . . . .”215
Katrina’s storm surge was much higher than Sandy’s.216  On the coast of
Mississippi, the surge reached 27 feet and rushed as far as ten miles
inland.217  In New Orleans, the surge was somewhat more modest, reaching
15-19 feet.218  But because most of New Orleans is situated below sea level,
Katrina flooded eighty percent of the city.219  The movement of water from
the Gulf was facilitated by a network of canals that had been dredged to
accommodate oil and gas pipelines, as well as a navigational canal known as
the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, which served as a “hurricane highway” for
207 Superstorm Sandy Deaths, supra note 205. R
208 Mapping Hurricane Sandy’s Deadly Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2012/11/17/nyregion/hurricane-sandy-map.html.
209 Trindle et al., supra note 204. R
210 Katie Zezima & Meghan Barr, Displaced Hurricane Sandy Victims Get Temporary Shelter
at Hotels, HUFF. POST IMPACT, Jan. 25, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2013/01/
25/sandy-victims-hotels_n_2551005.html.
211 Erik Holm & Leslie Scism, Sandy’s Insured-Loss Tab: Up to $20 Billion, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 2, 2012, 9:41 AM, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204712904
578092663774022062.html.  Subsequent tallies have risen to $62 billion in damage and
other losses in the U.S., and at least $315 million in damage in the Caribbean. Superstorm
Sandy Deaths, supra note 205. R
212 Julie Turkewitz, Unemployment Deepens Storm’s Loss as Businesses Stay Closed, N.Y. TIMES
Dec. 27, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/28/nyregion/unemploy-
ment-deepens-the-loss-from-hurricane-sandy.html.  New Jersey lost 8100 jobs. Id.
213 For a detailed description of Hurricane Katrina and its impacts, see Christine A.
Klein and Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a Century of Unnatural
Disasters, 60 S.M.U. L. REV. 1471, 1499–503 (2007).
214 Newkirk, supra note 202; Superstorm Sandy Deaths, supra note 205. R
215 Newkirk, supra note 202 (quoting Michael Kistler, Director of Risk Modeling, Risk R
Management Solutions).
216 Id. (describing Sandy’s storm surge).
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
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the storm surge.220  The loss of coastal marshes to dredging activities along
the Gulf and to rising sea levels also contributed to the increased storm
surge.221
It took six days to evacuate the city.222  As a 2006 congressional report
put it, “thousands languished in heat and squalor on islands of concrete
highway, in darkened stadiums, in nursing homes, or on rooftops, waiting for
rescue, sometimes dying before help arrived.”223  Once they were able to
leave, many never came back.  As of the 2010 census, New Orleans had
almost 100,000 fewer people than it did before Katrina hit.224
In the weeks after Hurricane Katrina, Congress appropriated billions in
disaster relief,225 but since then it has made only modest changes in the law
governing federal flood insurance.226  It has also failed to adopt any signifi-
cant remedial legislation to enhance federal accountability for such disasters
220 See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 802, 807–11 (E.D.
La. 2008) (finding a consensus “concerning the funnel effect” of MRGO and other canals
and the levee systems built along their banks).
221 See St. Bernard Parish v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 528, 535–36 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (“By
1990, estimated wetland loss from . . . the Coastal Louisiana Hydrologic Basin Area . . . was
reported to be 74,800 acres, or an average of 1,290 acres per year between 1932 and
1990. . . . ‘Between 1956 and 1990, 68,600 acres of wetlands [about 67%] were lost in the
study area [as a result of] subsidence, navigational channels, oil and gas exploration and
production, development and storms[.]’” (citation omitted) (alterations in original));
Klein & Zellmer, supra note 213, at 1510 (“Although difficult to predict with precision, as a R
general rule of thumb, every two to four linear miles of coastal wetlands may reduce storm
surge by a height of one foot.”).  In response to concerns about the causal link between
wetlands and storm surge, Congress enacted the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection,
and Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 101-646, 104 Stat. 4778 (1990) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3951–3954 (2006)), a modest provision, in 1990.
222 Newkirk, supra note 202. R
223 COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, HURRICANE KATRINA: A
NATION STILL UNPREPARED, S. Rep. No. 109–322, at iii (2006).  The Report places the
blame squarely on federal, state, and local governments. Id.  As for the federal response, it
found that “Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff was ‘detached’ and that then-
Federal Emergency Management Agency Director Michael Brown was ‘clueless . . . .’”
Report: Katrina Response a ‘Failure of Leadership,’ CNN (Feb. 14, 2006), http://www.cnn.
com/2006/POLITICS/02/13/katrina.congress/index.html.
224 Newkirk, supra note 202. R
225 See Elizabeth Dwoskin, What You Need to Know About the Fight Over Hurricane Sandy
Relief, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 15, 2013, available at http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/2013-01-15/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-fight-over-hurricane-sandy-relief
(“On Sept. 8, 2005, President Bush signed off on $51.8 billion in emergency aid for the
victims of Hurricane Katrina . . . follow[ing] one for $10.5 billion that had been approved
on Sept. 2, only one week after Katrina hit the Gulf Coast.”).
226 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120
Stat. 1355, 1394 (2006) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 701 (2006)).  Congress refused to return
FEMA to its former independent status, but it elevated it within the DHS and gave its
administrator direct access to the President during disasters. See KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 33729, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT POLICY CHANGES AFTER HUR-
RICANE KATRINA 6 (2006).  Congress also appropriated funds for post hoc disaster relief.
Id.
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or to clarify the Corps’s responsibility for flood control.227  And it has utterly
failed to grapple with human-induced climate change, leaving the ever-
increasing emission of greenhouse gases to ad hoc, piecemeal initiatives,
many of which are happening at the state and local levels.228  To the extent
that the EPA has attempted to curb greenhouse gas emissions from power
plants and other industries,229 Congress has done its best to stand in the way,
227 Efforts to reform the Corps were raised in both chambers, in the form of revisions
to the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA), but Congress failed to act. See Daniel
A. Farber et al., Reinventing Flood Control, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1085, 1116–18 (2007).  Back in
1994, Congress adopted insurance reforms that strengthened requirements for insuring
structures within floodplains.  National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-325, 108 Stat. 2255 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5145a (2006)).  More comprehen-
sive legislation was introduced but tabled that year. See Janet Neuman, Are We There Yet?
Weary Travelers on the Long Road to Water Policy Reform, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 139, 146 (2010).
228 See John S. Gray, ‘A Glorious Mess’: Congress’ Creation If Its Inaction Forces EPA to Regu-
late Climate Change Under Existing Laws, 46-DEC HOUS. LAW. 30 (2008) (describing “little or
no momentum” to adopt climate legislation until the Supreme Court’s decision that EPA
must regulate CO2 if it poses an endangerment to health or welfare (citing Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007))); Andrew Wheeler, Clean Air and Climate Change: 111th Con-
gress—Prospects (ALI-ABA Course of Study Dec. 3–5, 2008), available at SP028 ALI-ABA 83
(2008) (describing congressional resistance to “a vast reordering of the American economy
in the name of solving a speculative problem”); Amy Harder, Perfect Storm Stifles Congress on
Energy, NAT. J. DAILY, Apr. 18, 2012 (“The gridlock in Congress has emboldened the
Obama administration to act unilaterally on issues traditionally dealt with on Capitol Hill,
such as oil and gas-drilling policies, fuel-economy standards, and clean-energy
incentives.”).
229 For EPA’s climate-related regulatory efforts after the Massachusetts decision, see
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg.
66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1); Prevention of Significant Deteri-
oration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71); Final Implementation Plans: Interstate Trans-
port of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals (also known as
the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule), 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011), vacated, EME
Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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both by obstructing new air pollution regulations230 and by encouraging ever
greater reliance on fossil fuels.231
2. The Deepwater Horizon Blowout
Our reliance on fossil fuels has also contributed to the largest oil spill in
world history.  The BP Deepwater Horizon spill began on April 20, 2010,
when the Macondo well exploded.232  Eleven workers were killed in the
explosion.233  Oil erupted out of the well.  Efforts to stem the flow failed
when a safety device, the “blowout preventer,” could not be activated.234  Eve-
rything that could go wrong did.  After a number of failed attempts, BP
capped the well eighty-six days later.235  Nearly 5,000,000 barrels of oil had
been released.236
Nearly three years later, no new substantive legislation has been
adopted.237  But the executive branch has been hard at work.238
230 See, e.g., Associated Press, House GOP Readies Ban on EPA Greenhouse Gas Regulations,
FOXNEWS (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/02/02/house-gop-readies-
ban-epa-greenhouse-gas-regulations/; see also Suzanne Goldberg, US Environmentalists Chal-
lenged to Get Climate Change Laws Through Congress, GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/17/us-environmental-groups-climate-change-legislation
(reporting that America’s environmentalists “grossly under-estimat[ed] the resistance to
any environmental measures from Republicans in Congress and the conservative Tea
[P]arty movement” (citing Harvard Professor Theda Skocpol)); Hart, supra note 201 (sum- R
marizing a report released by Reps. Markey, D-Mass., and Waxman, D-Calif., that explains
how the Republican congressional response to climate change “is to deny the science and
block action”); Carol Shea-Porter, Fix Congress to Fix Climate Change, DAILY KOS (Aug. 2,
2012, 11:19 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/08/02/1116101/-Fix-Congress-to-
Fix-Climate-Change (reporting that Congress took twenty-seven votes to block climate
change-related action in 2011); Richard W. Stevenson & John M. Broder, Speech Gives Cli-
mate Goals Center Stage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/
us/politics/climate-change-prominent-in-obamas-inaugural-address.html (describing how
the Administration has learned its “lessons from [its] first term, when [it] failed to win
passage of comprehensive legislation . . . [and] plans to . . . focus on what it can do admin-
istratively to reduce emissions from power plants, increase the efficiency of home appli-
ances and have the federal government itself produce less carbon pollution.”).
231 Brian Scheid, Energy Issues Likely to Play Role as Congress Tackles Tax Reform in 2013,
INSIDE ENERGY-FEDERAL LANDS 3, Jan. 7, 2013 (reporting that Democrats in the 113th Con-
gress hope to end billions of dollars in subsidies historically granted to the oil and gas
industry and to foster more support for renewable energy).
232 Sandra Zellmer, Joel A. Mintz & Robert Glicksman, Throwing Precaution to the Wind:
NEPA and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout, 2 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 62, 62 (2011).
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, Scientists
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/
us/03spill.html.
237 See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and
Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221, 249 (2012) (“[D]espite the largest oil spill
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL512.txt unknown Seq: 34 17-JUL-13 10:57
2356 notre dame law review [vol. 88:5
Immediately after the spill, President Obama created the National Com-
mission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Spill and Offshore Drilling to investi-
gate and advise on initiatives to prevent future oil spills.239  The report
included a variety of recommendations, most of which involve regulatory
changes by federal agencies.240  One of its suggestions had already been
implemented by Department of Interior Secretary Salazar, who had reorga-
nized the agency in charge of offshore drilling, the Minerals Management
Service (MMS), into three distinct agencies: The Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and
Office of Natural Resources Revenue.241  The division of labor between these
new agencies is designed to ensure greater accountability and oversight by
separating the conflicting missions formerly housed in MMS—resource eval-
uation and leasing, safety and environmental protection, and revenue collec-
tion and distribution.242
Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Justice engaged in its most aggres-
sive prosecution for an environmental disaster in Department history.243  BP
ultimately plead guilty to fourteen criminal charges related to the explosion
and agreed to pay $4.5 billion in fines and other penalties.244  The potential
in American history, legislative efforts to address deepwater drilling died in the Senate,
indicating that not every crisis is sufficient to generate reform legislation.”).
238 Juliet Eilperin, Troubled Waters: Federal Oversight of Offshore Oil Drilling, 17 ROGER WIL-
LIAMS U. L. REV 89, 95–96 (2012) (describing administrative responses to Deepwater
Horizon).
239 Exec. Order No. 13,543, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,397 (May 26, 2010).
240 NATIONAL COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILL-
ING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 215–306
(2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-
OILCOMMISSION.pdf [hereinafter DEEPWATER].
241 Secretarial Ord. No. 3299, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,051 (Oct. 4, 2010); see Eilperin, supra
note 238, at 95–96 (“The Office of Natural Resources Revenue . . . would oversee revenue R
collection.  The remaining agency would be split between the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management (BOEM), charged with managing U.S. offshore resources, and the Bureau of
Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), charged with enforcing safety and envi-
ronmental regulations.” (footnote omitted)).
242 See id. at 95–96; Noelle Straub, Interior Unveils Plan to Split MMS into 3 Agencies, N.Y.
TIMES (May 20, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/05/20/20greenwire-interior-
unveils-plan-to-split-mms-into-3-agen-72654.html.
243 See Clifford Krauss & John Schwartz, BP Will Plead Guilty and Pay Over $4 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/business/
global/16iht-bp16.html?pagewanted=all.
244 Id.  This includes eleven felony counts of misconduct or neglect for the deaths of
the workers killed in the explosion, one felony count of obstruction of Congress over BP’s
misstatements on the rate that oil was gushing from the well, and two misdemeanor counts
for violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Clean Water Act. Id. By compari-
son, Exxon paid only $25 million in federal criminal fines for the Exxon Valdez spill. Costs
of Spills, INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N LTD. (2010), http://www.itopf.com/spill-
compensation/cost-of-spills/.  In total, Exxon paid $3.8 billion in fines, clean-up costs, and
victim compensation.  Byron Pitts, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: 20 Years Later, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11,
2009, 1:39 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-4769329.html.
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for an even larger penalty related to the incident still looms: BP could face
$21 billion in civil fines under the CWA if it is found to have been grossly
negligent.245
The National Commission further recommended that Congress enact
legislation requiring oil companies to pay fees that would be used to fund
research and agency review, and also called on Congress to provide funding
for spill response.246  Although there have been countless hearings and sev-
eral proposed bills, nothing significant has been enacted to date.247
After the blowout, Senate and House committees in the 111th Congress
held over sixty hearings on a variety of issues related to deepwater oil devel-
opment, and members introduced over 150 proposals related to oil spills.248
Three of these proposals were enacted into law, but they concerned “short-
term matters that will not have a lasting impact on oil spill governance.”249
Two more broad-sweeping measures have passed the House but have failed
to gain support in the Senate: the Consolidated Land, Energy and Aquatic
Resources Act (CLEAR),250 which would establish new leasing standards and
provide funding to protect and maintain the coast, and the Protecting Invest-
ment in Oil Shale the Next Generation of Environmental, Energy, and
Resource Security Act (PIONEERS) Act.251  The main thrust of the PIO-
NEERS Act is to remove regulatory barriers for the production of oil shale,252
but an amendment was added that would establish a trust fund to restore the
economy and resources of the Gulf Coast, to be financed by penalties arising
245 See Krauss & Schwartz, supra note 243 (“Under the Clean Water Act, fines could R
range from $1,100 for every barrel spilled through simple negligence to as much as $4,300
a barrel if the company were found to have been grossly negligent.  With an estimated 4.9
million barrels of oil spilled in the accident, the company faces liabilities of as much as $5.4
billion to $21 billion.”).  BP also faces federal and state claims for damages to natural
resources. Id.
246 DEEPWATER, supra note 240. R
247 However, Congress did enact, and the President signed into law, the Pipeline Safety,
Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-90, 125 Stat. 1904
(codified at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 60138–60140 (2012)).  But it is directed toward pipeline safety
and is not a response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster.
248 See Andrew Hartsig, Shortcomings and Solutions: Reforming the Outer Continental Shelf
Oil and Gas Framework in the Wake of the Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL
L.J. 269, 288–99 (2011).
249 JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42371, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill:
Highlighted Activities 5 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42371.pdf
(citing Pub. L. No. 111-191, Pub. L. No. 111-212, and Pub. L. No. 111-281).  One appropri-
ations bill that was signed into law in 2010 requires the Coast Guard to issue regulations to
reduce the risks of oil spills involving the transfer of oil from or to a tank vessel, to report
to Congress on human errors that could cause oil spills, and to pursue stronger enforce-
ment of international agreements on oil spills, among other things primarily related to
tanker vessels.  Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-281, 124 Stat. 2905
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 and 46 U.S.C. (2006)).
250 H.R. 3534, 112th Cong. (2012).
251 H.R. 3408, 112th Cong. (2012).
252 Lamborn Introduces PIONEERS Act, CONGRESSMAN DOUG LAMBORN (Nov. 14, 2011),
http://lamborn.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=150&itemid=942.
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from the Deepwater Horizon spill.253  The Senate failed to pass reciprocal
legislation.254
The 112th Congress exhibited even less appetite for reforming deep-
water exploration and oil drilling.  A few committees held hearings on spill-
related issues, several of which considered the National Commission’s recom-
mendations.255  Some thirty proposals were introduced that would address
various spill-related issues, but none passed.256  Perversely, proposals that
would encourage offshore development have seen somewhat more legislative
interest.257
3. Hydraulic Fracturing
Hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” is a method of recovering oil and
natural gas from low permeability rock formations such as shale.258  High
pressure is used to pump fluids and “propping” materials, such as sand, into
the rock formations to crack them open, which releases oil and gas into the
well.259  Although fracking has been used since the 1940s, its use has esca-
lated dramatically in the past two decades in order to develop unconven-
tional oil and gas fields across the country, often in places where
253 For analysis, see RAMSEUR, supra note 249, at 5–6; JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. R
RESEARCH SERV., R41684, OIL SPILL LEGISLATION IN THE 112TH CONGRESS (2012), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41684.pdf.
254 S. 3663, the Clean Energy Jobs and Oil Spill Accountability Act of 2010, would have
been similar to the House’s CLEAR Act.  S. 3663, 111th Cong. (2010).  The bill got hung
up over the repeal of liability limits for oil spills. A Look over the Horizon: Oil Spill Legislation,
BLANK ROME LLP (Dec. 2010), http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentID=37&
itemID=2362.
255 RAMSEUR, supra note 249, at 5. R
256 Id. Congress did pass one piece of legislation related to pipeline spills, H.R. 2845.
The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-
90, 125 Stat. 1904.
257 For example, a provision of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 transfers
authority over air emissions off Alaska’s north coast from the U.S. EPA to the Department
of the Interior to minimize impediments to offshore energy development.  Pub. L. No.
112-74, § 432, 125 Stat. 786, 1049 (2011) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7627 (2006)).
258 See BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42502, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
AND THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (NEPA): SELECTED ISSUES 1 (2012), availa-
ble at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42502.pdf.
259 See Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 n.1 (M.D. Pa.
2010) (“[P]ressurized fluids are used to dislodge and release natural gas from deep under-
ground formations.”).  The chemical makeup of these fluids varies by producer and by
region, and their quantities and proportions “are generally unknown.” Marcellus Shale,
N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION (2013), http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/46288.
html. See Krishna Ramanujan, Study Suggests Hydrofracking Is Killing Farm Animals, Pets, COR-
NELL UNIV. CHRONICLE ONLINE (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/
March12/FrackingAnimals.html (noting that legislation, secrecy, and non-disclosure
agreements have allowed fracking companies to keep the proprietary chemicals used in
their propping fluids secret).
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development had not been economically feasible in the past.260  This growth
has been stimulated both by technological advances and by sharp increases in
gas prices.261
The dramatic growth of fracking has raised concerns about ground-
water contamination.262  In 2008, a quarter of water wells near the gas fields
in Wyoming’s Sublette County were found unsafe for drinking due to con-
tamination by benzene, sulfates, chloride, and other pollutants.263  In addi-
tion, the fracking process requires significant amounts of water so it is often
conducted in close proximity to rivers, streams, and lakes, making surface
water contamination a distinct possibility.264
Reports about the adverse effects of fracking have failed to prompt fed-
eral legislation governing unconventional oil and gas operations.265  To the
contrary, in the 2005 Energy Bill, Congress exempted onshore oil and gas
facilities from both the Safe Drinking Water Act266 and from stormwater per-
260 Norimitsu Onishi, Vast Oil Reserve May Now Be Within Reach, and Battle Heats Up, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2013, at A9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/us/vast-oil-
reserve-may-now-be-within-reach-and-battle-heats-up.html?pagewanted=all (reporting that
developers are eyeing the “largely untouched” crude oil reserves of the Monterey Shale in
California).
261 See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
A PRIMER ES-1 (2009), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publica-
tions/epreports/shale_gas_primer_2009.pdf [hereinafter MODERN SHALE GAS] (“Techni-
cally recoverable unconventional gas (shale gas, tight sands, and coalbed methane)
accounts for 60% of the onshore recoverable resource [in the U.S.]”).
262 MURRILL, supra note 258, at 1; see Carolyn F. Burr et al., Water: The Fuel for Colorado R
Energy, 15 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 275, 294–96 (2012) (describing how contamination
from fracking could occur).
263 Susan Phillips, EPA Blames Fracking for Wyoming Groundwater Contamination,
STATEIMPACT: PENNSYLVANIA (Dec. 8, 2011, 1:34 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/penn-
sylvania/2011/12/08/epa-blames-fracking-for-wyoming-groundwater-contamination/.
264 MODERN SHALE GAS, supra note 261, at Forward; see Marcellus Shale, supra note 259 R
(noting that fracking often requires over one million gallons of water per well).
265 The EPA and the Department of Interior have taken some steps to increase infor-
mational transparency through studies and regulations governing fracking on federal pub-
lic lands, Lena Groeger, 40 Acres and a Rule: Draft Federal Fracking Regs Cover Only A Sliver of
Land, PROPUBLICA (May 8, 2012, 10:04 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/40-acres-
and-a-rule-draft-federal-fracking-regs-cover-only-a-sliver-of-land, but Congress has
threatened to block even those modest efforts.  For example, in 2012, Republican Senator
James Inhofe introduced the Fracturing Regulations Are Effective in State Hands Act,
described as: A bill “[t]o clarify that a State has the sole authority to regulate hydraulic
fracturing on Federal land within the boundaries of the State.”  S. 2248, 112th Cong.
(2012).
266 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1) (2006).  The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300f (2006), requires permits for the underground injection of hazardous substances in
order to protect drinking water supplies.  The Energy Policy Act of 2005 exempted the
underground injection of fluids or propping agents, other than diesel, that are used in
fracking.  Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 322, 119 Stat. 594, 694 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 300h(d) (2006)).
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mitting requirements under the CWA.267  The latter exemption was fore-
shadowed by the CWA amendments of 1987, when Congress required EPA to
develop a permitting program for stormwater runoff from industries and
large municipalities but exempted oil and gas exploration, production, and
processing operations from the permitting requirements.268  EPA had con-
strued the 1987 provision as requiring stormwater permits for oil and gas
construction facilities larger than five acres,269 but Congress disagreed.270
A few corrective bills have been proposed, but none has passed.271
Instead, Congress merely directed the EPA to “examine the relationship
between hydraulic fracturing and drinking water resources.”272
In the absence of a satisfactory federal response, several states have taken
matters into their own hands.  In 2010, New York’s House Assembly voted to
prohibit hydraulic fracturing statewide for eleven months due to concerns
about drinking water contamination.273  In 2011, Maryland passed the Mary-
land Shale Safe Drilling Act, which bans hydraulic fracturing on the western
side of the state until 2013.274  Other states have undertaken more modest,
case-by-case approaches.275
267 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(24) (2006) (“The term ‘oil and gas exploration, production,
processing, or treatment operations or transmission facilities’ means all field activities or
operations . . . including activities necessary to prepare a site for drilling and for the move-
ment and placement of drilling equipment, whether or not such field activities or opera-
tions may be considered to be construction activities.”).
268 Id. at § 1342(l)(2).
269 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990 (Nov. 16, 1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c)(1)(iii)).
270 33 U.S.C. § 1362(24) (2006).  The EPA subsequently revised its regulations to
exempt oil and gas construction activities from its stormwater permitting requirements, 71
Fed. Reg. 33,628 (June 12, 2006) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(2)(ii)), but the revi-
sion was invalidated. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 526 F.3d 591, 607–08 (9th Cir.
2008) (“[W]e conclude that EPA’s inconsistent and conflicting position regarding the dis-
charge of sediment-laden storm water from oil and gas construction sites causes its . . . rule,
40 C.F.R. § 122.26, to be an arbitrary and capricious one.”).  For the EPA’s regulatory
response, see CHARLES G. GROAT & THOMAS W. GRIMSHAW, FACT-BASED REGULATION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT, 41 (2012) (“[O]il and gas opera-
tors must obtain a stormwater permit . . . for the construction of a well pad and access road
that is one acre or greater, but they need not obtain such a permit for any uncontaminated
stormwater from the drilling and fracturing operation.”).
271 See Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act, H.R. 1084, 112th
Cong. (2011); S. 587, 112th Cong. (2011) (repealing the Safe Drinking Water Act exemp-
tion for fracking and requiring disclosure of chemicals used).  For details, see Bruce M.
Kramer, Federal Legislative and Administrative Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing Operations, 44
TEX. TECH L. REV. 837, 855–57 (2012).
272 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES vii (2011).
273 Cameron Jefferies, Unconventional Bridges over Troubled Water—Lessons to Be Learned
from the Canadian Oil Sands as the United States Moves to Develop the Natural Gas of the Marcellus
Shale Play, 33 ENERGY L.J. 75, 105–06 (2012).
274 Id.
275 See, e.g., Andrew Maykuth, Pa. Orders Company to Halt Drilling After Well Blowout, PHIL.
INQ. (June 8, 2010), http://articles.philly.com/2010-06-08/news/24961451_1_eog-resour
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4. Coal Mining and Ash
Twenty percent of America’s total energy demand, and forty-two percent
of its electricity demand, is met by burning coal.276  Mining and burning coal
is one of the oldest forms of fossil fuel energy production, but it comes at a
high price to human health and the environment, when it is mined, when it
is burned, and when the residual ash is put to rest.
A technique widely used in the Southeast known as mountaintop
removal is especially problematic.  Appalachian coal mining has been the
driving force of that region’s economy since the 1880s.277  In 2000 alone,
mines in this area produced over 1 billion tons of coal—more than half of
the United States’ total production.  The coal generally occurs in narrow
seams separated by dirt and rock called “overburden.”  In the past miners
removed the coal by drilling passageways, or shafts, into the mountainsides.
In the mid-1990s, a more efficient method of surface mining—mountaintop
removal—became prevalent throughout Appalachia.  It involves placing
explosives at various points around a mountaintop and blasting off the over-
burden, which is then removed using draglines—gigantic machines that can
scoop 100 tons of loose overburden at a time—allowing access to the exposed
coal seams.278
Mountaintop removal exacts a heavy toll in both environmental and
social costs.  It results in severe environmental degradation by literally flatten-
ing mountains and transforming densely forested mountaintops to treeless
terraces and plateaus.  The displaced overburden becomes “valley fill,” which
is pushed into valleys that typically contain headwater streams.279  This has
permanently filled thousands of stream miles, destroying water quality and
causing more severe and more frequent flooding in the region.280  Residents
are exposed to flash floods, polluted drinking water, thick dust, and the
never-ending noise created by explosions at the mining operations, many of
which operate twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.281
ces-blowout-drilling-operations (“Pennsylvania environmental officials on Monday sus-
pended drilling operations of a Marcellus Shale natural-gas operator whose Clearfield
County well erupted last week into an uncontrolled geyser of gas and wastewater.”).
276 Coal, INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH, http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/
energy-overview/coal/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
277 This background is derived from Sandra Zellmer, Mountaintop Removal, CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2009), http://www.progressivereform.org/perspMt_top.cfm.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21421, MOUNTAINTOP MINING:
BACKGROUND ON CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 1 (2012) (“[A] single fill may be over 1,000 feet
wide and over a mile long. . . . EPA estimates that since 1992 almost 1,200 miles of Appa-
lachian streams were buried by surface coal mining practices . . . . As a result, streams are
eliminated, stream chemistry is harmed by pollutants in the mining overburden, and
downstream aquatic life is impaired.”).
281 Id.; see Paul A. Duffy, How Filled Was My Valley: Continuing the Debate on Disposal
Impacts, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 143 (2003) (discussing recent legal developments
related to surface mining); Patrick C. McGinley, From Pick and Shovel to Mountaintop
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A federal district court enjoined the Corps from issuing § 404 permits
for mountaintop removal overburden valley fill, and held that § 404 does not
allow the filling of streams and other waters solely for the purpose of waste
disposal.282  The ruling was consistent with the long-standing 1977 version of
the Corps’s regulations, which defined the term “fill material” as material
used for the primary purpose of replacing aquatic area with dry land or of
changing the bottom elevation of a water body, thereby precluding activities
that were intended as a means of waste disposal.283  As a result, permits for
disposal of mining overburden and other pollutants must be issued by the
EPA or a delegated state under § 402, which requires the imposition of strict
technology-based requirements, including, where feasible, zero discharge.284
That regulatory definition stood for twenty-five years, when in 2002 the
Corps and the EPA revised their regulations to an effects-based test, which
defined “fill material” as any materials that had the effect of changing the
bottom elevation of a water body.285  The Corps’s permitting process under
§ 404 is far more lenient than the EPA’s § 402 program and even allows the
Corps to issue nationwide permits (NWPs) for activities that “cause only mini-
mal adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will have
only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment.”286  NWPs cir-
cumvent the in-depth analysis and public participation that would otherwise
be triggered by individual permit applications.287  From 2002 to 2010, hun-
dreds of mountaintop mining operations were authorized by the Corps
under NWP-21, adversely affecting thousands of stream miles and the com-
munities that relied on them.288
Removal: Environmental Injustice in the Appalachian Coalfields, 34 ENVTL. L. 21 (2004)
(describing the history and adverse effects of mining techniques).
282 Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927, 931,
945 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) (“[T]he final rule [is] fundamentally inconsistent with the CWA, its
history, predecessor statutes, longstanding regulations, and companion statutes.”), vacated,
317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003).
283 Permits for Discharges of Dredged or Fill Materials into Waters of the United States,
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(2) (1977).
284 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006).
285 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129, 31,131 (2002).  The agencies reasoned that “[s]imply because a
material is disposed of for purposes of waste disposal does not . . . justify excluding it
categorically from the definition of fill.  Some waste (e.g., mine overburden) consists of
material such as soil, rock and earth, that is similar to ‘traditional’ fill material used for
purposes of creating fast land for development.” Id.
286 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2006).
287 See COPELAND, supra note 280, at 3 (“Nationwide permits cover approximately R
74,000 activities annually (about 90% of total Corps permits) and involve less regulatory
burden and time than authorization by individual permits.”).
288 ROYAL C. GARDNER, LAWYERS, SWAMPS, AND MONEY 68 (2011).  The Corps, under the
direction of the Obama Administration, suspended NWP-21 in 2010.  75 Fed. Reg. 34,711
(June 18, 2010).  It reinstated NWP-21 in 2012 but limited its application to valley fills of
300 linear feet or less.  77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,274 (Feb. 21, 2012).  However, the new
NWP-21 allows district engineers to waive that limit “for the loss of ephemeral or intermit-
tent stream bed if they make a case-specific determination that the proposed activity will
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL512.txt unknown Seq: 41 17-JUL-13 10:57
2013] treading  water 2363
Moreover, since 2002, the Corps has also issued § 404 permits for many
other types of activities that discharge waste into the nation’s waterways.  For
example, a gold mining company received a permit to discharge 4.5 million
tons of chemically processed tailings through a three-mile long pipeline from
its gold mine into Lower Slate Lake in Alaska.  The Supreme Court upheld
this permit in its Coeur Alaska decision.289
However, an intrepid district court in West Virginia enjoined the Corps
from issuing § 404 permits for valley fills290 and found the 2002 regulation
“fundamentally inconsistent with the CWA, its history, predecessor statutes,
longstanding regulations, and companion statutes.”291 The Fourth Circuit
reversed, concluding that the Corps’s interpretation of “fill” was entitled to
deference.292  As a result, the Corps remains in charge of fill from
mountaintop removal, but the EPA has occasionally exercised its statutory
veto authority under the CWA to prevent the most environmentally destruc-
tive mines.293
The end of the power production process is equally problematic.  Burn-
ing coal to generate electricity creates nearly 140 million tons of scrubber
sludge and ash every year, over sixty percent of which is dumped into
unlined, earthen embankments and ponds.294  The embankments occasion-
ally burst, and wastewater and leachates are sometimes intentionally pumped
result in minimal individual and cumulative adverse effects on the aquatic environment.”
Id. at 10,203.
289 See supra notes 154–163 and accompanying text. R
290 Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927, 946
(S.D. W. Va. 2002).
291 Id. at 945.  It stated that the 2002 regulation “was designed simply for the benefit of
the mining industry and its employees,” and that it turned the CWA on its head by author-
izing “polluting and destroying the nation’s waters for no reason but cheap waste disposal.”
Id. at 946. For a detailed description, see George Cameron Coggins & Robert L.
Glicksman, Scope of the Dredge and Fill Permit Program—Relationship to NPDES Permit Program,
2 PUB. NAT. RESOURCES L. § 19:17 (2012).
292 Kentuckians for Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 448 (4th Cir.
2003). The Fourth Circuit subsequently reversed another district court decision that had
invalidated mountaintop removal for violating the CWA and NEPA. See Ohio Valley Envtl.
Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc denied, 567 F.3d 130
(4th Cir. 2009).
293 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2006); see Juliet Eilperin, Obama Administration Cracks Down on
Mountaintop Mining, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2011, 10:46 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/13/AR2011011307095.html (reporting that EPA
had vetoed a permit for the nation’s largest surface mine that “would use destructive and
unsustainable mining practices that jeopardize the health of Appalachian communities
and clean water on which they depend”).  A federal district court struck down the veto,
however, holding that the EPA lacked authority to revoke a permit two years after it had
been issued by the Corps.  Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 850 F. Supp.
2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012).  The EPA has appealed.  Rose Ellen O’Connor, EPA Fights to Stop
Large Mountaintop Coal Mine, DC Bureau Blog, 2013 WLNR 6512161 (Mar. 15, 2013).
294 AMERICAN COAL ASH ASS’N, 2008 Coal Combustion Product (CCP) Production & Use Sur-
vey Report (2008), available at www.recyclingfirst.org/pdfs/46.pdf; see Eric Schaeffer, Coal
and the U.S. Economy, 13 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 131, 133–34, 137–38 (2011); Shaila Dewan, Coal
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out of ash and sludge impoundments and released into rivers to make room
for more waste, making power plants the second largest source of heavy
metal discharges in the United States.295
The nation’s attention became focused on the coalfields in 1972, when a
huge waste impoundment at Buffalo Creek, West Virginia collapsed.  Its
floodwaters destroyed 500 homes, killed 125 people, and left 4,000 home-
less.296  It became impossible for Congress to ignore the enormous costs that
the mining industry had externalized onto coalfield communities, and in
1977 Congress passed the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
(SMCRA) to counter the impacts of unregulated mining.  SMCRA was
intended to promote social and environmental justice in coalfield communi-
ties through a strict regulatory program that would hold coal companies
accountable for their actions.  Congress gave the Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) in the Department of the Interior
authority to issue regulations, approve or disapprove state permit programs,
oversee state administration, and provide federal programs for states that do
not take over administration.297  SMCRA recognized mountaintop removal
as a legitimate mining technique, albeit one that requires stringent regula-
tion and reclamation.
Under the 1980 Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments, the EPA was to
determine how to regulate the massive quantities of coal ash waste within two
years of enactment.298  Although the EPA promised to develop disposal stan-
dards, it has failed to do so.299
In 2008, a huge coal ash pond at the Kingston power plant burst, dump-
ing 300 million gallons of sludge into the adjacent river and the surrounding
lands.300  Officials at the Tennessee Valley Authority, which operates the
plant, initially said that 1.7 million cubic yards of wet ash spilled when the
retaining wall of the pond gave way.301  The TVA subsequently obtained an
aerial survey that showed the actual amount of ash was 5.4 million cubic
yards, or enough to cover 3,000 acres one foot deep.302  River water tested
Ash Spill Revives Issue of Its Hazards, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/12/25/us/25sludge.html.
295 See Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.
gov/tri/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (listing electric utility industry as second to the paper
industry in terms of toxic releases).
296 Zellmer, Mountaintop Removal, supra note 277, at 2.
297 30 U.S.C. § 1211 (2006).
298 42 U.S.C. § 6982(n) (2006).
299 Notice of Regulatory Determination on Wastes from the Combustion of Fossil Fuels,
65 Fed. Reg. 32,214 (May 22, 2000) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261); Schaeffer, supra note
294, at 133–34. R
300 Dewan, supra note 294. R
301 Id.
302 Shaila Dewan, Tennessee Ash Flood Larger Than Initial Estimate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27,
2008, at A10.
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near the spill showed elevated levels of lead and thallium, which can cause
birth defects and other serious health disorders.303
The Kingston coal ash pond is just one of over 1,300 similar impound-
ments in the United States.304  Many of these dumps contain arsenic, lead,
mercury, selenium, and other harmful heavy metals.  Yet they are not subject
to federal regulation.305  “Water contaminated by coal ash violated federal
drinking water or health standards at [sic] at least 197 sites in 37 states,”
according to the environmental group Earthjustice.306  The EPA gave forty-
five ponds a “high hazard potential rating,” meaning that if the ponds break,
lives would be lost.307  In the two years following the Kingston spill, power
plants deposited over 200 million tons of ash or sludge into ponds and
landfills.308
If coal ash were categorized as a hazardous waste, the EPA would have
direct authority over it, rather than leaving it to the states, and new, more
protective handling procedures would be imposed on utilities.309  In the
wake of the Kingston disaster, the EPA proposed hazardous waste-coal ash
regulation, but opposition from Congress brought the rulemaking to a
standstill.310
303 Shaila Dewan, Huge Coal Ash Spills Contaminating U.S. Water, N.Y. TIMES (last visited
Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/world/americas/07iht-
sludge.4.19164565.html?pagewanted=all; see LINDA LUTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41341, REGULATING COAL COMBUSTION WASTE DISPOSAL: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 6–7 (2012)
(listing antimony, arsenic, barium, beryllium, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury, nickel,
selenium, silver, and thallium as contaminants present in coal ash and noting that “[t]he
disposal of CCW [coal combustion waste] is essentially exempt from federal regulation”).
304 Id.
305 Id.; see LINDA LUTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42847, H.R. 2273 AND S. 3512: ANAL-
YSIS OF PROPOSALS TO CREATE A COAL COMBUSTION RESIDUALS PERMIT PROGRAM UNDER
RCRA (2012), available at http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/CRS_Rpt_R42847.
pdf.
306 Juliet Eilperin, Coal Ash Decision Stymied in Election Year, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2012),
available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-14/national/35499874_1_coal-
ash-ash-ponds-hazardous-waste.
307 Id.
308 News Advisory, ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY PROJECT (Dec. 21, 2012), available at http:/
/www.environmentalintegrity.org/news_reports/documents/122112EIPTVAAnniversary
ReportnewsadvisoryFINAL1.pdf.
309 Eilperin, supra note 306. R
310 Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Spe-
cial Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg.
35,128 (June 21, 2010), (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 257, 261, 264, 265, 268, 271, 302); see Lisa
Evans, Groups Across U.S. United Against Coal Ash Bill, EARTHJUSTICE (Sept. 14, 2012, 11:27
AM), http://earthjustice.org/blog/2012-september/groups-across-u-s-unite-against-coal-
ash-bill (describing opposition to S. 3512, the Coal Ash Recycling and Oversight Act of
2012, which would prevent the EPA from issuing regulations for coal ash sludge or waste-
water); Ken Ward Jr., Years After Tenn. Disaster, Coal-Ash Rules Still Stalled, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL (Dec. 22, 2012), http://wvgazette.com/News/201212220034 (describing
companion House bill); see also Eilperin, supra note 306 (“Despite ongoing controversy— R
in the last week and a half alone environment groups have sued 14 power plants in North
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In addition, national effluent standards for toxic wastewater discharges
from ash ponds should have been established under the CWA several
decades ago, but they too have yet to be issued.311  As a result of a threatened
lawsuit by Defenders of Wildlife and other environmental groups, EPA
agreed to a consent decree with a 2014 deadline for issuing the effluent stan-
dards.312  EPA plans to coordinate its rules for both wastewater discharges
under the CWA and coal ash disposal under RCRA.313  However, the waste-
water rulemaking has been delayed once again, and the timing of both rules
remains uncertain.314
III. CONGRESS IS BROKEN
There’s something unique afoot in Congress in recent decades.  From
the heightened influence of campaign financing to a dramatic increase in
the use of filibusters, significant institutional forces are working against sub-
stantive legislative initiatives.  No doubt, when it comes to legal reforms,
“[courts]—and indeed the law itself—have a cultural conservative bias.
Grounded in rules, orderliness, and stability, they inevitably tilt toward the
Carolina and four in Illinois over coal ash contamination—no one expects anything more
to happen before the election.”); Robert B. Semple Jr., Last Lap for Transportation Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2012, at SR-12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/opin-
ion/sunday/last-lap-for-transportation-bill.html (“[T]he House has tied itself in knots . . .
with extraneous amendments . . . requiring President Obama to approve the risky Keystone
XL pipeline, shortchanging environmental reviews and preventing the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency from regulating toxic coal ash.”).  For the likely effects of the pending bills,
see LUTHER, supra note 305. R
311 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006).
312 Groups Applaud EPA Action to Reduce Water Pollution From Power Plants, PR NEWSWIRE
(Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/groups-applaud-epa-action-to-
reduce-water-pollution-from-power-plants-106957693.html.
313 See id. (explaining that EPA officials have tried to coordinate efforts to revise the
power plant effluent limitation guideline under the CWA and the coal combustion residu-
als disposal rule under RCRA).
314 Id.; see EIP and Allies Agree to Short-Term Extension for Release of EPA Toxic Wastewater
Guidelines, ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY PROJECT (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.environmental
integrity.org/news_reports/12_11_2012.php; OMB’s Role in Regulation: Helping or Hurting?,
CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, http://www.progressivereform.org/OMBrole.cfm (arguing
that the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) “saddled EPA’s
original proposal with a cost-benefit analysis that would make it all but impossible for EPA
to describe plainly hazardous coal ash as a hazard”); Ben Somberg, Coal Ash Comments
Submitted: Get Serious, Please, CPRBLOG (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.progressivereform.org/
CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=6526AB97-F7B7-5041-07C82CA8D677CDB3 (arguing that EPA must
retake control of a process “hijacked by OIRA,” and that President Obama must force
OIRA “to stop serving as a conduit for industry, and to leave the scientific judgments in the
hands of the agencies designated by Congress”); Steinzor Comments on EPA’s Coal Ash Propo-
sal, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.progressivereform.org/
articles/Coal_Ash_Comments_NR_111910.pdf (placing the blame for the failed rulemak-
ing efforts primarily on OIRA, which imposed a watered-down, regulation on EPA).
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status quo.”315  Yet legislative reforms do occasionally pass, and people
expect their elected representatives to make improvements in the laws that
govern our daily lives and well-being.  Although Congress has managed to
break the gridlock and pass remedial packages in certain areas, such as
health care and banking, since 1990, it has been virtually useless when it
comes to environmental law.
A. Partisanship and Money
In recent years, institutional impediments to legislative action have
gained force.  Among the most troubling of these changes include exemp-
tions from campaign financing limits, the growth of powerful and uncompro-
mising single-issue interest groups, and the increasing frequency of filibusters
in the U.S. Senate.316  While other scholars have addressed these issues more
extensively,317 a brief assessment is warranted here.
The Senate has become “the highest hurdle” for legislation to clear.318
The difficulty of passing laws in the Senate is by design, to some extent.319
The Federalist Papers and the Records of the 1787 Convention are peppered
with statements about how the Senate should restrain the “excess of law-mak-
ing,” which Madison and others described as a “disease[ ] to which our gov-
ernments are most liable,”320 and, in particular, to “check the precipitation,
changeableness, and excesses” of the rabble-rousers in the House.321  In
recent decades, however, the Senate has operated as a super-majoritarian
body due to the routine use of the filibuster and related devices.322  Accord-
315 John D. Leshy, Reflections on Social Change and Law Reform, 84 COLO. L. REV. 217, 219
(2013).
316 LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST (2011); Elliott, supra note 19, at 39; Leshy, supra R
note 315, at 220–21. R
317 For examples of this discussion from this Symposium, see Gerard N. Magliocca,
Don’t Be So Impatient, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2157 (2013); John C. Roberts, Gridlock and
Senate Rules, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189 (2013).
318 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Senate: Out of Order?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1046
(2011); see Barbara Sinclair, The New World of U.S. Senators, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 1,
17–18 (Lawrence Dodd & Bruce Oppenheimer eds., 9th ed. 2009) (detailing the increase
in the number of bills passed in the House but not the Senate).
319 See Leshy, supra note 315, at 219 (describing the law’s inherent bias toward R
stability).
320 Bruhl, supra note 318, at 1048 n.28 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); see Ewing & Kysar, supra note 30, at 353–54 (2011) R
(“Our ‘preference for passivity,’ built out of ‘the idea that we are more endangered by
government action than inaction,’ has become a dangerously double-edged sword . . . .
[E]ffective public action may be thwarted by Madison’s all-too-familiar nightmare, in which
‘heterogeneity of interests . . . prevent[s] the majority coalition from doing anything at
all . . . while simultaneously facilitating the ability of self-interested minorities to loot the
federal fisc.’” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).
321 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 512 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966).
322 See Bruhl, supra note 318, at 1043–44.  Some types of legislation are not subject to
filibusters, including certain trade agreements and some aspects of the federal budget.
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ing to Senator Tom Udall, there have been more filibusters since 2006 than
the total that were in play between 1920 and 1980.323  The Senate Republi-
cans of the 111th Congress broke the record for the number of filibusters in
a session, passing 100 cloture votes in the first eleven months.324
By any of the standard measurements of legislative productivity—the
total number of bills passed, the number of floor votes taken in each cham-
ber, or the number of bills signed into law—Congress had its least-productive
year in modern history in 2011325 and was well on its way to the least produc-
tive session in modern history.326  It passed only eighty bills in 2011, which is
far fewer than any other session since the infamous “do nothing” 80th Con-
gress of 1947-1948, and only half as many as the next worse Congress (the
104th Congress of 1995-1996).327
There was little improvement when the 111th Congress gave way to the
112th, which is being billed as the “most polarized [session] since the end of
Reconstruction.”328  This is saying quite a lot, considering that all five of the
SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? 185–94 (1997); Bruhl, supra
note 318, at 1047 n.26.
323 Tom Udall, Senate Rules: Common Sense Reform, TOM UDALL: SENATOR FOR NEW MEX-
ICO (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.tomudall.senate.gov/?p=blog&id=1151.
324 Steven R. Hurst, GOP Filibuster Record: Republicans Using Obstruction Tool with Astonish-
ing Frequency, HUFF. POST POLITICS (Mar. 1, 2010, 2:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2010/03/01/gop-filibuster-record-rep_n_480722.html; see Julian Zelizer, Gridlock in
Congress? Blame the GOP, CNN OPINION (May 21, 2012, 8:55 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2012/05/21/opinion/zelizer-congress-polarization (“Since 2007, the Senate Historical
Office has shown, Democrats have had to end Republican filibusters more than 360 times,
a historic record.”).  The only way to stop a filibuster is by invoking cloture under Senate
Rule XXII. Filibuster and Cloture, U. S. SENATE http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/his-
tory/common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
325 Stephen Dinan, Congress Logs Most Futile Legislative Year on Record, WASH. TIMES, (Jan.
15, 2012), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/15/congress-
logs-most-futile-legislative-year-on-reco/?page=all.
326 Ezra Klein, 14 Reasons Why This Is the Worst Congress Ever, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG,
(July 13, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/
07/13/13-reasons-why-this-is-the-worst-congress-ever/.
327 Id. Although it passed few bills, the 111th Congress passed at least one very signifi-
cant piece of legislation signed by the President: the Health Care Law, which was enacted
in 2010. See, e.g., NPR Staff and Wires, Obama Signs Historic Health Care Legislation, NPR
(Mar. 23, 2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12505
8400.  It also appropriated over $1 trillion to revive the economy.  Brad Plumer, The Stimu-
lus Bill, Three Years Later, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Feb. 17, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/the-stimulus-bill-three-years-later/2012/02/
17/gIQAdS2LKR_blog.html.
328 Id. One way to determine the level of polarization in Congress is the Congressional
Quarterly’s Party Unity score, which measures how many times a majority of one party
opposed a majority of the other.  “In 2011 . . . the House set a new record on that measure,
with 75.8 percent of its roll call votes pitting Democrats and Republicans against each
other.” Id.  The DW-Nominate system, which measures coalitions in Congress—who votes
together and how often—places the 112th Congress at the top of the polarization scale
since Reconstruction, too. Id.
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worst performances on record were in the past decade, according to an analy-
sis by The Washington Times.329  Four of those sessions were when Democrats
were in control and Republicans were in the minority.330  In many ways, how-
ever, the fifth one—the 112th Congress’s Republican-controlled House—has
been worse.  Instead of passing any of the requisite appropriations bills that
keep the government running,331 and instead of raising the debt ceiling to
ensure against a government default on international loans and a global
financial crisis, the House devoted immense amounts of time attempting to
repeal the 2008 Affordable Care Act—the Democrats’ “signature legislative
achievement.”332  In fact, as of September 2012, the House had voted thirty-
three times to repeal the Act, despite the absolute certainty that the Senate and
the President would never authorize repeal.333
Perhaps the inability to get things done is a reflection of divided govern-
ment.334  After all, when there is a member of one party in the White House
and a different party in either the House or the Senate (or both), it is not
easy to set aside partisan differences and hammer out compromise agree-
ments that can be enacted as law.  However, there have been many instances
of divided government during periods of immense legislative activity.  Even
the 104th Congress somehow managed to pass 333 laws, despite concerted
efforts of Republican Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich to stonewall Presi-
dent Clinton and the Democrats in Congress at every turn.335
Then why are we seeing so much grandstanding in recent sessions?  And
why is so little attention being paid to the public interest?  Professor Lessig
explains the etiology and consequences of today’s campaign-finance-driven,
self-aggrandizing Congress:
[C]orruption does indeed wreck our democracy. . . . [It is fostered by a con-
gressional] system that has evolved the most elaborate and costly bending of
democratic government in our history. . . .
329 Dinan, supra note 325.
330 Id. (“Using the Resume of Congressional Activity, printed in the Congressional
Record at the end of each year since 1947, The Times ranked each session on all six of the
measures, then compiled the rankings into a ‘legislative futility’ index.  In 2011, the Senate
ranked poorly on all measures relating to bills. . . . [Although] [t]he House record was
more mixed[,] . . . it passed the fewest number of bills in its history and had fewer bills
signed by the president than any other Congress. . . . .”).
331 Klein, supra note 326. The 112th Congress is not the first Congress to fail to pass R
the thirteen appropriations bills that fund the federal government, but most have passed at
least three of them.  The 112th Congress has passed none.  Id.
332 Id.
333 Id.  See Democratic Leader’s Press Office, Polling Memo: The GOP’s blemished brand -
“Still ‘Dog Food,’” Cong. Docs., Oct. 3, 2012, 2012 WLNR 21031645 (“The GOP can’t find
time to work on jobs, a Farm Bill, or the Violence Against Women Act, but they found
enough to vote more than 30 times to repeal the Affordable Care Act.”).
334 See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, MILES TO GO (1996) (“[I]n the Senate a party can
win a majority, organize the body, and need minority votes the very next week.”).
335 See Klein, supra note 326. R
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. . . [W]hen democracy seems a charade, we lose faith in its process. . . . [T]o
more rational souls, the charade is a signal: spend your time elsewhere,
because this game is not for real.  Participation thus declines, especially
among the sensible middle.336
According to Lessig, when “rational souls” drop out, public policy “gets
driven by the extremists at both ends.”337  Thomas E. Mann and Norman J.
Ornstein agree that we are experiencing the most dysfunctional Congress of
the past forty years, but they place the blame squarely on the Republicans in
both houses of Congress.
[W]e have no choice but to acknowledge that the core of the problem lies
with the Republican Party.
The GOP has become an insurgent outlier in American politics.  It is ideo-
logically extreme; scornful of compromise; unmoved by conventional under-
standing of facts, evidence and science; and dismissive of the legitimacy of its
political opposition.338
Mann and Ornstein conclude, “When one party moves this far from the
mainstream, it makes it nearly impossible for the political system to deal con-
structively with the country’s challenges.”339
Yet despite these impediments, in the past decade, reform legislation has
been adopted in national security,340 banking and bankruptcy,341
whistleblowing,342 patent law,343 wages,344 and health care.345  Part of it is
336 LESSIG, supra note 316, at 8–9. R
337 Id. at 9.
338 Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, Let’s Just Say It: The Republicans are the Prob-
lem, WASH. POST: OPINIONS (Apr. 27, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-04-
27/opinions/35453898_1_republican-party-party-moves-democratic-party.  Mann and Orn-
stein expanded on this riff in their recent book. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN,
IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS (2012).  The authors make an extraordinarily credible
partnership—Mann is a fellow at the Brookings Institution, often billed as a liberal or
centrist think tank, and Ornstein is a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, which
has a conservative reputation.
339 Mann & Ornstein, supra note 338. R
340 After September 11, 2001, Congress passed eight major statutes addressing terror-
ism and national security.  Peter Baker & Jonathan Weisman, Deal Spotlights Rarity of Biparti-
san Action, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2008, at A10, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/24/AR2008012402993.html.  One of these, the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, created the Department of Homeland Security—the first
new cabinet department since 1989.  6 U.S.C. § 316 (2006).
341 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 256,
has been billed as the most substantial revision of bankruptcy law since the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Code.  Eugene R. Wedoff, Major Consumer Bankruptcy Effects of the 2005 Reform Legisla-
tion, SL068 ALI-ABA 1 (Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://www.ilnb.uscourts.gov/
opinions/JudgeWedoff/s256_main_points6.pdf.
342 In 2010, in response to a series of corporate scandals that defrauded countless inves-
tors, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act, one of the most significant financial reform efforts since the Great Depression.
Section 922 amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding § 78-u6, entitled
“Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (Supp. 2011).
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crisis driven—from the September 11 attacks to the mortgage meltdown to
the Enron scandal.  But even when facing dire circumstances, several of these
bills “barely survived despite the Democrats’ numerical strength, and they
did so only in a highly compromised (some might say disfigured) form.”346
It is no stretch to conclude that Congress is broken, and many credible
scholars and political analysts have done just that.347  While it may be possi-
ble to reform some of the problems that plague Congress, including the
excessive use of the filibuster in the Senate, it would be exceedingly difficult,
particularly when it comes to environmental law, and it may not be worth the
candle.348
B. Congressional Apathy Toward the Environment
If national security breaches, banking scandals, and other crises have
acted—albeit rarely—to break up the logjam in Congress, why haven’t envi-
ronmental crises stimulated some kind of response?  Most tellingly, there has
been no comprehensive substantive response to the BP Deepwater Horizon
blowout, despite its environmental devastation and long-lasting societal and
economic impacts.349  Similarly, Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy prompted
This new Section required the SEC to enact a whistleblower program to pay rewards to
individuals who provide information about possible securities violations.  Dodd-Frank sig-
nificantly improved existing whistleblower-protection laws, most notably the relevant provi-
sions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural
Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1107, 1108, 1138–41 (2006)
(analyzing ability of Sarbanes-Oxley to motivate and protect employee whistleblowers who
attempt to expose wrongdoing).
343 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified
in various sections of 35 U.S.C); see Nicholas W. Stephens, From Forest Group to the America
Invents Act: False Patent Marking Comes Full Circle, 97 IOWA. L. REV. 1003, 1006 (2012) (assess-
ing the new patent law).
344 Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. III 2009) (supersed-
ing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)).
345 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012) (reviewing the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act., 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).  Going back even further,
when the Court struck down a portion of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (1994), in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997), Congress took corrective action by passing the Religious Land Use and Institution-
alized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2000).
346 Bruhl, supra note 318, at 1045.  “The healthcare law was profoundly influenced by
the need to secure sixty votes.  The stimulus bill took the shape it did based largely on the
need to satisfy Susan Collins, a minority-party Senator . . . . What made her critical was her
ability to deliver the pivotal sixtieth vote.” Id. at 1045–46 (footnotes omitted).
347 See supra notes 316, 317, 336–38, and accompanying text.
348 See Bruhl, supra note 318, at 1053–54 (explaining that the difficulty of reforming
the Senate stems from the Senate’s own rules for changing the rules).
349 See supra Part III.B.2.
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only modest changes in federal law,350 and other deeply troubling environ-
mental issues have received no remedial action from Congress.351
It is fair to surmise, then, that there is something unique about environ-
mental law that exacerbates tendencies to gridlock.  In 2008, the New York
University School of Law devoted a two-volume symposium issue of its envi-
ronmental journal to the environmental “logjam” in Congress.352  The issue
included over thirty articles from scholars, government officials, representa-
tives of non-profit organizations and think tanks, and students.  The vast
majority of these articles grappled with the reasons for, and the conse-
quences of, the past twenty years of environmental gridlock.  According to
the symposium organizers, there are four primary reasons for the logjam: (1)
people want greater environmental protection but aren’t willing to pay for it;
(2) current regulatory approaches foster turf wars between federal and state
regulators, wasting resources and good will; (3) existing statutory provisions
make it difficult to openly weigh environmental and economic trade-offs; and
(4) regulatory approaches are too compartmentalized by media-specific and
agency-specific (and even agency division-specific) tasks and objectives oper-
ating independently of each other.353  These reasons may explain some of
the resistance to congressional reform, but there are other compelling rea-
sons as well.  In particular, many of the most pressing problems of the 1970s
have already been addressed, with a reasonable degree of success,354 and the
remaining environmental issues are more complex, more difficult, more
transboundary in nature, and more controversial:
[E]nvironmental law has been a victim of its own success.  Our area is no
longer in a crisis (or perceived crisis) that causes it to take priority over other
more pressing national problems such as terrorism and the financial crisis—
as it once was when the Cuyahoga River caught fire, Kepone poisoned the
James River, children in the inner city suffered retardation from lead in gas-
oline, and we believed that PCBs and other chlorinated organics were caus-
ing wide-spread sterility in the animal kingdom and otherwise destroying
nature.355
In addition, there was a greater degree of respect for science in the
1970s and 1980s.  By contrast, the modern Congress has exhibited a remarka-
ble degree of disdain for science in just about every area,356 but especially
350 See supra Part III.B.1.
351 See supra Part III.B.2–4.
352 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 1, 1–1046 (2008).  Three of the organizers subsequently pub-
lished a book on the subject: DAVID SCHOENBROD ET. AL., BREAKING THE LOGJAM (2010).
353 SCHOENBROD, supra note 352, at 4–7.  The authors propose four corresponding R
principles to guide environmental reform efforts.  Two of them would rely more heavily on
market-based approaches and more (quantity and quality) cost-benefit analyses.  The third
would devolve more responsibility to state and local governments. The fourth, which is the
only one I support, would make regulatory approaches less compartmentalized and more
holistic and polycentric. Id. at xii.
354 See Zellmer, supra note 40, at 1233. R
355 Elliott, supra note 19, at 37.
356 See supra note 338 and accompanying text (quoting Mann and Ornstein). R
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when it comes to the environment.357  Its scorn has been especially evident
in debates about climate change.358  Professor Angelo describes this new
“anti-science” movement:
[T]he public and our political systems [are] becoming more skeptical of
science and less open to incorporating new scientific developments into the
law. . . . [S]cience frequently is used to justify predetermined results.  If the
scientific information does not support the predetermined result, it is
ignored or discredited as being “junk science.”359
The problems of the 1970s were both more tangible and more personal,
which made seemingly hyper-technical scientific debates less necessary.  By
1970, both Congress and the White House had taken notice of “a rising surge
of deeply-felt moral, cultural, and communitarian public expectations and
demands.”360  Smoldering and foamy rivers, beach closings, fish kills, species
extinctions, and publicity about carcinogenic chemicals and radiation from
nuclear power plants fueled the public’s concern.  According to John Whita-
ker, who served as President Nixon’s Domestic Council Associate Director for
Environmental Policy, “there is still only one word, hysteria, to describe the
Washington mood on the environment issue in the fall of 1969.”361
Thousands of demonstrations took place across the nation, including on the
first Earth Day on April 22, 1970, showing an intense level of public
engagement.362
In addition to fear, Americans felt shame, too, particularly when the first
astronauts came back from the moon with stunning—and humbling—
images of the continent “covered with clouds of pollution.”363  Senator
Edmund Muskie gave voice to these sentiments:
We are confronted with the terrible prospect that the American dream of
the good life may turn out to be a nightmare.  Our efforts to improve our
357 See Mary Jane Angelo, Harnessing the Power of Science in Environmental Law: Why We
Should, Why We Don’t, and How We Can, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1527, 1530–34 (2008).
358 See JAMES LAWRENCE POWELL, THE INQUISITION OF CLIMATE SCIENCE 187 (2011)
(“The clock is ticking.  Our leaders do not have the luxury of waiting decades to find out if
scientists are right about global warming.”).
359 Angelo, supra note 357, at 1564 (footnote omitted); see Holly Doremus, Scientific R
and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1611–17 (2008) (describ-
ing the recent trend of politicizing science either by government officials pressuring
agency scientists to alter results to support their political agenda or by criticizing scientists’
work as junk science whenever it cuts against the political agenda).
360 Mark Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution Control Law, 71 MINN. L. REV. 19, 23
(1986).
361 JOHN C. WHITAKER, STRIKING A BALANCE 27 (1976).  Whitaker was also the Undersec-
retary of Interior. John C. Whitaker, NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM, http://www.
nixonlibrary.gov/forresearchers/find/textual/central/smof/whitaker.php (last visited
Mar. 9, 2013).
362 Sagoff, supra note 360, at 27.  Sagoff draws parallels with the Civil Rights Movement, R
which also demonstrated a high degree of public engagement in politics, and the public’s
demands for human rights, protection, and compensation. Id. at 24.
363 Id. at 26.
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lives may have created hazards from which there is no escape.  From this
time forward we must devote as much energy and ingenuity to the elimina-
tion of man-made hazards to man as we have to the expansion of his ability
to harness energy and materials to his desires.364
Both political parties rushed, opportunistically, to respond to public sen-
timent.365  Beginning with the 1968 election, both touted environmental
protection as their clarion cry, and both the Nixon White House and Con-
gress, which was controlled by Democrats, competed for the environmental
torch.366  The result was “a process of ambitious, aspirational environmental
legislation.”367  The CWA, the Clean Air Act, the ESA, and NEPA are among
these statutes.368
By the 1980s, most Americans still supported the “grand vision” of the
1970s environmental legislation—a vision that former EPA Administrator
William Ruckelshaus described as “the essential unity of nature and of the
need for bringing industrial society into harmony . . . .”369  But the public’s
belief that the nation could achieve the ambitious environmental aspirations
of the 1970s through stringent technology-forcing legislation had been
shaken.370  Statutory deadlines were missed, horror stories of expensive but
ineffective regulations abounded, and people lost faith in the government’s
364 Edmund Muskie, . . . and from Senator Muskie, in THE ENVIRONMENT 15, 16 (Fotune
ed., 1970).
365 Elliott, supra note 19, at 40; see Sagoff, supra note 360, at 21–22 (describing how R
environmental law grew up in the 1970s, when “[e]ditorial opinion, political rhetoric, and
expert testimony” came together with public sentiment to “condemn[ ] pollution as a sym-
bol of national irresponsibility for which the country would pay dearly”)
366 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 53–54 (2004); see E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a R
Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313,
324, 335–37 (1985) (describing the competition between Senator Muskie and President
Nixon as a “politicians’ dilemma,” which resulted in a version of the Clean Air Act that was
“more stringent than either of them would have preferred” due to their “policy escala-
tion”); David Vogel, A Big Agenda, 11 WILSON Q. 50, 57–58 (1987) (describing the “bidding
war” between Muskie and Nixon leading to the Clean Air Act of 1970).
367 Elliott, supra note 19, at 40. R
368 Other major pieces of legislation passed in the 1970s—and still intact today—
include the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y
(Supp. II 1972); the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300F–300J-10; and the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6987 (1976).  Keystone public land
conservation statutes were enacted as well, including the National Forest Management Act
of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1614 (1976), and the Federal Lands Policy and Management
Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1784 (1976).
369 Sagoff, supra note 360, at 19 (citing William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science, and Democ- R
racy, 1 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 19, 30 (1985)).
370 Id. at 19–20.  According to Sagoff:
[T]he sharp dichotomy between moral ends and prudential or expedient means
allows a distance to develop between legislated goals and the policies promul-
gated to implement them. . . . [I]nadequate implementation plans are approved,
deadlines are allowed to slip, violations are left unmonitored, compromising con-
sent decrees are signed, harmful pollutants are not listed, standards are set partly
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL512.txt unknown Seq: 53 17-JUL-13 10:57
2013] treading  water 2375
ability to identify the most serious environmental problems, to set appropri-
ate priorities, and to develop and enforce “technologically workable and
politically viable” regulatory solutions.371  At the same time, the Reagan
administration’s deregulatory agenda was fostering a major change in institu-
tional direction.372  Government regulation became the enemy, as it was per-
ceived as causing “higher prices, higher unemployment, and lower
productivity growth.”373  The Reagan administration was especially adept at
placing its anti-regulatory message at the heart of the public debate, “from
lobbying and campaign contributions to litigation and think tanks.”374
In 1981, President Reagan issued his regulation-curbing Executive
Order 12,291, which requires agencies to employ cost-benefit analyses for all
major proposed regulations.375  As a result, EPA and other regulatory agen-
cies increasingly relied on economic methods to craft and constrain their
initiatives, even when the statutes being implemented did not require such
methods.376
on economic grounds, scientific evidence is scanty and uncertain, and resolutions
are delayed indefinitely in litigation . . . .
Id. at 82–83.  As a result, people feel that the law has lost touch with reality, and they no
longer support it, even though they agree with its aspirational goals. Id. at 83.
371 See Adam Babich, Understanding the New Era in Environmental Law, 41 S.C. L. REV.
733, 736–37 (1990) (“The enormous scope and complexity of environmental problems
and resulting scientific and political uncertainties explain much of this failure. . . . A more
fundamental cause is rooted in the seemingly inherent inability of large government
bureaucracies to accomplish their missions efficiently.”).  For critical assessments of the
shortcomings of the 1970s-era pollution control laws, see Edmund Muskie, Reflections on a
Quarter Century of Environmental Activism: On Postponing Deadlines, Second-Guessing the Con-
gress, and Ignoring Problems Until It Is Too Late, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10081 (1988), and Barry
Commoner, Failure of the Environmental Effort, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10195 (1988).
372 See Jeffrey Rudd, The Evolution of the Legal Process School’s “Institutional Competence”
Theme: Unintended Consequences for Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1045, 1048 (2006).
373 William E. Kovacic, The Reagan Judiciary and Environmental Policy: The Impact of
Appointments to the Federal Courts of Appeals, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 669, 673 (1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
374 Jedediah Purdy, Our Place in the World: A New Relationship for Environmental Ethics and
Law, 62 DUKE L. J. 857, 859 (2013).  The anti-regulatory movement infiltrated the federal
judiciary as well; President Reagan consistently appointed conservative judges to the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts as part of his anti-regulatory agenda.  Kovacic,
supra note 373, at 678–79. R
375 Executive Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
376 See Rudd, supra note 372, at 1075–76; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, R
19–22 (2002); Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive
Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 558 (2004) (analyzing cost-benefit analysis in
the climate change policymaking).  According to Professor Richard Lazarus, the adminis-
tration’s emphasis on property rights and free market economics sparked a backlash of
public resistance to deregulation.  Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Gray-
ing of United States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in
the United States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 85–86 (2001).  He argues that environmental law’s
normative foundations remained secure until the Republicans gained control of Congress
in 1994 and launched their anti-regulatory “Contract with America.” Id. at 92–93; Richard
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Despite the anti-regulatory rhetoric of the 1980s, Congress was not quite
ready to give up on regulatory approaches.377  However, it began to broaden
its conception of environmental law.  Motivated by highly publicized disasters
such as Love Canal and Times Beach, it turned to the common law tort sys-
tem, which relies on civil liability as a means to control harmful behavior,
such as pollution control.378  The preeminent example of this new approach
to pollution control is the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),379 widely known as
Superfund, which imposes strict liability on parties responsible for releases of
hazardous substances, and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA), which created the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRKA).380  These statutes shifted the focus from pro-
spective regulation implemented by permit-wielding agencies to retroactive
liability.  They also placed greater responsibility on the private sector—both
businesses, who must analyze and address their potential environmental lia-
bilities or face potentially ruinous monetary judgments, and consumers and
neighbors, who were given the informational tools to monitor emissions and
seek recovery for contamination.381
The imposition of strict, retroactive liability has generated a great deal of
controversy,382 yet in terms of pollution control Superfund has been highly
successful.  When the statute reached its twenty-fifth anniversary in 2005, the
EPA reported “1,388 hazardous waste sites have been identified nationally,
and cleanup work has been completed on sixty-two percent of those
sites.”383  On average, Superfund responds to over 300 newly discovered
releases every year.384  Hundreds of former landfills and other contaminated
sites have been transformed into commercial, industrial, and residential
developments, recreational areas, and wildlife habitats.385
J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94
GEO. L.J. 619, 678–79 (2006).
377 See, e.g., supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text.  The Oil Pollution Control Act
of 1990 takes a hybrid approach, which utilizes a strict liability scheme to redress oil spills
along with design standards (double hulls) for large tankers to prevent or mitigate future
spills.  See supra notes 106–110 and accompanying text.
378 See Babich, supra note 371, at 735.
379 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6991i (2006).
380 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2006).
381 See Babich, supra note 371, at 735.
382 For a discussion, see Steven Ferrey, Allocation and Uncertainty in the Age of Superfund:
A Critique of the Redistribution of CERCLA Liability, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 36, 37 (1994) and
Elizabeth Rogers, Cleaning Up Superfund Law: Controversy over Liability Provisions Stalls
Reauthorization Drive, 83 ABA J. 91, 91 (Dec. 1997).
383 Molly J. Walker Wilson & Megan P. Fuchs, Publicity, Pressure, and Environmental Legis-
lation: The Untold Story of Availability Campaigns, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 2147, 2198 (2009) (cit-
ing U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Superfund, Superfund’s 25th Anniversary: Capturing the Past,
Charting the Future (2006)).
384 See U.S. EPA, Beneficial Effects of the Superfund Program 3 (2011), available at www.epa.
gov/superfund/accomp/pdfs/SFBenefits-031011-Ver1.pdf.
385 Id. at 12.
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Despite the success of past environment legislation, the bipartisan sup-
port for environmental protection and liability came to an end in 1990.386
Since then, there has been a “poisonous dynamic” where “both political par-
ties have degenerated into a ‘blood feud’ in which they would rather have an
environmental issue than a compromise that results in legislation to solve
environmental problems.”387
Market failures are part of the problem, but political failures are even
more to blame.388  Professor Amy Sinden explains how power disparities dis-
tort agency decision making and perpetuate environmental degradation:
The parties to environmental disputes are often vastly mismatched in terms
of wealth and power.  On one side, those who stand to benefit from environ-
mental regulation are usually large, diffuse groups of individuals, each of
whom shares a relatively small, often non-economic stake in the controversy.
On the other side, those who stand to lose from regulation tend to be rela-
tively small groups, made up primarily of corporations, each with a large
economic stake in the outcome of the dispute.  This mismatch produces sub-
stantial distortions in the political process and in associated government
decision making.389
Sinden describes environmental politics as “a struggle among self-inter-
ested groups for scarce public resources,” making the passage of legislation
imposing strict standards “unlikely at best.”390
The public also plays a role in congressional priority-setting.  One might
suspect that the biggest change since the 1970s and 1980s is the relative lack
of public support for environmental protection.391  If indeed the public is
apathetic about the environment, perhaps Congress is fulfilling its responsi-
bilities by doing nothing.  The polls do not bear this out, however.
386 See Elliott, supra note 19, at 45; David J. Sousa & Christopher McGrory Klyza, New
Directions In Environmental Policy Making: An Emerging Collaborative Regime or Reinventing Inter-
est Group Liberalism?, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 377, 421 (2007) (“In the 1990s, Republican leg-
islators had little interest in giving Clinton a legislative victory on environmental questions,
and environmental advocates were terrified of opening up the environmental laws to
greater flexibility in the conservative climate of the 104th and 105th congresses.”).
387 Elliott, supra note 19, at 24. R
388 See Sinden, supra note 18, at 1408–09 (describing the Tragedy of the Commons and R
other market failures).
389 Id. at 1409.
390 Id. at 1446 (footnote omitted).  Sinden suggests that protective environmental legis-
lation gets enacted during moments of “[c]ivic republicanism . . . [when] legislative out-
comes can reflect some conception of the ‘public good’ rather than a simple aggregation
of private preferences resulting from ‘deals’ among self-interested groups.” Id. at 1447.
Civic republicanism has a “clearer antagonism to a political process that is captured by
powerful groups and [a marked] discomfort with the concept of private preferences as the
building blocks of public policy.” Id. at 1449.
391 See Jeffrey M. Jones, Worry About U.S. Water, Air Pollution at Historical Lows, GALLUP
POLITICS (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/153875/Worry-Water-Air-Pollu-
tion-Historical-Lows.aspx (reporting that Americans’ concerns about pollution dropped
over 20 percentage points from the year 2000).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL512.txt unknown Seq: 56 17-JUL-13 10:57
2378 notre dame law review [vol. 88:5
According to a 2012 Pew survey on regulation, 70 percent of those
polled said they believed there was too much regulation, in the abstract, but
when regulatory topics were broken down into five distinct categories, the
vast majority said we needed more regulations on issues involving environ-
mental protection and food safety.392
When polled shortly before Earth Day 2011, three in four Americans
surveyed by Gallup said they worry a fair amount about contamination of soil
and water by toxic waste, pollution of rivers, lakes, and reservoirs, pollution
of drinking water, and the maintenance of the nation’s supply of fresh water
for household needs.393  Indeed, all four issues referring to “water” in the
2011 poll ranked in the top tier of environmental concern.394
When polled about climate change, however, Americans appear to be
less alarmed.  The lack of public concern about climate change may reflect
the lack of confidence in the science of things unseen, but it is more likely a
reflection of the public’s anxiety about the economic downturn and unem-
ployment.395  It may also be attributed, at least in part, to a failure in leader-
ship and the elite, partisan schism over the issue.  “ ‘When elites disagree,
polarization occurs, and citizens rely on other indicators, such as political
party or source credibility, to make up their minds.’”396  People use media
coverage to gauge the positions of party leadership, and they interpret the
news based on ideological affiliation.  Scientific messages, in particular, are
“often superseded by ideological considerations . . . .”397
If elite, partisan polarization is the root cause of the public’s relative
nonchalance about climate change, bold political leadership and clear mes-
392 Auto Bailout Now Backed, Stimulus Divisive: Mixed Views of Regulation, Support for Key-
stone Pipeline, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (Feb. 23, 2012), http://
www.people-press.org/2012/02/23/section-2-views-of-government-regulation/.  Pew repor-
ted that these responses “have changed little from July 1995.” Id.
393 Lydia Saad, Water Issues Worry Americans Most, Global Warming Least, GALLUP POLITICS
(Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/146810/water-issues-worry-americans-glo
bal-warming-least.aspx.
394 Id.
395 See generally Robert J. Brulle et al., Shifting Public Opinion on Climate Change: An Empir-
ical Assessment of Factors Influencing Concern Over Climate Change in the U.S., 2002–2010, CLI-
MATIC CHANGE (2012) 1, available at http://www.pages.drexel.edu/~brullerj/02-12Climate
ChangeOpinion.Fulltext.pdf (analyzing the “factors affecting U.S. public concern about
the threat of climate change between January 2002 and December 2010”); Eduardo Porter,
In Energy Taxes, Tools to Help Tackle Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2013, at B1, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/business/energy-tax-is-underused-tool-in-cli-
mate-change-fight.html?_r=0 (“[E]rratic weather across the country in the last couple of
years seems to be softening Americans’ skepticism about global warming.  Most New
Yorkers say they believe big storms like Sandy . . . were the result of a warming climate,” but
people still have little appetite for increased energy taxes.).
396 Brulle et al., supra note 395, at 17 (quoting S. McDonald, Changing Climate, Chang-
ing Minds: Applying the Literature on Media Effects, Public Opinion, and the Issue-Attention Cycle to
Increase Public Understanding of Climate Change, 4 INT’L. J. SUSTAINABILITY COMM. 45, 52
(2009)).
397 Id. at 8.
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saging could go a long way toward bringing public opinion around.  It
appears that the executive branch may be prepared to lead this charge even
if Congress is not, and that could be more advantageous than one might
think.398
IV. CONGRESSIONAL GRIDLOCK MAY NOT BE SUCH A BAD THING
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Putting our faith in Congress to adopt comprehensive environmental
reforms may be misplaced.  There are at least three reasons why environmen-
talists might worry less about congressional reform than about other priori-
ties:  the strength of the existing statutory framework; congressional capture;
and judicial review.
A. The Beauty of the Existing Statutory Framework
Calls for a legislative overhaul are premised on the assumption that the
existing statutory architecture is utterly defective, or that societal values or
physical circumstances have changed so significantly that the existing objec-
tives and approaches are incapable of serving our needs.399  Neither is true
when it comes to federal environmental law.400  It is not that the existing
environmental laws are fundamentally flawed, but that the “‘corrupting and
disproportionate influence of polluters’” stymies both on-the-ground imple-
mentation of existing requirements and regulatory progress.401
Yet it is hard to ignore the fact that decades of unyielding gridlock raise
significant concerns both for environmental law and, more sweepingly,
democracy.  Separation of powers, with its checks and balances to ensure
against improvident congressional action, is one thing, but congressional
obduracy is quite another, particularly in the face of mounting national and
global threats like climate change, sea level rises, drought, water-borne dis-
ease, and extinctions.402
On the other hand, even if Congress were motivated to adopt reforms,
environmentalists may not be happy with them.  If the ESA were to be revised
398 Juliet Eilperin, In Inaugural Address, Obama Makes a Moral Case for Action on Climate
Change, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-22/
national/36485834_1_climate-change-president-obama-renewable-energy (reporting Presi-
dent Obama’s commitment to galvanize public support for climate change regulation).
399 See Elliott, supra note 19, at 37 (“[P]assing environmental legislation requires that a R
majority of the players abandon their first-best preferences and settle for their second- or
third-best. This generally requires an actual or perceived crisis that changes the dynamic of
‘politics as usual’ by focusing public attention on the issue and temporarily forcing mem-
bers of Congress to put aside their usual political motivations.”).
400 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
401 Herman et al., supra note 12, at 10 (quoting Peter Lehner, Executive Director of R
NRDC, Address at N.Y.U. Envtl L.J. Symposium, The Logjam: Are Our Environmental Laws
Failing Us or Are We Failing Them? (Mar. 28–29, 2008)).  For detailed discussion of these
factors and ways to portage around them, see infra Part VI.
402 See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 30, at 411–12. R
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by Congress today, for example, it might be rescinded altogether or altered
beyond recognition, and not in a way that would protect species and their
habitats.  In response to the BP Deepwater Horizon Blowout, the House
would have lifted Obama’s moratorium on deepwater offshore drilling in the
Gulf and cleared away any semblance of environmental review for future
projects like BP’s, but the Senate stood in the way.  In the 112th Congress,
the top priorities of the House Energy and Commerce Committee included
rolling back the EPA’s “regulatory choke hold,” increasing domestic oil pro-
tection, and opposing renewable electricity standards, all in the name of lim-
iting government and promoting industry.403  One of the proposed bills
would have gutted the CWA’s ability to protect streams, lakes, and wetlands
from pollution from mining and other industrial activities.404
B. Capture
“Capture” describes the power relationships between government offi-
cials and the regulated industry.  As Lawrence Baxter explains, capture
occurs “whenever a particular sector of the industry, subject to the regulatory
regime, has acquired persistent influence disproportionate to the balance of
interests envisaged when the regulatory system was established.”405
The typical story of capture involves rent-seeking action before regula-
tory agencies by the regulated entities.  Regulated entities have an advantage
over members of the general public when it comes to influencing agency
policies. There are several reasons for this.  First, regulated entities can con-
trol the flow of information, “producing information asymmetries that make
it more likely agencies will adopt industry-favored policies.”406  In addition, it
is far easier for concentrated regulated interests to become politically organ-
ized than for individuals to do so.407  As a result of these and other phenom-
403 See Congress: EPA Rollback, Renewable Spending Oversight Among House Energy Commit-
tee’s Priorities, 42 ENVTL. REP. 101 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
404 See Clean Water Cooperative Federalism Act, H.R. 2018 (2012). For additional
examples, see CLEAN WATER ACTION, Congress Goes After the Environment, http://www.cle-
anwateraction.org/page/12-key-us-house-votes-fight-protect-our-environment-112th-con-
gress (visited Mar. 1, 2013).
405 Lawrence G. Baxter, “Capture” in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It Toward the
Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 176 (2011) (emphasis removed).
406 Shapiro, supra note 237, at 222.  Shapiro cautions, “The public choice accounts R
assume regulators are self-interested, but there is considerable evidence that public offi-
cials also have other-regarding motives.” Id. He concludes that agency capture is not
“automatically produced” by public interest dynamics. Id. at 227.
407 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 141–45 (1965).  Officials’ predi-
lection toward fulfilling their own self-interest, including employment with the regulated
entity after they complete their government service, is an additional reason for agency
capture. See Steven Croley, Interest Groups and Public Choice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW ***, 39 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds.,
2010).
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ena, regulated entities dominate the rulemaking process,408 and regulatory
results tend to be skewed in favor of them, typically in ways that diminish the
stringency of regulation or avoid regulation altogether.
The Mineral Mining Service (MMS) is a case in point, vividly illustrated
by the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.  From that case, “[w]e now know that
the oil industry largely drove policy decisions in the agency. At the same time,
there can be little doubt that the result did not serve the public interest,
having resulted in the death of eleven workers and the worst environmental
disaster in the United States.”409  As noted above, the Obama Administration
engaged in a full-scale recalibration of MMS to break the industry’s hold over
the agency.410
There are a number of additional reforms that could make agencies
more resistant to capture.  Some would have to come from Congress,411 but
others could be adopted by the executive branch.  One of the most impor-
tant would be to increase transparency in the regulatory process, thereby
making industry domination of the process more obvious and placing the
public on alert that industry is attempting to subvert the regulatory pro-
cess.412  Other executive branch reforms suggested by Professor Sid Shapiro
and other administrative law experts include
[P]ermitting agencies to submit their own budgets to Congress (making
them less susceptible to White House political pressure on behalf of business
interests); establishing qualifications for administrators (limiting the Presi-
dent’s ability to appoint administrators based solely on their anti-regulatory
ideology); . . . and making wider use of public advocates (who represent
otherwise unrepresented citizens in regulatory proceedings).413
As it is, there is at least some evidence that EPA is less subject to capture
than was MMS, even absent institutional reforms.  The EPA has a much
broader array of statutory responsibilities and it interacts with far more
408  Shapiro, supra note 237, at 236 (explaining that business interests dominate the R
rulemaking processes both in terms of the number business interests involved in rulemak-
ings and in terms of the total number of comments filed); Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemak-
ing in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV.
99, 128 (2011).
409 Shapiro, supra note 237, at 223. R
410 See supra notes 241–242 and accompanying text.
411 For example, Congress could “establish[ ] agencies with broad jurisdictions (mak-
ing them more likely to resist political pressure from any one set of interests); eliminat[e]
statutory conflicts of interest (which require agencies to promote and regulate an indus-
try); [and] limit[ ] preemption (allowing state regulators to fill regulatory gaps) . . . .”
Shapiro, supra note 237, at 250. Congress could also establish a more “strong and vibrant R
civil service as a bulwark against capture.”  Id. at 223; see Leshy, supra note 315, at 225 R
(“Rebuilding faith in government and in the value of public service is one of the biggest
challenges before us.”).
412 See Shapiro, supra note 237, at 223. R
413 Id. at 249–50 (footnotes omitted).
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diverse interest groups.414  Agencies that regulate multiple industries on a
variety of issues tend to be less vulnerable to capture than agencies that regu-
late a single industry on a narrow set of issues.415
Moreover, in terms of capture, Congress itself is not immune.  Regu-
lated entities can and often do use their superior political and financial influ-
ence to capture members of Congress and their staff.  First and foremost,
they can do so by urging Congress to adopt substantive legislation that favors
their economic interests.  “The United States Code is chock full of tax breaks,
subsidies, and regulatory loopholes that are questionable from a public pol-
icy perspective.”416
Perhaps less obvious but no less effective in achieving their de-regulatory
goals, regulated entities can also persuade Congress to impose obstacles that
make it more difficult to regulate.417  In addition, they have sought and
achieved the defunding of agencies, thereby crippling regulatory and
enforcement efforts.418
Congressional capture is aided and abetted by lobbyists.  Around eighty
percent of the lobbyists who appear before congressional members in hopes
of influencing environmental outcomes represent businesses or trade associa-
tions.419  In the past few decades, conservative interests have changed the
public discourse by spending billions of dollars to sway public opinion; they
have outspent progressive interests by orders of magnitude.420  The anti-gov-
ernment, anti-regulatory message has taken root.  The rise of the Tea Party is
one expression of the public’s perception that excessive government regula-
tion reduces both individual freedoms and economic growth.421
Conservative interests have been able to displace the policy frame that
progressives used in the 1960s to obtain public support for government reg-
ulation, and replace it with one that delegitimizes government and deters
support for additional regulation.  In this manner, the national agenda has
414 See Mank, supra note 61, at 1277–78; see also John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic
Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 233, 236, 309–10 (1990) (suggesting that EPA is not a cap-
tured agency because so many different interest groups monitor its actions).
415 See Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative
Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 93–94 (1992); Bradford C. Mank, Superfund Contractors
and Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 34, 49–52 (1993) (arguing that EPA is less vulnera-
ble to agency capture because it regulates multiple industries); Shapiro, supra note 237, at R
250.
416 Shapiro, supra note 237, at 228. See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, R
74 VA. L. REV. 339, 361 (1988).
417 See Shapiro, supra note 237, at 222. R
418 Id. at 240.
419 Scott R. Furlong, Exploring Interest Group Participation in Executive Branch Policymaking,
in THE INTEREST GROUP CONNECTION 290–91 (Paul S. Herrnson et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).
420 KEN SILVERSTEIN, WASHINGTON ON $10 MILLION A DAY (2002).  For a counterargu-
ment that “our government cannot be bought” by lobbyists, see Nicholas W. Allard, Lobby-
ing is an Honorable Profession: The Right to Petition and the Competition to Be Right, 19 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 23, 29 (2008).
421 See Shapiro, supra note 237, at 245–46. R
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been shifted from its focus on the undesirable conduct of corporations to
the undesirable conduct of the government.422
As a result, constituents are less likely to reward members who sponsor
or otherwise support progressive environmental legislation with re-election.
Conversely, legislators who adopt policies favored by regulated entities are
more likely to be rewarded because those entities are in a better position to
assist officials in achieving their own personal agendas than the myriad,
diverse array of regulatory beneficiaries.423
C. Judicial Review
The courts serve as a counterweight to agency capture in two ways:  by
invalidating agency actions that are contrary to law or arbitrary and capri-
cious, and by stimulating institutional reform when all else has failed.  Judi-
cial oversight can help to ensure that agencies act consistently with their
statutory missions and the public interest.
First, to the extent that improper considerations or pressures influence
the outcome of an agency’s rulemaking process, judicial review can serve as a
bulwark against arbitrary or biased decisions and decisions that run contrary
to statutory directives.424  But judicial review is by no means foolproof.  An
empirical study by Professor Wendy Wagner found that courts encounter sig-
nificant obstacles in protecting the public interest against industry capture in
rulemaking processes, not the least of which is that courts oversee only a tiny
fraction of agencies’ rules, in large part due to the limited resources available
to public interest groups for litigation.425
Second, judicial decisions can result in much needed institutional
reform when other branches of the government fail to act, or act inade-
quately.426  It is a fair point to note that courts may not be optimally suited,
as institutions, for crafting comprehensive reforms in scientific and techno-
logically complex areas like environmental law.427  Yet courts have accom-
plished remarkable things, both in response to citizens’ suits brought under
environmental statutes and tort claims for environmental harms.  When
either type of claim is brought before them, the courts’ rulings—regardless
of whether they are pro-industry, pro-environment, or pro-government, can
422 Id. at 246 (footnote omitted).
423 See id. at 226.
424 See Thomas O. Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of Administrative Agen-
cies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599, 641 (1997) (“Having to conform to the authoriz-
ing statute, requisite procedures, and reasoned elaboration requirements can temper
tendencies toward arbitrariness, special interest deals, or other behaviors in tension with
an agency’s overt statutory mission.”); see also id. at 634 (“[J]udicial review can help to
deter the worst abuses of power . . . .”).
425 See Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency Rulemakings: An
Empirical Investigation, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1739 (2012).
426 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1305 (1976).
427 See Leshy, supra note 315, at 219. R
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serve as “prods” to the other branches of government to engage in a more
comprehensive way.428
Placing too much reliance on the courts to advance an environmental
mission can be risky, however.  Federal courts today—especially the Supreme
Court and the D.C. Circuit—are more sympathetic to conservative, anti-regu-
latory arguments than progressive ones.429  So if the democratically elected
body (Congress) fails to take corrective action when the courts gut its existing
laws or when agencies misconstrue or misapply them, environmental protec-
tion and, arguably, democratic processes will suffer.430
V. PORTAGING STRATEGIES
In the environmental arena, non-legislative measures may address many
of our concerns, and some of these could make effective “portaging” strate-
gies around—instead of through—the congressional logjam.431  When Con-
gress is dysfunctional, the other branches of government tend to fill the
vacuum.432
The political system is like a hydraulic system: shut off a valve here and the
pressure will exert itself through other channels.  The policy choices will be
made, just not through our elected legislators acting through the constitu-
tionally envisioned channels.  A broken legislative process means a greater
role for executive, administrative, and judicial lawmaking.433
Although comprehensive legislative reform may be the “first best”
option for addressing wicked environmental problems, empowering the
executive branch to engage in more progressive action presents a viable “sec-
ond best” alternative.434  Three pathways are considered in this Part: invigo-
rating petitions for rulemaking; placing greater reliance on executive orders;
and stepping up enforcement efforts.
428 See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 30, at 356–58 (describing how “boundary-pushing” R
tort litigation fulfills a “crucial institutional role” by clarifying “baseline norms of responsi-
bility,” revealing gaps in the common law, and forcing other branches of government to
recognize social needs).
429 Leshy, supra note 315, at  219; see supra note 99 (describing the Reagan Administra- R
tion’s lasting effects on the federal judiciary).
430 See infra notes 463–472 and accompanying text (analyzing judicial review of the
denial of rulemaking petitions).
431 Elliott, supra note 19, at 41.
432 Id. at 44.
433 Bruhl, supra note 320, at 1052 (footnote omitted). R
434 See Cole, supra note 20, at 129 (“It is difficult to imagine that any single social
institution . . . could constitute a first-best solution for all environmental problems in
this second-best world, with its wide variety of institutional and technological contexts and
complexities.”); Ewing & Kysar, supra note 30, at 353 (describing how climate change and
related “threats of unlimited harm” are “[r]apidly evolving, globally interconnected, and
wickedly complex” so as to resist “familiar lawmaking forms”).
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A. Invigorate Petitions for Rulemaking
Facilitating petitions for rulemaking would empower citizens to push
public interest oriented agency action forward.  This option would turn in
part on heightening the agencies’ appreciation for the role of rulemaking
petitions and in part on clearing away the procedural impediments both to
petitioning agency action and to obtaining judicial review of petition denials.
Under the APA, “[e]ach agency shall give an interested person the right
to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”435  In addition,
the APA requires agencies to “conclude” matters presented to them “within a
reasonable time.”436
The majority of petitions for rulemaking are submitted by environmen-
tal interest groups or states.437  From 1999-2011, EPA received thirty-eight
general rulemaking petitions, most of which were filed pursuant to the CWA,
the Clean Air Act, or the Toxic Substance Control Act.438  As of September
2012, EPA had granted nineteen (50%), denied twelve (32%), and had not
yet taken any public action on seven.439
Agencies should take note of the empirical data.  Rulemaking petitions
that are accompanied by credible legal and scientific analysis are often meri-
torious.440  Petitions have stimulated several major regulatory actions, such as
the endangerment finding on greenhouse gases.441
A study of rulemaking petitions by Professors Biber and Brosi found
that, by collecting and sharing myriad, widely dispersed, and diffuse informa-
tion with the agencies, public participation may improve the agency’s per-
435 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006).
436 Id. § 555(b); see In re Am. Rivers & Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 418 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (federal agencies must respond to petitions for rulemaking under the APA); 1 RICH-
ARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE  LAW TREATISE § 6.10, at 517 (5th ed. 2010) (“At a mini-
mum, the right to petition for rulemaking entitles a petitioning party to a response to the
merits of the petition.”).
437 See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency
Inaction, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) 1, 57, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986
928.
438 Id. at 58.
439 Id. at 59.
440 See id. at 59–60.  This is not to say that frivolous petitions are never filed.  Just as you
can sue a ham sandwich (as the old adage goes), you can petition an agency for any (or
no) reason.  Presumably, those that are slapped together and devoid of any support or
merit can be winnowed out without a great deal of time and effort.
441 Id. at 59 (citing Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007)).  For an analysis of Massa-
chusetts v. EPA, see infra notes 466–469 and accompanying text. R
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formance.442  In addition, agencies that take citizen petitions seriously may
see increased public acceptance of their decisions.443
Biber and Brosi’s work analyzed data on petitions to the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife (FWS) under the ESA.  They demonstrated how citizen petitions
resulted in the listing of species “at least as deserving of protection under the
Act as species identified by the agency on its own.”444  Far from causing
“uninformed decisionmaking, interfering with agency priority-setting, under-
mining agency expertise, or leading to over-enforcement against low-value
targets,” rulemaking petitions and citizen suits resulted in better decisions
without destroying the agency’s ability to set its own agenda.445  Biber and
Brosi noted that this is especially true for agencies that have a statutory man-
date to rely on specified technical factors “that do not require complicated
resource trade-offs.”446
But what of the argument that overzealous federal agencies systemati-
cally overregulate already, even absent rulemaking petitions?447  In short,
this theory does not hold much water.448  There is little evidence that today’s
agency officials wield their regulatory powers in an overly aggressive fashion
to increase their agency’s budgets and their own salary, job perks, power, and
reputation.449  Agency officials sometimes—perhaps often—act out of moti-
442 See Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions and
Public Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321, 323–24 (2010).
“[E]conomists, engineers, biologists, and other technical experts might welcome public
participation, not just because it might increase public acceptance of final agency deci-
sions, but also because the public might help the agency reach better decisions in the first
place.” Id. at 378.
443 Id. at 378.
444 Id. at 321.  See id. at 377–78 (“[T]here is no evidence of any substantial difference
between the ability of FWS . . . and outside groups to identify species that warrant listing
under the Act.”).
445 Id. at 378.
446 Id. at 379.  Biber and Brosi acknowledge that the ESA is unique in that it requires
the agency to consider scientific factors but not economic factors.
[W]e can say much less about whether petitions would work sensibly in a regula-
tory program where either (a) cost was a significant and legal consideration for
the agency to take into account . . . ; or (b) the decisionmaking process requires
trade-offs among a range of amorphous and unspecified public values . . . (such
as Federal Communications Commission regulation in the “public interest”).
Id.
447 See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38
(1971); Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1304 (2006).
448 See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 447, at 1304. R
449 See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 437, at 16–17 (“[A]t best, the self-aggrandize- R
ment hypothesis is overstated . . . .”); Arthur Pugsley, The Myth of EPA Overregulation, 39
ECOLOGY L.Q. 475, 475 (2012) (“[S]ince 2008, all but one successful challenge to EPA
regulations resulted in a decision that the regulation did not go far enough relative to the
directive of Congress”).  Thus, EPA typically underregulates, so the perception of aggressive
EPA over-regulation is “largely a counterfactual narrative.” Id. at 475; see also Shapiro,
supra note 237, at 222 (describing how public officials are motivated by many things R
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vations other than patronage or rent-seeking, for example, a strong commit-
ment to their agency’s mission, a desire to employ their own expertise on a
particular subject, like the environment, or even to promote the long-term
public interest in health and wellbeing.450
This holds true with regard to the EPA.  Although the EPA has a reputa-
tion for being “inclined toward over-activity,”451 it has moved slowly, or not at
all, on issues ranging from toxic water pollutants to hazardous air pollutants
to greenhouse gas emissions.  In most cases, it has taken years for the EPA to
issue environmentally protective regulations, and then often only after citi-
zens’ petitions and lawsuits were lodged against the agency.452  EPA inaction
can be at least as detrimental to achieving statutory objectives as arbitrary
action.453
Rulemaking by the EPA, whether it is self-initiated or initiated by peti-
tion, is often slowed or stopped by the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA), “an obscure but powerful office within the White House’s
Office of Management and Budget . . . .”454  OIRA was established by Con-
gress in the 1980 Paperwork Reduction Act.455  EPA’s proposed regulations
constitute a substantial portion of the rules scrutinized by OIRA,456 in part
besides self-aggrandizement).  The “relationship between a larger agency budget and
higher salaries or cushier working conditions” is especially weak.  Livermore & Revesz,
supra note 437, at 17 (quoting Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building in Constitutional Law, 118 R
HARV. L. REV. 915, 922–23 (2005)).
450 See David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 473, 498 (1999); Shapiro, supra note 237, at 251. R
451 Livermore & Revesz, supra note 437, at 48. R
452 See id. at 49; Pugsley, supra note 449, at 478; Wagner et al., supra note 408, at 128; see R
also Biber & Brosi, supra note 442, at 323 (describing how EPA’s rulemaking on green- R
house gas emissions was motivated by citizen petitions).
453 See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 437, at 50 (“The goals of many statutes cannot R
be achieved without administrative action to implement and enforce their provisions. Espe-
cially in areas where Congress has delegated broad authority to administrative agencies to
promote public health and safety or to protect the environment, regulatory inaction can
have potentially significant consequences” (footnotes omitted)).  Livermore and Revesz
point to the Deepwater Horizon blowout as a prime example of a catastrophe that could
have been avoided “if agencies had exercised their existing legal authority in a more proac-
tive fashion.” Id. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
454 CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM (CPR), PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH BY THE STROKE
OF A PEN 25 (2008), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPR_ExecOrders_Stroke_of_a_
Pen.pdf. [hereinafter CPR].  OIRA has been conducting regulatory oversight since the
beginning of the Reagan administration, but its power has grown significantly since then.
See infra notes 489–491.
455 44 U.S.C. § 3503 (2006).
456 See OIRA, AGENCIES WITH THE MOST REGULATORY ACTIONS CURRENTLY UNDER
REVIEW, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/ (reporting that 28 of 143 actions pending before
OIRA in Feb. 2013 were from the EPA) (last visited Mar. 9, 2013); OIRA, EO REVIEW
COUNTS – RESULTS (1/1/12 TO 12/31/12), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCount-
sSearchInit?action=init (reporting that 53 of 424 actions reviewed by OIRA during 2012
were from EPA, which was second only to Health and Human Services with 81 actions
reviewed).
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because many EPA rulemakings have a large economic impact,457 and also
because most of them involve high levels of public participation.458  OIRA
review acts as an internal checking mechanism, causing agency ossification
and “paralysis by analysis.”459
When an agency like the EPA fails to act due to OIRA obstruction or
other factors, the public health and welfare suffers.  One solution may be to
dismantle OIRA altogether, but another is to require OIRA to review the
denial of petitions for rulemaking.  Such a requirement could “prod” agen-
cies to move forward on serious environmental problems while ensuring that
such petitions do not “overly intrude on agency agenda-setting
prerogatives.”460
Courts also have an important role in reviewing an agency’s denial of
rulemaking petitions.  Although certain highly discretionary actions, such as
prosecutorial decisions, and failures to act may be unreviewable,461 reviewing
courts are authorized to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unrea-
sonably delayed.”462  Judicial review is available for an agency’s denial of peti-
tion for rulemaking,463 although review is “extremely limited and highly
deferential.”464  Because courts are loath to reshuffle an agency’s prioritiza-
tion of resources and personnel, they rarely overturn the denial of a petition
for rulemaking, but patently arbitrary denials will be reversed and
remanded.465  One of the most notable examples of judicial reversal of such
a denial is Massachusetts v. EPA, where the Supreme Court found that EPA
457 See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State:
A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006).
458 Livermore & Revesz, supra note 437, at 56; see also Sally Katzen, A Reality Check on an R
Empirical Study: Comments on “Inside the Administrative State”, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1497, 1499
(2007) (describing the EPA as “an atypical agency in almost every relevant respect,” includ-
ing its opportunities for proposing new regulations).
459 See Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 50 (1998); Richard
B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 447 (2003);
see also Livermore & Revesz, supra note 437, at 20 (“Instead of being justified by fears of R
overzealous regulation, OIRA review is seen as helping to generate moribund agencies that
fail to address important social problems in a timely fashion.”); id. at 21 (“Multiple layers
of review . . . make rulemaking a costly, time-consuming, and risky proposition.”).
460 Livermore & Revesz, supra note 437, at 50; see also Ewing & Kysar, supra note 30, at R
350 (discussing the need for “prods and pleas” from multiple actors to move regulatory
agendas forward).
461 See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 66–67 (2004) (holding that
BLM’s failure to prevent impacts from off road vehicle use was not a reviewable “agency
action”); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not to take
enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review . . . .”); see also Glen
Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORY L.J. 369, 372 (2009) (“Non-enforce-
ment decisions and other forms of regulatory inaction remain a serious problem . . . .”).
462 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006).
463 Id. § 555(e).
464 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–28 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
465 See id. at 527; Livermore & Revesz, supra note 437, at 54. R
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had not justified its refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions as “air pollu-
tants” under the Clean Air Act.466  It recognized the petitioners’ “undoubted
procedural right” not only to file a petition for rulemaking in the first place
but also to challenge EPA’s rejection of their petition in court.467  It also
recognized that, unlike non-enforcement decisions, “agency refusals to initi-
ate rulemaking ‘are less frequent, more apt to involve legal as opposed to
factual analysis, and subject to special formalities, including a public explana-
tion.’”468  Citing the voluminous evidence of the adverse effects of green-
house gases, and the statutory directive to list air pollutants that endanger
health or welfare, the Court held that EPA’s denial of the petition was arbi-
trary, capricious, and contrary to law.469
Few post-Massachusetts decisions have followed suit,470 and most courts
continue to scrutinize denials of petitions lightly or not at all.  Recent circuit
court cases dismissing citizens’ petitions include one upholding the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission’s determination that risks of terrorism posed by
keeping nuclear fuel on-site in pools was low and did not warrant a change in
risk level requested by states,471 and another upholding EPA’s denial of a
petition to regulate light pollution under the Clean Air Act.472
This brings us back to the proposal for OIRA to review denials of
rulemaking petitions.473  Even if the courts fail to engage in meaningful
review, OIRA can perform an important role in prodding agency action by
scrutinizing socio-economic and environmental impacts of an agency’s
refusal to grant meritorious petitions.  One way to achieve OIRA review of
466 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2006)).
467 Id. at 527.
468 Id. (citing Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n. v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir.1987)).
469 Id. at 534.
470 For one of the rare post–Massachusetts cases reviewing and reversing the denial of a
petition for rulemaking, see Natural Res. Def. Council v. FDA, 872 F. Supp. 2d 318, 342
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (remanding the Food and Drug Administration’s denial of petitions seek-
ing withdrawal of approval for uses of certain antibiotics in food-producing animals).
471 New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 589 F.3d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 2009).
472 See Wagner v. EPA, No. 11-1261, 2011 WL 6934553, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27, 2011) (
“Act’s definition of ‘air pollutant’ is ambiguous as to whether it includes anthropogenic
light, and petitioner has not demonstrated that [EPA’s] interpretation of the statute not to
include anthropogenic light was unreasonable . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also Conser-
vancy of Sw. Fla. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 677 F.3d 1073, 1085 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding
that the APA did not authorize review of the denial of petitions to designate critical habitat
for species listed before the 1978 ESA amendments because such designations were com-
mitted to agency discretion by law); cf. Colo. River Cutthroat Trout v. Salazar, Civ. Action
No. 09–2233 (PLF), 2012 WL 4890100, at *11 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2012) (affirming FWS’s
denial of a petition to list a trout species under the ESA because FWS had adequately
considered the explicit statutory factors in deciding not to list the species and FWS was not
required to consider global warming, particularly where the record was ambivalent as to
global warming’s effects on the species and where there was an absence of comments to
FWS regarding global warming).
473 See supra note 460 and accompanying text. R
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agency inaction would be to issue an executive order authorizing OIRA to
examine petitions for rulemakings filed with, and rejected by, agencies.474
B. Make More Effective Use of Executive Orders
Other executive branch portaging strategies include presidential execu-
tive orders, such as the one mentioned above and described in more detail
below, authorizing OIRA to review denials of rulemaking petitions.  By
directing federal agencies to work on specified priorities, executive orders
have a profound influence on how the government executes its policy
initiatives.475
Presidents have made extensive use of executive orders since 1789.476
The President is empowered to issue orders to federal agencies as necessary
for the “faithful execution of laws passed by Congress.”477  Such orders typi-
cally compel “officers of the executive branch . . . to take an action, stop a
certain type of activity, alter policy, change management practices, or accept
a delegation of authority under which they will henceforth be responsible for
the implementation of law.”478
Executive orders are equivalent to laws479 and are entitled to a “strong
presumption” of validity.480  So long as the orders are based on a constitu-
474 See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 437, at 3. R
475 CPR, supra note 454, at 1. R
476 See John C. Duncan, Jr., A Critical Consideration Of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of
Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 338 (2010).  Controversial examples
include President Jefferson’s Louisiana Territory purchase, President Lincoln’s Emancipa-
tion Proclamation, President Franklin Roosevelt’s internment of Japanese-American citi-
zens, and President Lyndon Johnson’s insistence on affirmative action clauses in
government contracts. See The Impact of Executive Orders on the Legislative Process: Executive
Lawmaking? Before the H. Committee on Rules, 106th Cong. 17, 29 (1999) (prepared state-
ments of Neil Kinkopf, Office of Legal Counsel, and Robert Bedell, Administor, Office of
Federal Procurement Policy, Office of Management and Budget).  For other perspectives,
see KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN 34 (2001); Tara L. Branum, President or
King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1 (2002); Todd
F. Gaziano, The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders and Other Presidential Directives, 5 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 267 (2001); John A. Sterling, Above the Law: Evolution of Executive Orders (Part One),
31 UWLA L. REV. 99 (2000).
477 Id. at 364; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing powers and responsibilities to “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”).
478 PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT 16 (2002).
479 Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U.S. 546, 560–61 (1892) (holding that presidential proclama-
tions have “the force of public law”).
480 See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 827 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(expressing doubts that judicial review of the President’s actions is permissible; that the
issuance of “a declaratory judgment against the President” and compelling him “personally
to defend his executive actions before a court” “is incompatible with his constitutional
position”); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 (1981) (stating that presidential
orders are “‘supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial
interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack
it’” (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring))); see also Duncan, supra
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tional or statutory grant of power to the President, the Supreme Court has
upheld them.481  In over 200 years, the courts have overturned only two exec-
utive orders.482  These two judicial opinions demonstrate that “the President
has no authority to act in any way that supplants the will of Congress, unless
his actions draw from a power specifically delegated to him by the Constitu-
tion.”483  However, the mere fact that Congress considered but failed to
adopt a position subsequently taken up by an executive order does not justify
invalidating the order.484
It appears that President Obama may be willing to utilize his Executive
Order power broadly in his second term as a counterweight to congressional
inaction, at least with respect to climate change.  As the New York Times
reported:
President Obama made addressing climate change the most prominent pol-
icy vow of his second Inaugural Address, setting in motion what Democrats
say will be a deliberately paced but aggressive campaign built around the use
of his executive powers to sidestep Congressional opposition. . . . Despite the
renewed attention to climate change following Hurricane Sandy and record-
high temperatures in the continental United States last year, there is little
sign that the politics of the issue [in Congress] will get any easier for Mr.
Obama.485
The Administration acknowledges that executive orders can only go so
far.486  Regulatory action by EPA to clamp down on emissions from
note 476, at 408 (finding “a strong judicial bias in favor of granting the President ample R
latitude in carrying out the executive function” through executive orders).
481 Duncan, supra note 476, at 364–65 (citing Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U.S. 546 (1892)). R
482 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1952) (invalidat-
ing President Truman’s order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession the
nation’s steel mills as beyond any authorization given by Congress or the Constitution);
Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that an
Executive Order barring federal contracts with employers who hire replacements during
lawful strikes was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act).
483 Duncan, supra note 476, at 410 (citing Youngstown and Reich).  Orders that violate R
civil rights may be vulnerable to attack as well.  E.O. 12,333, which has been used to kill
suspected terrorists, appears to be one such order. See Scott Shane, Debating a Court to Vet
Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2013, at A1 (describing complaints about the secret use of
counterterrorist strikes); Pete Yost, Memo Spells Out Drone Protocols, CALGARY HERALD, Feb. 6,
2013, at A9, available at http://www.pressdisplay.com/pressdisplay/viewer.aspx (reporting
that an unclassified Justice Department memo revealed more lenient rules than previously
thought for the use of drones to kill Americans suspected of terrorism).
484 See Duncan, supra note 476, at 409. R
485 Richard W. Stevenson & John M. Broder, Obama Offers a Liberal Vision in his Inaugu-
ral Address: ‘We Must Act’: Speech Gives Climate Goals Center Stage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2013, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/us/politics/climate-change-promi-
nent-in-obamas-inaugural-address.html.  Executive orders to address climate change might
be wielded in conjunction with a campaign to build support and stymy political opposition,
and with regulatory action by the EPA.  The combined “regulatory push will be particularly
important . . . with Republicans now in control of the House.” Id.
486 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588 (concluding that the President’s power to make laws
is limited by separation of powers, and rejecting the notion that presidents possess any
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existing coal fired power plants will remain the centerpiece of a coordinated
strategy to reduce greenhouse gases.487
As noted in the previous section of this Part, an executive order to
require OIRA review of the agencies’ denial of rulemaking petitions would
go a long way toward improving the regulatory process.  A series of executive
orders has directed OIRA to apply a cost-benefit analysis to all major federal
agency rules (rules that have a large economic impact) to assure that the
monetized net benefits of the rule exceed the monetized costs of implemen-
tation and compliance.488  While conducting its reviews, OIRA wields the
authority to change agency rules or to return them to the agency if it believes
that they fail to achieve economic efficiency.489  Over the years, OIRA’s
implementation of these directives has become a “choke point” for regula-
tions.490  EPA has been especially vulnerable to stonewalling by OIRA
because EPA’s rules often have immediate economic costs, as regulated enti-
ties must upgrade their pollution control technologies or processes, but less
immediate and less easily monetized, long-term benefits to health and the
environment.491  This is the kind of broad policy discretion that Congress
inherent legislative power); see also Utah Ass’n of Cntys. v. Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1186
(D. Utah 2004) (noting that “although this Court is without jurisdiction to second-guess”
the President’s reasons, it “may ensure that a president was in fact exercising the authority
conferred by the act at issue,” but upholding the executive order in question, which desig-
nated a national monument pursuant to the Antiquities Act of 1906), aff’d on other
grounds, 455 F.3d 1094 (10th Cir. 2006).
487 Stevenson & Broder, supra note 485.  According to the New York Times, Democrats R
are concerned that Republicans may employ “a little-used procedure to block new regula-
tions with a simple majority vote.” Id. The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 801(a)(1)(A) (2006), directs agencies to submit proposed rules to Congress before the
rules may take effect.  Congress can prohibit the rule from taking effect by adopting a joint
resolution of disapproval within sixty days of submission, which the President may veto. See
5 U.S.C. § 802 (2006).  Disapproval has only happened once, when Congress overturned
the Clinton Administration’s ergonomic standards. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
Congressional Review Act (CRA) FAQs, http://www.gao.gov/legal/congressact/cra_faq.
html#9.  Threats of disapproval crop up on occasion, though, including Senator Lisa
Murkowski’s threatened resolution to disapprove of EPA’s finding that greenhouse gases
endanger health and the environment.  Geof Koss, 2010 Key Senate Vote: Greenhouse Gas Reg-
ulation, CQ WEEKLY, Jan. 3, 2011, at 51.
488 See OMB, Mission and Structure of the Office of Management and Budget, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_mission/.
489 CPR, supra note 454, at 25–26. R
490 Id. at 25.
491 Bagley & Revesz, supra note 447, at 1269–70; Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role Of R
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1355, 1360 (2009).  In 2003, fourteen EPA rules
were “significantly changed” by the OIRA process.  Six were changed to delay or to com-
pletely eliminate regulations, four were revised in favor of alternatives that imposed fewer
costs on regulated entities, while three were sent back for revisions to the cost-benefit cal-
culation.  Bagley & Revesz supra note 447, at 1269–70 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING R
OFFICE, GAO–03–929, A RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES
AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 70 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03929.pdf).  “None of these rules were made more stringent (i.e., more costly
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delegated to federal agencies—not to OIRA—through enactments like the
CWA.492  An executive order could improve OIRA’s functioning in a variety
of ways, not the least of which would be to compel OIRA to give greater
weight to long-term human health and environmental benefits, and also to
review the denial of rulemaking petitions that relate to improving long-term
human health and environmental benefits.493
C. Engage in Ramped-up Enforcement Efforts
One of the key distinctions between environmental laws and regulations
that actually work to protect the environment and those that do not is the
extent to which they are enforced.494  In recent years, environmental
enforcement efforts have dropped precipitously, so much so that some pol-
luters consider non-enforcement a “vested right.”495  Enforcement declines
can be attributed to diminished budgets, bad PR, and adverse Supreme
Court precedent.
The reduction of the federal enforcement budget has diminished EPA
oversight of environmental programs and has allowed violations to go unpun-
ished.496  According to Inside EPA, “[s]weeping cuts to EPA’s fiscal year 2012
budget could have a dramatic adverse impact on the agency’s enforcement
office.”497  Not only has the federal budget for EPA enforcement been dimin-
for industry) in an effort to capture greater net benefits.” Id. at 1270 (emphasis in origi-
nal); see David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335,
380 (2006) (“[OIRA] never . . . encourag[ed] more stringent regulation than the agency
would adopt on its own, even when benefits far outweighed costs . . . .”); Lisa Heinzerling,
Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1100 (2006) (finding
that OIRA review has a “unidirectional nature” in favor of deregulation).
492 See Heinzerling, supra note 491, at 1100. R
493 For additional recommendations, see CPR supra note 454, at 26–27. R
494 See Victor B. Flatt & Paul M. Collins, Jr., Environmental Enforcement in Dire Straits:
There is No Protection for Nothing and No Data for Free, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55, 57 (2009).
495 Peter Lehner, The Logjam: Are Our Environmental Laws Failing Us or Are We Failing
Them?, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 194, 197 (2008).
496 See Margaret Kriz, Vanishing Act, NAT’L JOURNAL, Apr. 12, 2008, at 10, available at
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/vanishing-act-20080412?mrefid=site_search;
Will Reisinger et al., Environmental Enforcement and the Limits of Cooperative Federalism: Will
Courts Allow Citizen Suits to Pick Up the Slack?, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 3 (2010).
497 FY12 Budget Cuts Might Hurt Enforcement More Than Other EPA Programs, INSIDE EPA.
COM, Feb. 11, 2011.
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ished,498 federal funding for state enforcement of federal environmental laws
has been slashed as well.499
The reduction in enforcement is due not only to sharply reduced budg-
ets, but also to the media blitz about “unfair,” overly aggressive enforcement
against poor, downtrodden landowners, developers, and job-creators.500
This type of rhetoric creates a powerful disincentive for enforcement agen-
cies and their politically sensitive bosses.501
In addition, two recent Supreme Court opinions are inhibiting the
EPA’s ability to enforce the CWA.  Its 2006 decision in Rapanos v. United
States502 has “resulted in a dramatic decline in the number of Clean Water
Act inspections, investigations, and enforcement actions.”503  Because many
waters, especially waters in the arid western United States, are not continu-
ously flowing, the agencies are required to go through a labor intensive pro-
cess of establishing a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable waters, based
on Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion and subsequent guidance issued by
the agencies.504  Justice Stevens’s dissent in Rapanos predicted just this very
result: “Justice Kennedy’s approach will have the effect of creating additional
498 In Fiscal Year 2011, the EPA received around $8.8 billion, which is more than the
$7.5 billion received for 2008 (the final year of the Bush administration), but about $1.6
below what it received in Fiscal Year 2010. Facing FY11 Budget Cuts, EPA Moves to Boost Key
Air, Water Programs, INSIDE EPA.COM, July 22, 2011 [hereinafter Facing FY11 Budget Cuts]; see
EPA, FY 2012 EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF, 1 chart, available at, nepis.epa.gov/Exe/
ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=P100A5RE.txt.  “[T]he reduced funding levels led EPA to make seri-
ous cuts from a slew of programs.” Facing FY11 Budget Cuts, supra. The President
requested only $9 billion for the EPA in 2012, likely because House Republicans vowed to
trim the FY12 budget to at least FY08 levels ($7.5 billion). FY 2012 EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF,
supra, at 11 chart.
499 Will Reisinger et al., supra note 496, at 18 (“In 1986, federal EPA funds accounted R
for fifty-eight percent of state budgets for the enforcement of federal laws. By 2008, federal
appropriations had been reduced to twenty-three percent of state environmental budgets.”
(footnotes omitted)).
500 See, e.g., Kathleen Hartnett White, The EPA’s Overreach Problem, PRAIRIEPUNDIT (May
2, 2012), http://prairiepundit.blogspot.com/2012/05/epas-overreach-problem.html
(complaining that “EPA has employed intimidation, threats and punitive action” with the
intent of “crucifying” violators in a “pattern of disturbing overreach more resembling that
of totalitarian regimes than our representative democracy” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
501 See Kriz, supra note 496, at 18, 20–21. R
502 Rapanos is analyzed at supra notes 142–149 and accompanying text. R
503 Ben Webster, Memorandum Re: Decline of Clean Water Act Enforcement Program in ALI-
ABA Course of Study: CLEAN WATER ACT: LAW AND REGULATION, April 2009, at 1.  This
memo, which was prepared by Majority Staff, Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, and Majority Staff, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, summarizes
the results of a joint investigation by the Committees into allegations that the CWA
enforcement program had deteriorated.  It is based on a review of more than 20,000 pages
of documents provided to the Committees by the EPA and the Corps of Engineers. Id. at
1.
504 EPA & ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION FOLLOWING THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT’S DECISION in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States  (Dec.
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work for all concerned parties . . .  which will inevitably increase the time and
resources spent processing permit applications.”505  These increased require-
ments mean a corresponding decrease in enforcement actions.
Documents produced to the Committees [on Oversight and Government
Reform and on Transportation and Infrastructure] indicate that there has
been a drastic deterioration of EPA’s Clean Water Act enforcement program
[since Rapanos].  Hundreds of violations have not been pursued with
enforcement actions and dozens of existing enforcement cases . . . have had
civil penalties reduced, and have experienced significant delays.  Many viola-
tions are not being detected because of the reduction in the number of
investigations initiated.506
The 2012 Sackett opinion is likely to have an equally chilling effect.507
The Court’s decision that recipients of administrative compliance orders can
immediately challenge those orders in court “places a heavier burden
on EPA to gather information in support of its jurisdiction prior to issuing
compliance orders.”508  As a practical matter, the Sackett ruling is expected to
reduce EPA’s reliance on such orders because the agency is now “forced to
expend additional resources to substantiate its authority to issue each compli-
ance order in the first instance.”509  As a result, we can expect to see signifi-
cant changes in the way that the CWA and possibly other
federal environmental laws will be enforced.510
Admittedly, obtaining accurate, objective measurements of enforcement
successes and failures is not easy.511  Under the “cooperative federalism”
2, 2008), available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/2008_12_
3_wetlands_CWA_Jurisdiction_Following_Rapanos120208.pdf.
505 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 809 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
506 Webster, supra note 503, at 2.  An internal EPA memo stated that the Rapanos deci- R
sion and the agency guidance had “negatively affected approximately 500 enforcement
cases,” and that “[d]ata collected from the regions shows that a significant portion of the
CWA enforcement docket has been adversely affected.”  Memorandum from Granta Y.
Nakayama, EPA’s Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, to
Benjamin Grumbles, EPA’s Assistant Administrator for Water, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY
(Mar. 4, 2008).
507 For an analysis of the Sackett decision, see supra notes 169–175 and accompanying
text.
508 Julia E. Stein et al., Preenforcement Judicial Review After Sackett: Implications Beyond the
Clean Water Act, 42 ENV. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10818, 10823 (2012).
509 Id.
510 See Heather L. Demirjian et al., Supreme Court Issues Stunning Rebuke to EPA Enforce-
ment Practice, BLANK ROME, (Mar. 2012), http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?content
ID=37&itemID=2761.
511 For an assessment of EPA’s enforcement priorities and public health implications
from 1999–2009, see Robin Kundis Craig, The Public Health Aspects of Environmental Enforce-
ment, 4 PITT. J. ENVTL. PUB. HEALTH L. 1 (2010).  Craig notes that “EPA’s enforcement
rhetoric, moreover, is often at its strongest, most specific and most colorful when the EPA
acts to protect the public health, suggesting that the EPA recognizes the public relations
value of the public health aspects of environmental enforcement,” but that most of this
rhetoric arises in the Clean Air Act context rather than the CWA context. Id. at 10.
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model of most federal environmental statutes, enforcement “data can derive
from a multitude of federal, state, and local sources.”512  According to John
Cruden, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the U.S. Department of
Justice’s Environment and Natural Resources Division, the greatest number
of enforcement actions are undertaken by state and local governments, so
the data on declining federal actions fails to convey a complete picture.513
Moreover, the mere number of environmental enforcement actions taken,
regardless of which governmental unit takes action, does not necessarily
reflect the impact of an action.514  One large, multi-facility case can be far
more important than dozens of smaller, routine enforcement actions.515
Simply adding up the amount of penalties assessed against violators does
not tell the entire story, either.  The non-penalty aspects of an enforcement
order can have significant effects, such as cleaning up spills, restoring dam-
aged natural resources, and investing in technologically sophisticated pollu-
tion abatement equipment.516
That said, under President Obama’s EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson,
EPA’s enforcement actions compelled approximately $152,000,000 in civil
penalties (administrative and judicial) in just one year—2011—which is the
highest amount of monetary penalties in last five years.517  Most of the
increase comes from Clean Air Act enforcement actions, while CWA penal-
ties, particularly administrative penalties, have been relatively flat.518  In
terms of criminal enforcement, the number of investigations initiated rose
slightly between 2007 and 2011, but the number of defendants charged—
250—remained roughly the same.519  By comparison, there were 122 more
512 John C. Cruden, Comment on Environmental Enforcement in Dire Straits, 41 ENV’T.
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10686, 10686 (2011); see EPA Enforcement Priorities and Practicies
Before the House Energy and Commerce Committee: Subcommittee on Energy and Power, 112th Cong.
(2012) (testimony of Professor Joel A. Mintz), available at http://energycommerce.house.
gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Hearings/EP/20120606/HHRG-
112-IF03-WState-MintzJ-20120606.pdf (explaining the historical context of President
Obama’s EPA enforcement).
513 See Cruden, supra note 512, at 10686. R
514 See Flatt & Collins, supra note 494, at 57–58. R
515 See Cruden, supra note 512, at 10686. R
516 Id. at 10687. Non-penalty aspects of enforcement efforts include “injunctive relief
to repair or mitigate environmental harm, penalties, and/or supplemental environmen-
tal projects.”  Id. For examples, see U.S. EPA, FISCAL YEAR 2011 EPA ENFORCEMENT & COM-
PLIANCE ANNUAL RESULTS (Dec. 8, 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/
resources/reports/endofyear/eoy2011/resultscharts-fy2011.pdf [hereinafter COMPLIANCE
2011].  For an overview of the 2011 results, see U.S. EPA, Compliance and Enforcement
Annual Results 2011 Fiscal Year (last updated Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/compli-
ance/resources/reports/endofyear/eoy2011/index.html.
517 COMPLIANCE 2011, supra note 516, at 8. R
518 Id.
519 Id. at 13. Stephen L. Johnson was the EPA Administrator under President George
W. Bush from 2005-09.  Christine Todd Whitman preceded Johnson, serving from 2001-
2003. Chronology of EPA Administrators, EPA, (last updated Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.epa.
gov/aboutepa/history/admin/agency/index.html.
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defendants charged with federal environmental crimes in 2001 (for a total of
372 that year), and the civil penalties assessed in 2001, adjusted for inflation,
totaled $162,000,000.520  By both measures, enforcement results have gone
down in the past decade.  These statistics are even more startling if we go
back just two more years.  In 1999, with Carol Browner as the EPA Adminis-
trator under President Clinton, EPA enforcement efforts resulted in
$166,700,000 in civil penalties, 60 percent higher than 1998.521  This is
around $227,000,000 in inflation adjusted dollars—almost 50 percent more
than the total amount of EPA’s civil penalties collected in 2011.522  As the
Executive Director of the Natural Resources Defense Council observed, cur-
rent enforcement budgets, policies, and practices make it “almost economi-
cally irrational to comply with the law.”523
The keystone environmental laws of the 1970s, including the CWA, pri-
oritize public health and environmental integrity over private gains from pol-
lution.  Improving our implementation paradigm to ensure that health and
the environment are protected through effective enforcement initiatives is
not only good public policy, but it is precisely what Congress intended.524
Executive orders and agency regulations and guidance that prioritize envi-
ronmental enforcement over business as usual can create greater financial
incentives for compliance.  More strategic enforcement actions and higher
penalties go hand in hand with the other proposed executive branch initia-
tives to portage around the environmental logjam in Congress.525
CONCLUSION
Congress has been completely dysfunctional when it comes to the
nation’s most pressing environmental issues, such as climate change, energy
policy, enforcement authority, and the protection of critically important but
non-navigable waterways.  It has failed to pass substantive remedial legislation
520 U.S. EPA, FY 2001 NUMBERS AT A GLANCE (Feb. 18, 2011), available at http://www.
epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/endofyear/eoy2001.pdf#page=3.  Civil penalties
from EPA enforcement actions in 2001 totaled about $125,000,000. Id.  With inflation,
$125,000,000 in 2001 would be worth $158,667,423.32 in 2011. Inflation Calculator
(2001–2011), http://www.westegg.com/inflation (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
521 U.S. EPA, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL RESULTS–FY1999 (updated Feb.
18, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/endofyear/eoy1999.pdf.
522 Inflation Calculator (1999–2011), http://www.westegg.com/inflation (last visited
Mar. 9, 2013).
523 Lehner, supra note 495, at 198.  “Say a company is polluting—and polluting a lot. R
It’s getting free, or below cost, waste disposal by dumping it for free in our lungs, streams,
or soil.  Chances are, it won’t get caught and if it does, the penalty is unlikely to be as much
as it has saved despite penalty policies that demand recouping the benefit.” Id.
524 See id. at 199–200.  Congress included multiple overlapping enforcement systems to
ensure full protection in the CWA. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1321, 1365 (2006) (codify-
ing said enforcement system mechanisms).
525 A larger enforcement budget is critical, too.  Although agencies may be able to shift
some of their funding from other programs to enforcement, for the most part, enforce-
ment monies must come from Congress.
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despite a surprising amount of activity in the Supreme Court and despite
catastrophic events like Hurricanes Sandy and Katrina and the Deepwater
Horizon blowout.
Although comprehensive legislative reform may be the “first best” strat-
egy for addressing complex, transboundary environmental problems like cli-
mate change, a coordinated package of progressive executive branch actions
can serve as a viable “second best” option.  Just as there is rarely a single
pathway to portage around a logjam in a river, there is no single way to work
around Congress in an effort to solve the nation’s environmental problems.
This Article has singled out three possible avenues to move the environmen-
tal ball forward despite congressional disinterest (or even hostility): invigo-
rating citizens’ petitions for rulemaking; placing greater reliance on
executive orders that prioritize public health and environmental protection;
and stepping up environmental enforcement efforts.  Together, these strate-
gies would help meet the environmental goals of the existing statutory frame-
work—goals that remain relevant and even imperative today—and would
enable policymakers in the executive branch and public interest advocates to
do more than just tread water while they await comprehensive congressional
reforms.
